The article examines the judgments of the Court of Justice’s Second and Third Chambers in the case ClientEarth v EIB, in which it considered, for the first time, the applicability of the Aarhus Convention in the context of a financial institution. After providing a brief account of the Court’s reasoning, the article outlines the broader implications of the case for future internal review requests and climate litigation before the Court of Justice. Building on this analysis, it considers how the Court’s interpretative line may extend to other EU institutions, in particular the European Central Bank. The judgment notably points to the need for enhanced transparency regarding the evidence underpinning policies and measures with an environmental impact. It further invites closer reflection on the central role of robust climate-related data.

Since its ruling on the Maastricht Treaty, the German Federal Constitutional Court has developed a doctrine that elevates the fundamental constitutional principles in conjunction with the right to vote to the status of a ‘right to democracy’. In this Article, we explore how plaintiffs draw on the right to democracy in an effort to activate the Court’s self-asserted prerogative of ultra vires and identity review and keep Karlsruhe in the game of adjudicating on the conditions and boundaries of European integration. We assume that the legal opportunities associated with constitutional complaints invoking the right to democracy involve a dynamic, interdependent relationship where (the same) plaintiffs build on existing case law to develop legal arguments and where the Court evaluates, refines and codifies these arguments. To substantiate this interactive process of an expansion of legal opportunities, we draw on a largely untapped data source and use the original pleadings in four cases against the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Central Bank, linking these complaints to the respective court decisions.

The balance sheet of the ECB expanded greatly after the Great Crisis of 2007-9, similarly to other core central banks, but this development does not signify the adoption of a new ‘interventionist’ stance. The expansion of the balance sheet by core central banks reflects a profound change in the framework of monetary policy responding to pressures generated during and after the Crisis. In the case of the ECB, however, the expansion also resulted from attempting to cover the cracks of the fragmented European money market to protect the euro. This fragmentation persists and concern about the euro continues to shape ECB policy. The resurgence of inflation since 2022 led the ECB to contract its balance sheet, again similarly to other central banks, making a new framework necessary for monetary policy. But it is not clear what that would be, given the fragmented European money market. The monetary policy of the ECB is in a quandary reflecting the structural deficiencies of the Eurozone.

There is little doubt that the European Central Bank (ECB), and in particular its presidency, has taken the lead in tackling the euro crisis. But can this leadership be also characterised as charismatic? This article answers the question by focusing on language – a key component as well as a reliable indicator of charisma. By means of a software‐assisted content analysis of the entire corpus of ECB presidential speeches, it is found that the crisis has indeed led to the emergence of the Bank's presidency as a charismatic euro leader. This in turn confirms the recent politicisation of the ECB, but at the same time might be seen as mitigating the problems related to the Bank's democratic deficit, to the extent that charisma can be seen, from a Weberian standpoint, as an alternative source of political legitimacy.

Parliamentary questions are an essential tool of legislative oversight. However, the extent to which they are effective in controlling the executive remains underspecified both theoretically and methodologically. This article advances a systematic framework for evaluating the effectiveness of parliamentary questions drawing on principal–agent theory, the public administration literature on accountability and communication research. The framework is called the ‘Q&A approach to legislative oversight’ based on the premise that the study of parliamentary questions (Q) needs to be linked to their respective answers (A) and examined together (Q&A) at the micro‐level as an exchange of claims between legislative and executive actors. Methodologically, the Q&A approach to legislative oversight offers a step‐by‐step guide for qualitative content analysis of Q&A that can be applied to different legislative oversight contexts at different levels of governance. It is argued that the effectiveness of Q&A depends on the strength of the questions asked and the responsiveness of answers provided, which are correspondingly operationalised. To illustrate the merits of the approach, the article includes a systematic case study on the relationship between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in banking supervision (2013–2018), showing the connection between specific institutional settings and the effectiveness of parliamentary questions.

