Liberalism is a foundational school of thought in International Relations with a well-established and rich intellectual heritage dating back to the seventeenth century. It seeks to address core problems in world politics, including the appropriate scope of state authority, the conditions underpinning international cooperation, and the maintenance of international stability. With liberal scholars most notably contributing to debates on the causes and limits of cooperation. Liberal scholars have made their most influential contributions by examining questions such as what enables or constrains cooperation between states, with many claiming that political, economic, and social integration between states leads to more peace and less war. However, liberalism emerged from Western historical and philosophical contexts, and while liberal scholars claim that it is universally applicable, its assumptions can be criticised for not reflecting non-Western experiences. This chapter evaluates liberalism’s applicability to the Middle East by applying liberal theory to the analysis of cosmopolitan law, examining in particular the impact of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) on interstate relations. Thus, it applies liberalism to answer the following questions: do SEZs lead to greater economic integration between states in the Middle East? And is there any observable pacifying effect on political relations between trade partners?

This practical chapter outlines a comprehensive proposal for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, grounded in clear premises and a structured methodology. The plan unfolds in stages: Gaza must first be rebuilt to address humanitarian and strategic needs. Israel and the Palestinian Authority should renew cooperation in civilian and economic spheres. Militant factions like Hamas and Islamic Jihad must be marginalised and disarmed. Democratic elections in the West Bank should be limited to parties that recognise Israel and reject violence. A two-state solution is central, followed by consideration of a confederation between Palestine (West Bank) and Jordan. Gaza may join this confederation if its leadership commits to peaceful resolution and the proposed principles.

Shortly before midnight on 22 January 1973, Hussain Abu-Khair, the recently appointed PLO representative in Cyprus, went to sleep in his hotel room. Minutes after he turned off the light, six small bombs underneath his bed were activated remotely and ripped him to pieces. Chapter 5 analyses intelligence exchanges regarding this assassination. The chapter also discusses how Black September retaliated, especially its coup of killing a Mossad officer, Baruch Cohen, in Madrid. Intelligence agencies were further reporting about terrorist activities in Jordan and about Libya’s offer to sponsor Palestinian terrorist attacks. Comparing these reports with what is known about terrorist plans at the time, the agencies were often quite accurate in their assessments. While the agencies were tracking Palestinian-Libyan connections, Black September struck another unexpected extra-European location: the Saudi embassy in Khartoum, Sudan. This chapter also discusses an interesting case where Club de Berne cooperation thwarted an attack against the Jordanian and Israeli embassies in Paris.

The chapter delves into the iconic imagery and contested legacy of Moshe Dayan as the “minister of victory” during the Six-Day War. It examines the strategic decisions and military maneuvers orchestrated by Dayan, shedding light on his pivotal role in shaping the objective and management of the war. The emphasizing his focus on neutralizing the Egyptian military threat and avoiding unnecessary entanglements with other Arab armies. Dayan’s adaptability and opportunistic approach to seizing fleeting opportunities are highlighted, underscoring his influence on major decisions while attempting to minimize intervention in routine management. Furthermore, the chapter delves into Dayan’s considerations of international sensitivities, particularly regarding the Holy Basin and the potential involvement of the Soviet Union. The controversy surrounding the war’s objectives and priorities, as well as the tensions between the political and military echelons, is also examined. Additionally, the chapter delves into Dayan’s interactions with political figures and military leaders, revealing the complexities and challenges he faced in navigating the rapidly evolving dynamics of the war.

The chapter outlines Dayan’s transition from commanding the Southern Command to becoming the Chief of Staff, emphasizing his strategic vision and operational command. The document delves into Dayan’s approach to military training, his participation in advanced command courses, and the unique leadership style he exhibited during his command of the Northern Command. Additionally, it sheds light on Dayan’s role in shaping Israel’s security doctrine, particularly through the implementation of reprisal actions to address ongoing security threats. The content elucidates Dayan’s belief in the importance of readiness for both routine security challenges and high-intensity conflict, as well as his deep-seated conviction in the necessity of an reprisal operations for maintaining Israel’s deterrence posture that is necessary for Israel’s survival. Furthermore, it provides insights into Dayan’s perception of the conflict through his famous eulogy for a fallen officer, which underscores his complex sentiments towards peaceful coexistence and the harsh realities of conflicts in the region. Overall, the chapter highlights Dayan’s multifaceted leadership, military strategy, and the evolving nature of Israel’s security challenges during his tenure.

Chapter 7 concludes the Jordanian case study by analyzing the theory’s expectations for how strategic interactions around delegation and blame influence repression, protest, and accountability in authoritarian political systems. Original protest data indicates that the monarchy permits hundreds of protests each year and that security forces repress only a tiny fraction of these events. Instead, repression is highly targeted at those individuals who cross the regime’s redlines by publicly blaming and criticizing the king. The chapter explains how this approach to repression complicates anti-royal coordination, even among those opposition figures who personally blame the monarchy for Jordan’s ills. The chapter also illustrates how the monarchy provides limited accountability by removing prime ministers and cabinet ministers when the public becomes visibly dissatisfied with the government’s performance.

Chapter 5 provides evidence that power sharing in Jordan is effective at shifting the public’s attributions and protecting the monarchy’s popular support. First, the chapter draws on interviews with opposition activists to show that even these sophisticated political elites frequently do not perceive the king to be most at fault for their grievances. Second, it utilizes survey data to demonstrate that Jordanians perceive institutions like the cabinet and parliament to be important contributors to policy decisions in Jordan and that such attitudes are correlated with higher support for the monarchy. Third, the chapter reports results from a novel Facebook advertising experiment that is used to estimate public approval of the Jordanian monarchy relative to the prime minister and parliament. The experiment indicates that the king is more popular than these other institutions, and it suggests that the king’s popularity is less likely to be affected by unpopular policy decisions like substantial tax increases.

Chapter 6 continues the Jordan case study by providing an important assessment of the theory’s expectations over time. Drawing on archival documents, internet search data, elite interviews, and secondary sources, the chapter shows that Jordan’s kings have shared power more credibly when they have more reasons to be concerned about popular discontent. Furthermore, it also demonstrates that Jordanians have responded to these changes as the theory expects, becoming more likely to blame the king for their grievances when the monarchy controls the decision-making process more directly, and less likely to blame the king when he delegates more credibly to other political elites. Not only do these findings demonstrate the theory’s utility for explaining changes in authoritarian decision-making over time, but they also help to account for alternative explanations to the argument, such as the possibility that the Jordanian monarchy benefits from traditional legitimacy that protects its reputation from popular anger.

Chapter 4 begins the detailed case study of Jordan. It first provides important background information on the country and reviews academic literature explaining the monarchy’s durability over the past century. It then draws on my elite interviews and other country-specific sources to explain how Jordan’s policymaking process functions. The chapter shows that the Jordanian king does grant meaningful decision-making influence to political elites in the cabinet and parliament, even though this delegation can result in policies that do not reflect the monarch’s preferences and can increase potential elite threats against the monarchy. The chapter also provides evidence that this delegation is intentionally used by the monarchs as a blame avoidance strategy. Interviews with senior decision-makers, including former chiefs of the royal court and prime ministers, reveal that the monarchy is aware that its reputation is likely to suffer if the king governs more directly and attracts more blame for the public’s grievances. This awareness is also reflected in how the Jordanian educational system teaches students about the decision-making process, and in the monarch’s willingness to share power more credibly for economic and social issues rather than foreign policy and security issues.