This chapter introduces the final of four explanations for insincere coercion: restoring deterrence. Analyzing the 2006 Second Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah, the chapter explains why a coercer might deliberately continue to inflict punishment even after it becomes clear the target will not concede. Though Hezbollah is not a state actor, it has many of its attributes, and this chapter expands the scope conditions to test a theory of insincere coercion. In the conflict, after initial airstrikes failed to compel Hezbollah to release Israeli hostages or cease rocket fire, Israel instituted a punishment strategy by targeting the homes of Hezbollah members and supporters. Although this massive destruction did not resolve the immediate crisis through coercion, it served a broader strategic purpose: altering Hezbollah’s calculus for future conflicts. By imposing higher-than-anticipated costs, Israel successfully increased Hezbollah’s expected price for initiating subsequent crises. The chapter also utilizes a formal deterrence model to demonstrate how a punishment strategy impacts the probability of maintaining long-term peace. Ultimately, the case illustrates how intentional coercion failure and sustained punishment can restore deterrence, in the case of Hezbollah, leading to fifteen years of quiet along the Israel–Lebanon border.

This chapter explores feminist International Relations (IR) theory and its application to the Middle East, demonstrating how gendered power dynamics shape the region's international politics. Feminist IR challenges traditional IR theories by foregrounding gender as a fundamental category of analysis, revealing how hierarchical constructions of masculinity and femininity underpin state behaviour, security policies, and other global processes. The chapter examines key strands of feminist IR, including liberal, critical, poststructuralist, postcolonial, and queer feminist theories, emphasising their respective contributions to understanding the significance of gender, as well as race and sexuality, in global politics. Through a case study of Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip, still ongoing at the time of writing despite an announced ceasefire in October 2025, the chapter highlights the gendered dimensions of settler colonialism, militarism, and genocide. It interrogates how gendered and racialised discourses normalise violence and explores the war’s devastating impacts on women, social reproduction, and human security. The chapter critiques the complicity of colonial feminism in perpetuating oppression and underscores Palestinian women’s resistance. The chapter concludes by highlighting the role of feminist IR in offering pathways towards more just and inclusive international relations.

Liberalism is a foundational school of thought in International Relations with a well-established and rich intellectual heritage dating back to the seventeenth century. It seeks to address core problems in world politics, including the appropriate scope of state authority, the conditions underpinning international cooperation, and the maintenance of international stability. With liberal scholars most notably contributing to debates on the causes and limits of cooperation. Liberal scholars have made their most influential contributions by examining questions such as what enables or constrains cooperation between states, with many claiming that political, economic, and social integration between states leads to more peace and less war. However, liberalism emerged from Western historical and philosophical contexts, and while liberal scholars claim that it is universally applicable, its assumptions can be criticised for not reflecting non-Western experiences. This chapter evaluates liberalism’s applicability to the Middle East by applying liberal theory to the analysis of cosmopolitan law, examining in particular the impact of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) on interstate relations. Thus, it applies liberalism to answer the following questions: do SEZs lead to greater economic integration between states in the Middle East? And is there any observable pacifying effect on political relations between trade partners?

This chapter maps the background conditions that set India, Brazil, and Israel on a collision course between apex courts and elected branches. It first surveys court design and doctrinal evolution: India’s Supreme Court (PIL, basic-structure review, collegium, proportionality); Israel’s Supreme Court (abolition of standing/justiciability limits, reasonableness/proportionality, constitutional review via Basic Laws and – recently – striking down even Basic Laws); and Brazil’s Supreme Court (abstract review, expansive interpretation, and assertive criminal/prosecutorial powers). Across all three, anti-formalism, self-empowerment, and a liberal, cosmopolitan rights orientation expanded judicial reach before polarization surged. The chapter then traces polarization’s ascent alongside shifts in political hegemony: BJP dominance and Hindu nationalism in India; Likud-led, religion-inflected coalitions and anti-elite rhetoric in Israel; and Bolsonaro’s conservative, evangelical-backed populism in Brazil. Media fragmentation and social platforms amplify identity conflict, producing mass protests and, in Brazil, institutional assaults. Together, strong courts and sharp polarization generate recurrent executive–judicial clashes.

