Ce commentaire s’intéresse à la façon dont les traités relatifs aux changements climatiques ont été interprétés par la Cour internationale de Justice dans son avis consultatif du 23 juillet 2025 sur les obligations des États en matière de changement climatique. Il examine plus spécifiquement comment la Cour a exercé son office lorsqu’elle a dû interpréter des dispositions particulièrement ambigües de l’Accord de Paris et met en lumière les interrogations que certains passages de l’avis consultatif soulèvent à cet égard. Ce commentaire suggère que, dans le cadre de son interprétation, la Cour semble parfois avoir simplifié — peut-être même sans en avoir véritablement conscience — le sens que les rédacteurs de l’Accord de Paris avaient entendu attribuer à certaines dispositions de ce traité.

Focusing on the UK-Mauritius Chagos Agreement, this article maps the normative effects of advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). At a time when the advisory function of international courts is resorted to more frequently than ever before, a better understanding of the effects of advisory opinions is needed. ICJ advisory opinions are formally non-binding. As this article argues, however, their normative effects cannot be captured by their non-binding character, or the common understanding that they merely constitute “advice” to the requesting body. Rather, their normativity, as judicial pronouncements that state the law, can be felt across the international legal order, within and outwith the UN system, and in different judicial and non-judicial fora.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ, the Court) increasingly addresses major regional and global conflicts and crises. In contentious proceedings, its limited jurisdiction—regarding both subject-matter and matters affecting third States—often confines the Court to examining a small portion of the actual dispute between the parties. In advisory proceedings, by contrast, the Court faces no such constraints when determining the legal positions of individual States. This article argues that legal determinations made in advisory opinions can, in principle, be relied on as ‘givens’ in subsequent contentious proceedings where the Court would otherwise be prevented from making such determinations. The Court’s advisory and contentious jurisdictions are both built on consent, which is required to protect States’ sovereignty from exercises of the Court’s authority. If the Court exercises its authority in an advisory opinion by determining the legal position of a State, it removes sovereignty concerns regarding this determination for subsequent contentious proceedings. The significant practical challenges in relying on legal determinations from advisory opinions as ‘givens’ are most likely to be overcome in relation to determinations of status, rather than for establishing specific internationally wrongful acts. ‘Givens’ from advisory opinions are thus not a general workaround to the limitations in the ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction. Still, relying on determinations from advisory opinions in subsequent contentious proceedings invites the Court to enter into an intricate dialogue between its two forms of jurisdiction, a dialogue which may further intertwine them and thereby enhance coherence in the ICJ’s exercise of its judicial function.

This article studies how the International Court of Justice handled disputes on decolonization through the jurisprudence of Judge Wellington Koo of China. The Court served as a space for ongoing decolonization contestations and as a venue of last resort for those dissatisfied with how the end of imperial rule unfolded. A former statesman, Koo brought to the bench not only his expertise in international law, but also his political experience in shaping the postwar international order. The article follows the perspective of a judge who was himself often discontented, specifically with the Court—he often found himself writing either separate or dissenting opinions—but also with decolonization at large. It does so through examining a series of “edge cases,” ranging from Cambodia to South West Africa, that did not fit neatly with how the UN envisaged decolonization would manifest into discrete nation-states. This article argues that Court had an aversion to these exceptions and refrained from ruling in a way that would disrupt the dominant mode of decolonization. At the same time, looking at how Koo approached these “edge cases” shows how actors viewed the possibilities of decolonizing international law and the uneven legacy that the Court left for the international system.

Since the beginning of Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023, a rich body of legal scholarship has tackled various legal issues arising from Israel’s overall military conduct. One issue that has received very little attention is Israel’s destruction of Palestinian cultural heritage. In this article, I demonstrate how Israel’s systematic destruction of Gaza’s cultural heritage has been facilitated through reliance on sources and language of law. Considering this unprecedented level of destruction, I examine the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in applying protection and accountability measures in response to the ongoing destruction of Palestinian heritage. I suggest that these three organizations provide the State of Palestine with an entry point to demand recognition, protection, and accountability for the destruction of this heritage. Rather than approaching each organization as an end in itself, I propose engaging with the three organizations simultaneously as tools to be utilized.

