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The profession, the legal system and society have all traditionally seen loyalty, confidentiality, care and competence as cornerstones of professional responsibility. Lawyers are in a fiduciary relationship with their clients – clients need to be able to trust their lawyers to provide advice and represent them loyally in the legal system, uninfluenced by any concern other than the client’s interests. We examine lawyers’ general duty of care and competence in Chapter 5 and their obligations to avoid conflicts of interest in Chapter 6 . The topic for this chapter is the duty of confidentiality: the obligation to keep secret all communications made by the client to the lawyer about their affairs and all the information learned about the client directly or indirectly during the professional relationship (subject to various exceptions to be discussed).
This chapter explains how PhD students can use large language models (LLMs) to support research without outsourcing scholarship. It covers practical uses in writing, literature exploration, coding, experiment planning, and self-critique, while emphasizing that you remain responsible for accuracy, reasoning, and originality. The chapter highlights common failure modes such as fabricated citations, confident errors, and overly agreeable “reviews,” and discusses when LLM feedback is helpful versus misleading. It also outlines responsible use, including disclosure norms, bias awareness, and protecting confidential data. The goal is to benefit from speed and breadth while staying intellectually in control.
Chapter two examines why existing corporate law fails to address the social dimensions of corporate decision-making. It focuses on the fiduciary duties of care and oversight, disclosure obligations, and shareholder proposals and engagement. While these doctrines provide broad managerial discretion, they offer little guidance when decisions involve social tradeoffs that cannot be separated from business strategy.
The chapter explains how corporate law was built for an era in which social impacts were treated as externalities to be addressed by regulation. As a result, boards are required to monitor compliance and financial performance but not the social consequences of operational choices.
The chapter also shows why expanding substantive duties is not a solution. Courts lack the institutional capacity to resolve contested social questions. Prescribing outcomes would undermine managerial discretion without improving decision quality.
The core claim is that corporate law contains a governance gap. It authorizes discretion without requiring deliberation when social stakes are high. This gap explains why corporations develop their own governance structures rather than relying on law for guidance. The chapter sets up the need for a procedural approach that focuses on decision-making capacity rather than substantive results.
Chapter seven examines how climate change pushed corporations into governance roles traditionally associated with public institutions. The chapter traces the development of emissions accounting systems and sustainability standards that allow firms to measure and manage climate impact.
The case study focuses on how corporate actors helped create shared metrics and reporting frameworks. These systems enabled firms to translate abstract commitments into operational rules affecting supply chains, investment decisions, and product design.
The chapter shows how executive decision-making was structured through disclosure requirements that exposed tradeoffs and invited scrutiny. Monitoring systems verified implementation and created feedback loops.
The chapter also examines resistance and backlash. Investor disagreement and political polarization exposed the fragility of corporate climate governance. Yet the core accounting frameworks persisted and were later adopted by regulators.
This chapter demonstrates how corporate ordering operates in a global domain characterized by scientific uncertainty and political conflict. It shows why governance capacity matters more than rhetorical ambition and why climate governance depends on institutional design rather than consensus.
Health technology assessment (HTA) informs healthcare policy, reimbursement, and clinical decision making. Transparency in conflict-of-interest (CoI) reporting is critical to ensure the credibility and impartiality of HTA outputs. However, the extent and consistency of CoI disclosures across HTA reports remain unclear.
Objectives
To systematically assess the frequency, form, and comprehensiveness of CoI reporting in published HTA reports and to identify possible patterns.
Methods
We retrieved and screened 1,215 HTA records from the International HTA Database. After exclusions, 689 English-language reports were analyzed (full and mini HTAs (n = 254), rapid reviews (n = 166), and HTA research studies (n = 269)). CoI statements were categorized as positive (declared CoI) or negative (no CoI). Cross-country comparisons and content analyses of positive statements were conducted distinguishing between the presence of disclosure, its content and granularity, and the transparency of conflict management.
Results
CoI statements were present in 71 percent of full/mini HTAs, 60 percent of rapid reviews, and 100 percent of HTA research studies. CoIs were declared in 14, 16, and 83 percent of these categories, respectively. Reporting practices varied widely among agencies, with few providing detailed or standardized disclosures. Financial CoI dominated, while nonfinancial and institutional CoI were less frequently addressed.
Conclusions
CoI reporting in HTA remains inconsistent despite its recognized importance for transparency. Disclosure and management of conflicts represent distinct governance functions, both requiring attention. Our findings highlight a need for harmonized, individual-level disclosure policies, and a description of CoI management strategies in HTA processes.