The introduction opens with a fictive case study to frame the book’s central question: how non-Muslim courts interpret and frame Muslim Family Law (MFL) disputes, shaping reform, legitimacy, and minority trust. The case shows how narrative incohesion arises when courts justify identical legal outcomes through competing judicial narratives, producing uncertainty about the law’s foundations, meaning, and authority. Narratival incohesion erodes the rule of law and public confidence in the judiciary. Comparing Ghana, Israel, Greece, and India, the chapter identifies four modalities of narrative (in)cohesion – exclusion, alignment, conflict, and dissonance – showing how ideological unity or fragmentation within judiciaries produces narratival cohesion or incohesion. It also clarifies the theological and empirical foundations of MFLs in non-Muslim contexts, addressing questions of legitimacy, authenticity, and human rights. Finally, the chapter outlines the comparative qualitative methodology underpinning the study and argues that narrative is not merely interpretive but a transformative medium through which courts construct meaning, mediate between law and faith, and influence reform.

This chapter examines how narratival alignment within the Israeli judiciary has shaped the interpretation and reform of Muslim Family Law (MFL). Unlike in other jurisdictions, Israeli courts exhibit high narratival cohesion across the judicial hierarchy, underpinned by ideological consensus and professional norms. Through analyses of High Court of Justice (HCJ) and civil family court rulings, the chapter identifies five dominant judicial narratives – jurisdictional, human rights, best interests of the child, Orientalist-sexist, and comparative. It argues that while coherent apex-court narratives foster procedural justice, predictability, and minority trust, their effects on internal reform depend on resonance with religious courts and reformist groups. Alignment among the HCJ, reformers, and the shariʿa establishment enabled custody and gender reforms, including the appointment of Israel’s first female shariʿa judge. Yet in maintenance and confinement cases, alignment was absent, leaving patriarchal norms intact. The chapter thus reveals both the emancipatory and constraining potential of narratival cohesion in pluri-legal systems.

This book, the culmination of research initiated in 2013, offers a comprehensive examination of the persistent failure to achieve peace between Israel and Palestine. It contends that peace must be understood as a strategic necessity rather than a tactical manoeuvre, requiring sustained commitment, institutional trust and mutual restraint. Drawing on historical analysis, interviews and comparative case studies, the book identifies the structural, political and moral factors underlying the collapse of major peace initiatives – from Oslo to Camp David to Annapolis – and proposes an evidence-based framework for future negotiations. It argues that genuine reconciliation demands the renunciation of violence, control of extremist elements, and the cultivation of a shared political language grounded in recognition, empathy and coexistence. By situating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within broader international experiences – such as the Northern Ireland peace process, post-apartheid South Africa and Nordic reconciliation – the study demonstrates that protracted conflicts can be resolved through visionary leadership, ethical governance and equitable compromise. Ultimately, it asserts that peace constitutes both a moral imperative and a strategic prerequisite for the long-term stability, legitimacy and survival of Israel, Palestine and the wider region.

This chapter explores the third major peace junction marked by new leadership in Israel and the Palestinian Authority: Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas. Abbas later described this as the most serious phase of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The chapter traces the transition following Yasser Arafat’s and Ariel Sharon’s departures, Sharon’s Gaza disengagement and renewed optimism for peace. Olmert and Abbas introduced pragmatic diplomacy that culminated in the 2007 Annapolis Conference, convened by US President George W. Bush. The conference endorsed a ‘Roadmap for Peace’, requiring Palestinians to unify security forces, dismantle terror networks and promote transparent governance, while Israel was expected to halt settlement expansion, dismantle outposts and ease restrictions on movement. The Quartet would monitor compliance, and Arab states were urged to curb support for militancy. Despite American investment and a structured framework, the process faltered. Persistent mistrust, political instability and recurring violence undermined progress, leaving the Roadmap’s vision of a two-state solution unrealised.