This article investigates the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) in transferring financial and moral responsibility for the Eurozone crisis from the private to the public sector. Focusing on Greece, I argue that the ECB constructed the morality of the public debtor in such a way as to make this transfer of responsibility easier and the imposition of austerity measures justifiable. This in part relied on a shift in the ECB's discourse, which came to define the crisis exclusively in terms of public sector responsibility. However, the ECB also employed a range of non-linguistic policy measures aimed at intervening in the crisis. To interpret these measures I draw on Deleuze and Guattari's concept of ‘machinic enslavement’, arguing that the ECB contributed to the Greek crisis not only by defining it discursively but also by reshaping the country's financial infrastructure in crucial ways.

The ECB has two mandates its primary and secondary mandate. Its primary mandate has been the focus of many discussions but its secondary mandate is less frequently discussed. Nevertheless this mandate has important objectives and should not be considered obsolete. This article examines the legal status of the secondary mandate of the ECB with regard to climate change. In particular this article will consider the role of the secondary mandate with regard to the Digital Euro and energy targets. The Digital Euro can be used as a monetary tool and improve payment systems. However, depending on its design the Digital Euro can use a considerable amount of energy. This article concludes that if the design of the Digital Euro does not impact the monetary objectives, the secondary mandate of the ECB determines the design of the Digital Euro.

This article focuses on the correlation between the secondary objectives of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the right to a healthy environment. Whereas the primary mandate of the ECB is maintaining price stability, the applicable law also envisages secondary objectives, such as supporting economic growth and sustainable development. Crucially, however, there is an emerging scientific literature suggesting a trade-off between economic growth and environmental sustainability. This results in a balancing problem: To what extent environmental protection and sustainability can be balanced with economic growth within the ECB’s monetary policy? This article aims to analyse this issue with a specific focus on legal implications in terms of the right to a healthy environment. This study reveals the failure of the member states to comply with the international obligations under the right to a healthy environment in shaping the law of the ECB.

Today’s central banks wield extraordinary powers, both monetary and regulatory, and with a capacity to substitute for elected governments tempted to pass the buck. Debates about central banking’s powers and legitimacy barely touch, however, on whether and how monetary independence fits with the values that drive constitutionalism. It turns out that, for modern economies using fiat money, independence is a corollary of the higher level separation of (fiscal) powers between the legislative and executive branches. Even though independence is necessary, it needs to be carefully constrained by a “money-credit constitution.” Those general arguments, applicable in liberal democracies, do not carry across cleanly to the euro area. A principled case can be made for the ECB’s mandate being specially tight, but that is in tension with its de facto role as the emergency economic actor for the euro area. Facing up to that will be necessary sooner or later.

Recent discussions of accountability in contexts of expert knowledge raise questions about the limits of transparency. Against this background, we discuss the nexus between expert knowledge and meaningful accountability – that is, context-sensitive accountability based on a genuine understanding of a situation. We argue that the concentration of expertise in certain institutions makes it difficult to hold those institutions accountable. In particular, three components challenge meaningful accountability: specialization, inaccessibility and potential biases or conflict of interest. We emphasize the role of ‘epistemic communities’ and their impact on the tension between expert knowledge and independence. Drawing on the deliberative systems literature, we discuss how expert knowledge might be communicated to outsiders to enable meaningful accountability. To illustrate our argument, we draw on the European Central Bank, a case study in which states have chosen a delegation design characterized by a high degree of independence and trust in expert knowledge, to the detriment of accountability. We sketch possible avenues for creating the conditions for meaningful accountability even in the case of institutions with highly concentrated expertise.

The article explores the understandings of democracy underlying the judgment and its implications for the democratization of Europe. I read the judgement, critically, as impediment and, constructively, as impetus for the democratization of money and society. Firstly, I recount how the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) through the construction of a “right to democracy” and the concepts of “ultra vires act” and “integration responsibility” asserted its jurisdiction over the limits of European integration. The court’s reasoning prompts me to understand the judgment not as a defense of democracy, but rather as an instance of upholding a “rule of law” that impedes the democratization of society. Secondly, I turn to the pronouncements on the demarcation of monetary from economic competences by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the FCC. I explain what I hold to be the weaknesses in the FCC’s critique of the CJEU from a doctrinal perspective. I then propose to read the PSPP judgment constructively as introducing a procedural requirement that may democratize monetary policy. Thirdly, I situate my reading of the judgment in the larger debate on the democratization of society and, more specifically, money.