Recent developments in behavioural public policy emphasise the potential of transparent nudging interventions, such as nudge+ or boosts, to engage people with their decisions. However, the current state of research on transparent nudging is fraught with methodological critiques, and only a handful of studies examine differences between types of transparency messages or ‘disclosures’. Using a vignette survey experiment (n = 1916), we measure the influence of transparency, operationalised through different types of disclosures, on both the effectiveness of the nudging technique and the perceived autonomy of those subjected to the nudge. We employ a salience nudge to promote sustainable food choices and present four different disclosures. Results indicate that, while the nudge proved effective in promoting sustainable food choices, the disclosures neither enhanced nor reduced its effectiveness. At the same time, the nudge led to a small but significant decrease in perceived autonomy, which the disclosures did not offset. Overall, differences between the types of disclosures were not substantial enough to yield significant effects in either behavioural outcomes or perceived autonomy. These findings suggest that while disclosures can be applied to increase transparency without compromising nudge effectiveness, they are not sufficient to mitigate concerns about autonomy in nudging interventions.
Poor public understanding of artificial intelligence (AI) systems has become a matter of acute concern. Even when lacking expert technical knowledge, there are good democratic, economic and other societal reasons for ensuring that the public right to know operates effectively in the AI era. Yet, the trade-secret claims of AI providers and deployers are widely seen as a potential barrier to information disclosure rights and duties, which has provoked calls for areas of significant public interest to be carved out from the protections of trade-secrets law. Such transparency carve-outs are, however, likely to lead to uncertainty, over-inclusion and ineffectiveness. In this article, we argue that the dynamic, public-driven character of the right to know can be better secured through third-party participation and public-interest stewardship innovations in AI transparency.
This introduction situates the volume within contemporary debates surrounding Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG). It traces the historical evolution of the ESG movement—originally conceived as a voluntary form of regulation—from its origins in the early 2000s, associated with the launch of the UN’s Who Cares Wins initiative, to current developments marked by political backlash in the United States and regulatory consolidation in Europe. The authors argue that the widespread tendency to reduce ESG to issues of financial materiality—a view they describe as “mainstream ESG”—risks undermining its ethical and social foundations. Against this backdrop, the book advances the claim that ESG cannot be meaningfully developed without serious ethical reflection. The second part of the introduction presents the chapters included in this collection along three main lines: debates about the purpose(s) of ESG; discussions concerning the tensions between profitability and sustainability; and analyses of ESG as a form of voluntary or mandatory disclosure.
Edited by
Filipe Calvão, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva,Matthieu Bolay, University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western Switzerland,Elizabeth Ferry, Brandeis University, Massachusetts
The Introduction locates transparency in the global governance of agriculture and mineral supply chains. It proposes an analytical focus on the mediations of transparency to tackle the paradox of transparency, a process of mediation that incorrectly understands itself to be a process of disintermediation. This helps to investigate transparency beyond the normative and substantive assessment of its implementation. Rather than assuming that transparency is itself transparent, we ask: What are the technological practices, material qualities, and institutional standards producing transparency? How is transparency standardized, regimented by “ethical” and “responsible” businesses, or valued by traders and investors, from auction rooms to sustainability reports? Acknowledging that transparency is a global value, we question how transparency projects materially organize and semiotically regiment the global production and circulation of commodities across local settings. Focusing on moments and processes of mediation toward disclosure, immediacy, trust, and truth, we introduce how the chapters render transparency observable across sites, actors, institutions, and technologies.
On 24 May 2024, member states of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) adopted the Treaty on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge. Mandating that contracting parties require that patent applicants disclose any genetic resources or associated traditional knowledge that their invention is based on, the treaty has been hailed as historic triumph. In this article, we analyze whether the treaty is so remarkable in relation to Aotearoa New Zealand’s existing law and practice. Finding that it is not, and that the treaty could place limits on the law, we argue that Aotearoa New Zealand should not sign the Treaty but could learn from it. We conclude that, while Aotearoa New Zealand must continue to partake in any ongoing international negotiations, it should continue to find ways to address the domestic situation.
The social demand of transparency in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) has increased. This is due to their social and economic impact and the incidences of fraudulent behavior by some international NGOs managers. In this regard, an improved and abundant dissemination of information by NGO is essential. The Internet is considered a strategic communication tool in such dissemination. Following an explanatory research line, this article aims to identify the influence of the factors “organizational size”, “organizational age”, “public funding”, “legal form”, “internationalization”, “board size”, and “board activity” in the dissemination of web page information. The results show that only the factors of “organizational size”, “public funding,” and “organizational age” are statistically significant.
This article examines the charity financial reporting regimes of three common law jurisdictions: Ireland, the UK and the US. It assesses whether these respective disclosure models improve either nonprofit behaviour or enforcement odds. Three core aspects of the regimes are reviewed: the reliability of the disclosed information, the consistency of such information and its ability to facilitate comparison between charities, and the level of enforcement arising from disclosure. Particular attention is paid to oversight mechanisms, including audits, and their rates of effectiveness in the regulation of charities. The article examines ongoing efforts to reform broader international accounting standards and considers the impact such moves are likely to have at both regional and national level for charity accountability. It concludes that given the markedly different spheres in which for-profits and nonprofits operate, care should be taken in modelling charity disclosure regimes on those developed for for-profit entities.
