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This chapter begins with a discussion of the objectives that states try to achieve in their relationships of threat and support, and then develops the theoretical framework regarding the network coevolution of enmity and amity. It considers why states form supportive relationships in the shadow of looming interstate and intrastatesecurity threats. It then posits the conditions in which the interplay of the intergroup and intragroup security dilemmas leads to coercion and subversion as rival states pursue wedge strategies and supporting states pursue control strategies. The argument focuses on interest congruence in a state’s support group as a key factor driving the use of wedge and control strategies. The arguments presented in this chapter form the basis for the hypotheses that are explored in the subsequent chapters.
This chapter explores further the mixed blessings of security assistance from the standpoint of conflict management in civil wars. In some cases, the constellation of pressures from external supporters nudges states toward negotiation, especially mediation; in other cases, the external pressure nudges states away from negotiation. The results reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between the congruence within a state's support group and the propensity for mediation. Moreover, strong states appear less responsive to the characteristics of their support groups and also generally less interested in mediation. States facing more security threats also appear less responsive but also more interested in negotiation across the board. The key cases at the end of the Cold War, especially the Southern Africa case, further reveal the importance for peacemakers to account for the embedded nature of a given conflict in wider webs of enmity and amity.
This chapter examines the arguments regarding variation in the outcomes pertaining to interstate threat and intrastate conflict. The results show that states with strong but incongruent support groups are more prone to experience interstate threat and the escalation of civil war, as rivals attempt wedge strategies and supporters attempt control strategies. Additional analyses find that states which are caught in the midst of stark intergroup rivalries are more likely to experience aggressive wedge strategies before they further tighten their support relationships. The twilight of the Cold War, and especially the evolution of the Central American case, further demonstrates the roles that security assistance can play in igniting and sustaining proxy wars.
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