This chapter explores the relationship between migration dynamics, policies and the establishment of oil-based, rentier social contracts in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. Spanning from the 1930s to the present day, the text examines the pivotal role of migration policies in defining the distribution of hydrocarbon rent benefits among Gulf citizens. Notably, it explores how migration policies have created a unique demographic makeup in Gulf populations, marked by a significant dominance of foreign citizens yet with limited socio-political claims.

Fluctuating oil prices influenced the evolution of social contracts and prompted a ‘demographic engineering’ of migrant numbers and diversification by origin. While unemployment emerged among nationals and put Gulf states at risk of political destabilisation after the Arab uprisings, the looming contraction of oil rent compelled the GCC countries to diversify their economies and boost employment for Gulf nationals.

Examining the impact of the COVID-19 crisis and economic downturn, the chapter suggests a deepening of the rift within foreign resident populations. As Gulf regimes must sustain high economic growth rates to create jobs for nationals, they compete to attract and retain increasing numbers of ‘high value-added’ expatriates, through promoting economic inclusion, eroding the kafala and granting limited social rights. Recent social protection measures, however, incurred limited improvements for low-wage ‘detainable and deportable’ workers. The chapter unveils migration policies as a product of ideologies, reflecting conceptions about country, nation, history, origin, people, citizenship and welfare.

In many countries, the idea of minority autonomy is a taboo topic, rejected out of hand as a threat to the state. Yet the desire for some degree of self-government runs deep in many ethnic and religious communities. Some people have suggested that a generalized scheme of decentralization or devolution, understood as a country-wide process that shifts power from the central state to lower levels of government, can de facto enable minority autonomy without invoking any idea of group rights or ethnic autonomy. This chapter argues that this proposal is unlikely to work. Generalized decentralization can be implemented in ways that disempower and fragment minorities, and has often been adopted precisely with this intention. Decentralization is only likely to benefit minorities if and when it is designed with minority aspirations in mind. And this in turn requires that minority aspirations be moved out of the taboo category into the category of normal democratic politics: minority aspirations must be “normalized” and “desecuritized.” This is likely to require changes both in the broader geopolitics of the region and in the local self-understandings of nationhood and peoplehood.

As of yet, there is no political sociology of demography. Although not entirely ignored, demography has not been a central concern or preoccupation for most political sociologists; other topics and themes have more forcefully commanded attention. With some important exceptions, its relationship to states, parties, and movements has rarely been explicitly foregrounded. The same can be said about the relationship between demography and power. But what would a political sociology of demography look like? What kinds of questions and issues could it address? How could it contribute to our understanding of politics and demography, and of the relationship between the two?