In recent years, new forms of investment have been created to direct funds towards companies performing well according to predefined environmental, social, and governance (ESG) indicators. This volume addresses moral, political, and legal questions about the legitimacy of ESG as a management and investment strategy. Some chapters argue that ESG strategies should focus on creating real-life impacts on morally significant problems, such as climate change, human rights violations, and corporate corruption. Other chapters instead examine the possibility that the long-term feasibility of ESG limits its moral ambitions, requiring ESG to be regarded as only a set of devices for minimizing risk in a way that protects financial gain. The book contributes a much-needed understanding of ethical interpretations of the ESG movement, which are likely to drive future social, political and legal developments.
There are three ways of becoming a shareholder: by subscribing to a new issue of shares in a company; by purchasing shares from an existing shareholder; or by transmission of ownership in shares due to the operation of law (for example, where shares are transferred to the beneficiary under a will). In this chapter, we focus on the first method: the issuing of shares and securities as a means of fundraising, commonly referred to as ‘raising capital’ or ‘equity raising’. The term ‘subscription’ describes the relationship where a company issues shares directly to a shareholder. The legal relationship between the company that issues and the shareholder who subscribes for new shares can be analysed using the contractual rules of offer and acceptance.
Our primary focus in this chapter is the issue of securities by public companies. Generally speaking, only public companies are permitted to raise capital by issuing securities to a broad cross-section of the public.
First, this chapter canvasses the history of the fiduciary obligation as it applies to the director–company relationship. The fiduciary obligation includes two duties: a duty of loyalty and a duty to account for benefits gained—more informally termed the ‘no conflict’ and ‘no profit’ rules. This chapter then discusses examples of the ‘no conflict’ and ‘no profit’ rules from case law, and the modern exceptions to this general principle on the basis of commercial realities, such as the business opportunity rule. It then considers ss 182–3 of the Corporations Act which deal with a director’s misuse of information or position to gain an advantage for themselves or others, or to cause detriment to the company. While there is a clear relationship between these sections and the ‘no profit’ rule, they have developed differently since enactment as legislative provisions. This chapter then considers the requirements for directors to disclose their material personal interests under ss 191–195, and the inconsistent treatment of the disclosure requirements with the ability of a fiduciary to seek the fully informed consent of the company in general meeting. Finally, this chapter considers the protection afforded to members of a public company under ch 2E of the Corporations Act for related party transactions.
As discussed in earlier chapters, a company has the legal powers and capacity of an individual, in addition to any specific powers conferred by law. The two key decision-making organs that can act as the company in exercising these powers are the board of directors and the members in general meeting. The general law and Corporations Act divide the company’s powers and responsibilities between these two groups. This chapter discusses this division of powers. It also discusses how meetings of members and directors are held, and the requirements on companies to prepare and disclose key information, including financial reports.
In this chapter of Complex Ethics Consultations: Cases that Haunt Us, the author describes a case wherein surgical instruments were reused after a prion disease case at a time when the protocol would have been to discard them. Given that there are no interventions available for this prion disease questions arose regarding disclosure, in particular when it would be required and who would be in a position to provide that disclosure.
The chapters in this Part VII of Complex Ethics Consultations: Cases that Haunt Us are a powerful reminder that healthcare ethics consultation does not involve clinical ethics consultation alone. Organizational ethics issues can also weigh heavily on healthcare providers causing deep moral distress. The four chapters in this section reinforce enduring themes, but time and experience allow a reexamination. The first theme is the lesson of truth-telling, error disclosure, and organizational responsibility. The second is the importance of transparency in organizational decision making along with the importance of communication and coordination of care. These themes are explored in the part they played in real cases, looking at the lessons they teach; current dilemmas; the role of diversity, equity, and inclusion; and finally, the meanings for future practices. As the field of ethics consultation progresses, so too will moral distress and the need for the profession to protect its practitioners, as well as the ethicists to emotionally protect themselves. The successful future practice of ethics consultation depends on it.
This chapter examines the ability to obtain government information through the operation of freedom of information legislation in relation to AI data in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation provides a potential avenue of obtaining crucial information about the software used to automate decisions, the circumstances in which it was created or purchased, the materials that were used to train it, and any tests run to gauge its accuracy.
We experimentally study competitive markets with socially responsible production. Our main focus is on the producers’ decision whether or not to reveal the degree of social responsibility of their product. Compared to two benchmark cases where either full transparency is enforced or no disclosure is possible, we show that voluntary and costless disclosure comes close to the full transparency benchmark. However, when the informational content of disclosure is imperfect, social responsibility in the market is significantly lower than under full transparency. Our results highlight an important role for transparent and standardized information about social externalities.