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The fairness of criminal jury trial is predicated on the jury being able to clearly understand and accurately apply the criminal standard of proof. Among legal scholars, there is a strong international consensus that the criminal standard of proof as a legal concept is a very high standard that must be met by the prosecution and judged subjectively by the jury after hearing and assessing all the evidence. There is very little consensus, though, on how best to convey this standard to the jury. In this chapter we consider the practice in the jurisdiction of England & Wales of using sure as an ordinary language legal synonym of beyond reasonable doubt. In doing so, we outline a set of legal-discursive practices that transform the notion of ‘being sure’ from a simple gut assessment to an immensely confusing legal prescription. These practices are then exemplified through a judge’s excruciating attempt to clarify the use of sure and the Court of Appeal’s misreading of the fundamental issue. The chapter ends with some recommendations.
Interpreting for defendants who are not conversant with the language of the court is a standard service in jurisdictions that have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This ensures defendants’ linguistic presence and meaningful participation in the judicial process, thereby protecting their right to a fair trial. Yet, interpreting for jurors is rare, despite their crucial role in determining defendants’ guilt or innocence in criminal jury trials. This qualitative study compares two Hong Kong appellate courts’ divergent decisions and arguments presented in the appeal case which contested jurors’ access to the chuchotage interpretation, which is usually audible only to the defendant. The chapter reflects on the practice of court interpreting in the bilingual legal system of Hong Kong and argues for extending interpreting services to jurors to better safeguard defendants’ right to a fair trial. Given that English is a dominant language in jury trials and the majority of the population is Cantonese-speaking, the discussion links interpreting for jurors to upholding the fundamental principle of trial by peers drawn from a cross-section of the community.
The Leveller John Lilburne spent repeated spells accused of sedition or treason between 1638 and 1653. He was both a lay lawyer and a cause lawyer, pursuing the full range of what he insisted were the procedural rights of anyone on trial on criminal charges. Though he sometimes pointed to the law of England to make these claims, he was more insistent and consistent in basing these rights on the laws of God, nature, and reason. In this way, he moved from national to natural modes of rights claiming—he argued for human rights. This essay draws on the scores of publications where he made these claims. He never convinced his judges to accept them. But he convinced his jurors and people in the streets. Centuries would pass before the procedural rights he promoted were accepted as law. These rights would be even more fully embraced around the globe in the major human rights declarations of the twentieth century.
Should the justice system sustain remote operations in a post-pandemic world? Commentators are skeptical, particularly regarding online jury trials. Some of this skepticism stems from empirical concerns. This paper explores two oft-expressed concerns for sustaining remote jury trials: first, that using video as a communication medium will dehumanize parties to a case, reducing the human connection from in-person interactions and making way for less humane decision-making; and second, that video trials will diminish the ability of jurors to detect witness deception or mistake. Our review of relevant literature suggests that both concerns are likely misplaced. Although there is reason to exercise caution and to include strong evaluation with any migration online, available research suggests that video will neither materially affect juror perceptions of parties nor alter the jurors’ (nearly nonexistent) ability to discern truthful from deceptive or mistaken testimony. On the first point, the most credible studies from the most analogous situations suggest video interactions cause little or no effect on human decisions. On the second point, a well-developed body of social science research shows a consensus that human detection accuracy is only slightly above chance levels, and that such accuracy is the same whether the interaction is in person or virtual.
Resistance to the state is the theme of the final chapter. Chapter 7 contends that reluctant defendants were rejecting the trial jury; however, it was not the mechanism they resented, but rather what it symbolized. Today, the jury stands as an emblem of rationalism and modernity. That is not how the medieval world saw it. After Henry II, English rule meant government by jury; in this atmosphere, the jury – whose membership tended to be highly selective – represented not freedom, equality, or modernity, but royal overreach. Standing mute was one among a number of weapons belonging to the peasantry’s arsenal to protest the growing power of the king, whose authority expanded at the expense of his subjects’ rights. Passive noncooperation typified peasant strategies of resistance, which included also failure to perform labor services, ignoring summons to appear for jury duty, and rent strikes, as well as listening to outlaw tales, applauding the sermons of rebellious priests, and venerating at the shrines of political martyrs. These were the more usual weapons of popular resistance. Standing mute should take its place in this category.
A quarter-century has elapsed since the introduction of the Jury Law (Ley del Jurado) in Spain in 1995. This chapter describes trial by jury and its functioning over this period and also considers its chances for survival in the future. The chapter begins with the main features of the Spanish jury and includes changes to the Spanish judicial system after the introduction of jurors. This chapter also provides an overview of the current state of jury trials in Spain, including new statistics and judicial practices. Controversial and high-profile jury trials illustrate some of the strengths and weaknesses of the jury’s performance in Spain over the past 25 years.
As trial by jury is expanding across Georgia and covering more types of crimes, one question is gaining increasing importance – whether Georgians fully understand the reform, which to this point has expanded to seven cities and covers nearly 30 crimes in the Criminal Code. Without a well-informed public, progress of the reform will likely face serious challenges, such as citizens’ reluctance to participate, lengthy and costly selection procedures, and increased public support for the political opposition to the reform. Jury reform also remains a politically challenging process. Government support remains weak, exacerbated by skepticism from the courts. As a result, the reform is poorly funded and few, if any, efforts are made to educate the public. Furthermore, the jury receives little attention in the curriculum of Georgian law schools. The media is still not prepared for informed coverage of actual trials and is easily manipulated by opponents of the reform. This chapter addresses these and other problems faced by the Georgian jury and discusses risks that can hamper the development of the institution and discredit its value in the eyes of the public.
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