This practical chapter outlines a comprehensive proposal for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, grounded in clear premises and a structured methodology. The plan unfolds in stages: Gaza must first be rebuilt to address humanitarian and strategic needs. Israel and the Palestinian Authority should renew cooperation in civilian and economic spheres. Militant factions like Hamas and Islamic Jihad must be marginalised and disarmed. Democratic elections in the West Bank should be limited to parties that recognise Israel and reject violence. A two-state solution is central, followed by consideration of a confederation between Palestine (West Bank) and Jordan. Gaza may join this confederation if its leadership commits to peaceful resolution and the proposed principles.

To date, Ehud Olmert’s proposal remains the most far-reaching offer ever made to the Palestinians by a sitting Israeli prime minister. This chapter examines the circumstances that led to the substantive negotiations between President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert, following the Annapolis Conference and the establishment of a three-tier negotiation framework between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Despite Olmert’s evident commitment to peace and his readiness to offer unprecedented concessions, he failed to secure Abbas’s agreement.

The chapter analyses why this promising moment collapsed: the flawed structure of the talks, deep political divisions within both leaderships, the continuing expansion of settlements, Olmert’s entanglement in corruption scandals that undermined his legitimacy, his decisions to launch two wars, and persistent Palestinian mistrust in Israel’s willingness to deliver a durable peace. It concludes with a critical assessment of negotiation dynamics, extracting practical lessons for future diplomacy – lessons essential for any renewed effort to achieve a just, lasting resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In this chapter, the starting point is the Bandung conference and the early development of Third Worldism as an ideology. Many socialists and social democrats in the West saw Israel as a progressive force in the years before and after the Jewish state was established. From the mid-1950s, however, there emerged new perspectives on the conflict between Israel and the Arabs as the relationship was increasingly seen in the context of global anti-colonialism and anti-racism. The Suez crisis of 1956 contributed significantly to this interpretation as the conflict was seen as a clash between old imperialist powers and an emerging Third World. Through the 1960s and 1970s, this perspective came to dominate the view of Israel on the political left. Lines were drawn between the conflict between Israel and the Arabs and other conflicts, such as the war in Vietnam and the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. The conflicts were increasingly understood as local expressions of a global war between white oppressors and oppressed peoples of color. In this worldview, the Jews were eventually to take the place as the whitest of white oppressors.

This chapter suggests practical information on the requirements for successful negotiations. Building on extensive research in archives and more than one hundred in-depth interviews with senior decision-makers and negotiators who were involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the chapter outlines the basic qualities that negotiators, mediators and facilitators should have and things they should do, and then the discussion focuses on what negotiators, mediators and facilitators should not do. The arguments are supported by examples from previous peace negotiations between Arabs and Israelis. These experiences shed important light on past events and offer yardsticks for future negotiations. Thus, this is a practical chapter that can be useful for future negotiations.

Recognizing deprivation and injustice, Musa Sadr is the founder of the Movement of the Deprived (Amal), originally a nonsectarian movement for the marginalized. He opposes feudalism and holds a complex view of leftist movements. Rather than a separate sect within Islam, Sadr considers Shiʿism as an ideology of the Muslim vanguard, emphasizing ijtihad (innovative interpretation) and social solidarity. He discusses the interconnectedness of the Arab world, the threat of Israel and his vision for a unified Lebanon where communities coexist, expressing optimism about the Shiʿi community’s future role.

The years from 1956 to 1968 saw a profound cultural transformation in majority attitudes to religious minorities, and the latter’s engagement with Ireland. Israel’s victory in the wars of 1956 and 1967 changed the self-perception and public standing of the Jewish community. The disbanding of the British Empire in Africa, which was virtually completed by 1967, helped to detach Protestants from residual ‘West Briton’ nostalgia. In parallel with decolonisation, the beginning of the process of European integration created the prospect of a future political settlement within which minority status would be resolved in a pluralist definition of legitimate belonging. Finally, Vatican II (1962–5) was decisive in transforming the atmosphere of the country, but liberalisation was gradual, and at first often superficial. In 1966 – on the 50th anniversary of the Easter Rising – The Irish Times denounced the terrifying conditions of the country’s industrial and reformatory schools. That the minorities as a whole were unmoved by such revelations showed the extent to which – despite professions of liberalism – they were largely part of Ireland’s conservative consensus.