Treaties are the most visible, some would even say the ‘main source of international law’. This is true not only at the global level, but even more so in Europe. However, these treaties hardly explain the idiosyncratic, sometimes exceptionalist ways in which international law is identified, interpreted, and applied in this region. Still less do they explain the disproportionate normative influence of European legal rules outside Europe. Attributing these particularities and imbalances to ‘eurocentrism’ in international law is considered almost a truism these days. Yet, when examining how the European legal tradition translates into positive international law one category of rules has received little attention so far: the unwritten European rules that are resorted to within and beyond Europe. The idea of ‘unwritten’ European rules is not only historically charged but also conceptually vague. However, this article argues that a close analysis of their role is central to both understanding and overcoming the persistence of ‘eurocentrism’ in international law. To demonstrate this claim, the article introduces the term ‘unwritten’ European rules in international law. A historical section illustrates their ambivalent role since the beginning of the nineteenth century. It then analyses the continuing relevance of unwritten European rules in contemporary legal practice. The final section discusses how a common framework of secondary rules can help to distinguish between hegemonic and integrative uses of unwritten European rules, before concluding.

This article critically examines the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) ruling on the preliminary objections in Sudan v. United Arab Emirates, focusing on the implications of the UAE’s reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention. It evaluates the Court’s interpretation of the scope and effect of such reservations, contrasting it with precedents set in Bosnia v. Serbia and The Gambia v. Myanmar. Drawing on the ICJ’s jurisprudence, principles of state responsibility, and international criminal law, the article highlights significant tensions and ambiguities in the Court’s approach to admissibility, complicity, and provisional measures. The study incorporates insights from the International Criminal Court and UN Human Rights Council resolutions to contextualise the legal and factual matrix. Ultimately, it argues for a more coherent doctrinal framework to address the impact of reservations on treaty obligations and jurisdictional competence in genocide-related disputes.

International Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Judicial role — Disputes — Agreement between Parties — Whether absence of a dispute — Role of the Court in determining whether a dispute existed — Whether Court entitled to decline to give judgment — Claims and counter-claims — Whether lacking object — Parties’ positions converging during hearing — Admissibility

Rivers — International watercourses — Use of waters — River Silala flowing from Bolivia to Chile — Chile’s claims concerning status and use of waters of the Silala — Whether the Silala an international watercourse — Whether Parties’ positions converging during the proceedings — Whether Chile’s claim being without object — Whether Chile being entitled to equitable and reasonable utilization of waters of the Silala — Whether Chile’s claim without object — Whether Chile being entitled to its current use of waters of the Silala — Whether Parties’ positions converging during the proceedings — Whether Chile’s claim being without object — Whether Bolivia having obligation to notify and consult in regard to measures likely to have adverse effect on Silala — Obligation to control and prevent activities likely to cause environmental harm — Whether Bolivia complying with obligation to notify and consult — Applicable law — Whether obligation to notify and consult existing as matter of customary international law — Appropriate standard — Whether “significant harm” being different from “significant adverse effects” — Whether Bolivia satisfying threshold to comply with obligation to notify and consult

International Court of Justice — Provisional measures — Alleged violations of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948 — Prima facie jurisdiction — Whether a dispute between the Parties — Exchanges in multilateral fora — Whether Israel’s acts falling within scope of Genocide Convention — Whether Israel’s acts being governed by international humanitarian law — Standing — Obligations erga omnes partes — Plausibility — Whether South Africa’s claimed rights existing under international law — Whether Israel’s acts carried out with requisite intent — Link — Real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice — Vulnerability of civilians — Reports of United Nations agencies on Gaza — Whether steps taken by Israel removing risk of irreparable prejudice — Measures to be adopted — Power to indicate measures different in whole or in part from those requested — Binding character of measures indicated

