To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
We trace the evolution of statistics from its origins in the seventeenth century, contrasting twentieth-century data sets and approaches with those seen frequently today. This discussion motivates the approach taken in the book, which focuses on the bias--variance tradeoff as opposed to unbiased estimation, and on finite-sample guarantees as opposed to asymptotics, which can often be misleading in problems whose difficulty is controlled by several parameters. We introduce the decision-theoretic framework that underpins our assessment of the performance of statistical procedures, and discuss the concepts of minimaxity and adaptation. One of our perspectives is to seek to understand the behaviour of methods with respect to as wide a class of data generating mechanisms as possible, and in particular under model misspecification --- where an idealised model that motivates a procedure fails to hold. We discuss the use of the book for teaching and prerequisites for students, concluding with notation used throughout the book.
This Element situates epistemic game theory at the intersection of decision theory, game theory, and interactive epistemology. It provides an overview and a critical assessment of some of the most classical results and contributions in the field: the epistemic characterization of Nash equilibrium, the epistemic interpretation of mixed actions, rationalizability in static games, and sub-game perfect equilibrium in dynamic games. The book furthermore discusses more recent contributions that highlight the importance of correlated beliefs in games, and as well as experimental and empirical findings on higher-order strategic reasoning.
Anthropomorphic learning in behavioural data science refers to a hybrid modelling paradigm that integrates human-centric principles from decision theory with data-driven methodologies of machine learning to simulate, predict and optimise human-like behaviours in artificial systems. This chapter introduces and explores this hybrid approach, examining its theoretical underpinnings, methodological framework and practical applications. Anthropomorphic learning seeks to bridge the normative rigour of decision theory – grounded in models of preference, choice and rationality – with the empirical flexibility of machine learning, particularly in settings marked by uncertainty, complexity and interactivity. The chapter distinguishes anthropomorphic learning from conventional hybrid modelling techniques and critiques its promise through a detailed analysis of recent implementations in user modelling, digital choice architectures and autonomous agent systems. It also discusses its limitations and ethical implications, especially concerning transparency, replicability and human interpretability. By embedding agency, intentionality and bounded rationality into algorithmic structures, anthropomorphic learning represents a compelling frontier for advancing both human-aligned AI and behavioural data science.
We cannot justifably believe that any currently available actions will have a non-negligible positive influence a billion or more years in the future. I offer three arguments for this thesis. According to the Infinite Washout Argument, given the non-zero chance that your actions will produce infinitely many effects, any finite effects will wash out in expectation. According to the Cluelessness Argument, we cannot justifiably guess what actions are likely to have positive effects in a billion-plus years. We cannot be justified, for example, in thinking that nuclear war or human extinction would be more likely to have bad than good consequences that far into the future. According to the Negligibility Argument, even if we could justifiably guess that some particular action is likelier to have good than bad consequences that far in the future, the odds of good consequences would be negligible due to the compounding of probabilities over time.
Not everything we know about numbers can be interpreted as true of what they represent, so this chapter explores how far we can go in applying the numbers to real problems, and how we can be sure they are meaningful.
The people who started decision theory, how they identified the key quantifiable ingredients of good decisions: values, trade-offs and probabilities, then turned this mathematical beginning into the applied discipline of decision analysis.
Rational choice theories belong to the most important building blocks of 20th century economics. Their usefulness to model human behaviour has been extensively debated in modern social science and beyond. While some have argued that rational choice theories should be applied to a broad range of political and social phenomena, the rise of behavioural economics questions whether they are appropriate at all for understanding economic behaviour. Conversations on Rational Choice sheds light on what is actually at stake in these debates. In 23 conversations, some of the most prominent protagonists from economics, psychology, and philosophy discuss their individual perspectives on the nature, possible justifications, and epistemic limitations of rational choice theories. Offering a comprehensive assessment of the value of rational choice theories in producing knowledge in economics, these conversations lay the ground for a more nuanced appraisal of rational choice theories from a practical viewpoint.
In today's data-driven world, this book offers clear, accessible guidance on the logical foundations of optimal decision making. It introduces essential tools for decision analysis and explores psychological theories that explain how people make decisions in both professional and personal contexts. Using real-world examples, the book covers topics such as decision making under uncertainty, decision trees, strategies of risk management, decisions that are gambles, heuristics, trade-offs, decision making under stress, game theory, decision making in a dispute or conflict, and multi-attribute decision analysis. Readers will identify common decision traps and learn how to avoid them, understand the causes of indecisiveness and find out how to deal with it, gain insights into their own decision-making processes, and build confidence in their ability to make and defend informed decisions across a range of scenarios.
Computational neuroimaging is defined broadly as the use of neuroimaging to investigate the localization and representation of parameters in formal mathematical models. We focus upon models of behavior and neural processing that have been adopted widely in behavioral sciences and cognitive neuroscience, including reinforcement learning, predictive coding, decision theory (drift diffusion and evidence accumulation), population receptive field models, and encoding models (including artificial neural networks). The aim is not to explain all the technical details of the various models, but illustrate and discuss the added value of combining such models with neuroimaging.
From Decision Theory to Game Theory shows how the reasoning patterns of common belief in rationality, correct beliefs and symmetric beliefs can be defined in a unified way. It explores the link between decision theory and game theory, particularly how various important classes of games (e.g., games with incomplete information, games with unawareness and psychological games), can be analysed from both a unified decision-theoretic and unified interactive-reasoning perspective. Providing a smooth transition between one-person decision theory and game theory, it views each game as a collection of one-person decision problems – one for every player. Written in a non-technical style, this book includes practical problems and examples from everyday life to make the material more accessible. The book is targeted at a wide audience, including students and scholars from economics, mathematics, business, philosophy, logic, computer science, artificial intelligence, sociology and political science.
