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Following Argentina’s 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands, the United Kingdom dispatched a naval task force and engaged in weeks of intensive international negotiations. Yet, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher steadfastly refused to compromise on her core demand for a complete Argentine withdrawal prior to any sovereignty discussions, fully expecting the military junta to reject these terms. This chapter analyzes the conflict as a prime historical example of “insincere coercion” utilized to mobilize the support of a critical ally. To mount a successful brute force campaign 8,000 miles from home, the British military required diplomatic, intelligence, and military assistance from the United States. By participating in multiple peace initiatives brokered by US Secretary of State Alexander Haig and the United Nations, the UK bought precious time for its fleet to deploy while portraying Argentina as the intransigent party. Ultimately, this calculated failure of coercive diplomacy succeeded in its strategic objective: convincing the Reagan administration to abandon neutrality, thereby securing the vital American backing required for British victory.
Army chaplaincy was prone to provoke controversy. In the increasingly secular, pacifistic and multimedia context of the late twentieth century it was particularly vulnerable to hostile criticism, not least in the sending Churches. Even in the 1950s, though, it had its detractors. These were years in which the RAChD was laden with starchy veterans of the Second World War (who could relate poorly to National Servicemen); notably preoccupied with sex; and hampered by the Churches’ tendency to offload their delinquent clergy onto the Army. If National Service coloured negative stereotypes of chaplaincy over subsequent decades, media power and the dramatic circumstances of the Falklands War created a national celebrity in the form of David Cooper, chaplain of 2 PARA. In the 1990s, however, and lacking an equivalent stage, chaplaincy faded into the background, returning to the fore in the War on Terror, during which media portrayals of chaplaincy were once again usually favourable. Nevertheless, the findings of the Baha Mousa Inquiry of 2011 proved a serious embarrassment, reigniting charges of ‘role tension’ and ‘role conflict’ and highlighting the precarious nature of chaplaincy’s wider image.
Wartime leaders need to carry their armies and sometimes their nations through trying ordeals. Accordingly, there are occasions that call for effective rhetoric. This section consists of fourteen speeches during wartime or in the face of impending war. The speakers include Shakespeares Henry V, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Neville Chamberlain, Duff Cooper, Winston Churchill, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and George W. Bush.
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