International Court of Justice — Modification of provisional measures — Whether there being change in the situation — Whether change in the situation justifying modification of provisional measures — Prima facie jurisdiction affirmed — Plausibility affirmed — Real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice — Starvation of civilians — Provision of humanitarian assistance — Whether Israel doing enough to prevent irreparable prejudice — Measures to be adopted — Power to indicate measures different in whole or in part from those requested — Binding character of measures indicated

International Court of Justice — Modification of provisional measures — Whether there being change in the situation — Whether change in the situation justifying modification of provisional measures — Whether military incursion into Rafah being a change in the situation — Prima facie jurisdiction affirmed — Plausibility affirmed — Real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice — Power to indicate measures different in whole or in part from those requested — Whether provisional measures already indicated covering the situation in Rafah — Binding character of measures indicated

Canada has had a meaningful impact on international law through its participation in the development of the case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Several arbitral awards involving Canada, even before the establishment of the ICJ’s predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, were instrumental in shaping subsequent jurisprudence in different areas of international law. Canada’s participation in proceedings before the Court, as a party and intervener in contentious cases and as a participant in advisory proceedings, has been rich in legal arguments on fundamental issues, such as the functioning of the United Nations, the ICJ’s jurisdiction, the law of the sea, environmental law, and the law of state responsibility. Perhaps even more significantly, the activities and statements made by Canada’s courts, executive, and legislature are frequently relied-upon examples of state practice in pleadings before the Court. Finally, although Canada has had only one elected judge on the bench of the ICJ, Canadian jurists have frequently served as judges ad hoc and as counsel and advocates for states.

On 28 August 2023, Canada amended and substantially narrowed its unilateral declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The combined effects of its various reservations — notably, Canada’s new requirement that states must have provided at least six-month advance written notice before instituting ICJ proceedings against it, coupled with its ongoing rights to amend or terminate its declaration with immediate effect — have now rendered Canadian acceptance of Optional Clause jurisdiction compulsory in name only. Canada now appears to control whether any future ICJ cases can ever be brought against it in this way.

Le 8 juin 2023, le Canada et les Pays-Bas ont saisi la Cour internationale de justice (CIJ) pour des violations de la 1984 Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants attribuées à l’État syrien. À cette situation étatique, souvent décrite comme une zone où le droit et la justice n’avaient pas leur place, se superposent ainsi de premiers efforts pour que l’État rende des comptes. Au-delà de la possibilité dont dispose la Cour internationale de Justice (CIJ), en tant que visage institutionnel de la responsabilité étatique, de réduire ici le “fossé d’impunité,” cette affaire met également en lumière la tension existante entre deux visions opposées du droit international (“universaliste” et “souverainiste”) qui sont appelées à coexister dans le cadre de la lutte contre l’impunité. Bien que cette affaire, s’inscrivant dans une lignée jurisprudentielle favorable à l’élargissement de la fonction judiciaire de la CIJ, confirme la proximité avec le modèle “universaliste” eu égard à l’extension du locus standi devant son prétoire et à l’évolution de son mandat pour embrasser les contextes gouvernés par des violations massives des droits de la personne, il ne faudrait pas en déduire que le paradigme “souverainiste” a été effacé et remplacé.

The 2025 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change constitutes a diligent and reasoned exposition of the main bodies of international law on climate change. The Court read this law harmoniously and clearly identified States’ obligations as well as the legal consequences of breach. Under both treaty and customary international law, States must act with due diligence and do their utmost to mitigate climate change, including through action on fossil fuel production and consumption. The Court confirmed that the law of State responsibility applies if States fail to fulfil their obligations, and sketches a pathway for establishing causation of harm that would become relevant if reparation were sought.

This article examines the key dimensions of the Advisory Opinion, including the applicable law identified by the Court and its analysis of State responsibility, informing readers of the Court’s main findings and their consequences. It also puts forward a few reflections, including on the Advisory Opinion’s emphasis on international cooperation and finance flows, the Court’s views on sea-level rise and self-determination, the role of science in the Advisory Opinion and what the Court left for the future.