We provide a novel but intuitive explanation for expected utility violations found in the Allais paradox: individuals are commonly averse to receiving nothing. We call this phenomenon the zero effect. Our laboratory experiments show support for the zero effect. By contrast, the evidence for the certainty effect is weak to nonexistent.
Azrieli et al. (J Polit Econ, 2018) provide a characterization of incentive compatible payment mechanisms for experiments, assuming subjects’ preferences respect dominance but can have any possible subjective beliefs over random outcomes. If instead we assume subjects view probabilities as objective—for example, when dice or coins are used—then the set of incentive compatible mechanisms may grow. In this paper we show that it does, but the added mechanisms are not widely applicable. As in the subjective-beliefs framework, the only broadly-applicable incentive compatible mechanism (assuming all preferences that respect dominance are admissible) is to pay subjects for one randomly-selected decision.
This paper introduces a mixture model based on the beta distribution, without pre-established means and variances, to analyze a large set of Beauty-Contest data obtained from diverse groups of experiments (Bosch-Domènech et al. 2002). This model gives a better fit of the experimental data, and more precision to the hypothesis that a large proportion of individuals follow a common pattern of reasoning, described as Iterated Best Reply (degenerate), than mixture models based on the normal distribution. The analysis shows that the means of the distributions across the groups of experiments are pretty stable, while the proportions of choices at different levels of reasoning vary across groups.
This chapter overviews three recently developed posterior test statistics for hypothesis testing based on posterior output. These three statistics can be viewed as the posterior version of the trinity of test statistics based on maximum likelihood (ML), namely, the likelihood ratio (LR) test, the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, and the Wald test. The asymptotic distributions of the test statistics are discussed under repeated sampling. Furthermore, based on the Bernstein–von Mises theorem, the equivalence of the confidence interval construction between the set of posterior tests and their frequentist counterparts is developed, giving the posterior tests a frequentist asymptotic justification. The three statistics are applicable to many popular financial econometric models, including asset pricing models,copula models, and so on. Studies based on simulated data and real data in the context of several financial econometric models are carried out to illustrate the finite sample behavior and the usefulness of the test statistics.
Solving a decision theory problem usually involves finding the actions, among a set of possible ones, which optimize the expected reward, while possibly accounting for the uncertainty of the environment. In this paper, we introduce the possibility to encode decision theory problems with Probabilistic Answer Set Programming under the credal semantics via decision atoms and utility attributes. To solve the task, we propose an algorithm based on three layers of Algebraic Model Counting, that we test on several synthetic datasets against an algorithm that adopts answer set enumeration. Empirical results show that our algorithm can manage non-trivial instances of programs in a reasonable amount of time.
Economists have long studied policy choice by social planners aiming to maximize population welfare. Whether performing theoretical studies or applied analyses, researchers have generally assumed that the planner knows enough about the choice environment to be able to determine an optimal action. However, the consequences of decisions are often highly uncertain. Discourse on Social Planning under Uncertainty addresses the failure of research to come to grips with this uncertainty. Combining research across three fields – welfare economics, decision theory, and econometrics – this impressive study offers a comprehensive treatment that fleshes out a 'worldview' and juxtaposes it with other viewpoints. Building on multiple case studies, ranging from medical treatment to climate policy, the book explains analytical methods and how to apply them, providing a foundation on which future interdisciplinary work can build.
In this chapter, we discuss the decision-theoretic framework of statistical estimation and introduce several important examples. Section 28.1 presents the basic elements of statistical experiment and statistical estimation. Section 28.3 introduces the Bayes risk (average-case) and the minimax risk (worst-case) as the respective fundamental limits of statistical estimation in Bayesian and frequentist settings, with the latter being our primary focus in this part. We discuss several versions of the minimax theorem (and prove a simple one) that equates the minimax risk with the worst-case Bayes risk. Two variants are introduced next that extend a basic statistical experiment to either large sample size or large dimension: Section 28.4 on independent observations and Section 28.5 on tensorization of experiments. Throughout this chapter the Gaussian location model (GLM), introduced in Section 28.2, serves as a running example, with different focus at different places (such as the role of loss functions, parameter spaces, low versus high dimensions, etc.). In Section 28.6, we discuss a key result known as Anderson’s lemma for determining the exact minimax risk of (unconstrained) GLM in any dimension for a broad class of loss functions, which provides a benchmark for various more general techniques introduced in later chapters.
A number of mathematical models for overcoming intransitive choice have been proposed and tested in the literature of decision theory. This article presents the development of a new stochastic choice model based on multidimensional scaling. This allows decision-makers to have multiple viewpoints, whereas current multidimensional scaling models are based on the assumption that a subject or group of subjects has only one viewpoint. The implication of our model is that subjects make an intransitive choice because they are able to shift their viewpoint. This paper also presents the maximum likelihood estimation of the proposed model, and reanalyzes Tversky’s gamble experiment data.
We investigate the implications of penalizing incorrect answers to multiple-choice tests, from the perspective of both test-takers and test-makers. To do so, we use a model that combines a well-known item response theory model with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk, Econometrica 47:263–91, 1979). Our results reveal that when test-takers are fully informed of the scoring rule, the use of any penalty has detrimental effects for both test-takers (they are always penalized in excess, particularly those who are risk averse and loss averse) and test-makers (the bias of the estimated scores, as well as the variance and skewness of their distribution, increase as a function of the severity of the penalty).
If a loss function is available specifying the social cost of an error of measurement in the score on a unidimensional test, an asymptotic method, based on item response theory, is developed for optimal test design for a specified target population of examinees. Since in the real world such loss functions are not available, it is more useful to reverse this process; thus a method is developed for finding the loss function for which a given test is an optimally designed test for the target population. An illustrative application is presented for one operational test.