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Chapter 8 examines how early Cold War grand strategy reshaped the constitutional system governing war powers – and how institutional redesign in turn entrenched that strategy. Breaking from the prewar pattern of demobilization, President Truman and Congress built a permanently mobilized national security state, defined by large standing forces, sustained appropriations, and the framework created by the National Security Act. These choices gave presidents ready means of action abroad while weakening one of Congress’s traditional checks: control over whether forces existed to be used. The chapter then turns to two formative tests. In Korea, Truman’s decision to deploy major ground forces without prior authorization extended historical practice to a new scale, even as congressional funding and draft extensions complicate claims of unilateralism. At home, Truman’s attempt to seize the steel industry prompted a rare judicial rebuke, though the Supreme Court’s fractured Steel Seizure opinions expose persistent uncertainty about emergency power within the separation of powers. Finally, the chapter shows that an equally consequential precedent emerged in peacetime through debates over stationing U.S. forces in Western Europe, as forward deployments and alliance commitments blurred war and peace and normalized global readiness through budgets, basing, and treaties – often without combat.
Drawing on archival materials from the Republic of China (Taiwan), the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the United States, and the former Soviet Union, this article discusses why the PRC’s 1949–50 strike plans for Taiwan went unfulfilled. What prevented the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from “liberating” Taiwan was the fact that it lacked sufficient naval and air power to overwhelm the comparatively better equipped Kuomintang (KMT). The only way to overcome this disparity in a timely manner was to call upon Soviet assistance. In early 1949, seeking to incorporate China into the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, Joseph Stalin resolved to support the CCP’s seizure of power. At the same time, he adopted a policy of indirectly assisting the CCP’s preparations to take Taiwan. This was also when US strategy in Asia became focused on preventing the PRC and the Soviet Union from consolidating an alliance. The United States attempted to do so by using the occasion of Mao Zedong’s first visit to Moscow to publicly announce a policy of non-intervention on the Taiwan issue. To pull the PRC into the Soviet camp and prevent the CCP from turning to the United States and the West, as well as to maintain the Soviet Union’s ports and military bases on the Yellow Sea, Stalin responded by acquiescing to Mao’s demands that Dalian, Port Arthur (Lüshun), and the Changchun Railway be returned to China. However, he simultaneously halted indirect assistance for the CCP’s preparations for attacking Taiwan, instead giving Kim Il Sung the green light to launch an attack against South Korea. With the outbreak of the Korean War providing a legitimate pretext, and in response to the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, the United States adjusted its policy of non-intervention regarding Taiwan. Thus, while the status of Taiwan and Fujian’s coastal islands was considered by both the CCP and the KMT to be China’s internal affair, by 1950, it had already, in Mao’s words, “turned into a complex and serious international struggle.”
War and society scholarship has changed how historians understand the Korean War, reinterpreting the concept of civil-military relations to broaden its reach, introduce new voices, and incorporate fresh perspectives. The traditional model of civil-military relations centers on the linear interactions between a policy maker, who outlines objectives, and the senior commander tasked with implementing military actions to achieve those desired ends. The clash between President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur is the most iconic example of this conventional approach and has held sway over much of the literature. However, there are numerous more subtle instances of civil-military relations during the Korean War that illuminate the valuable contributions that war and society scholarship has made to our understanding of this conflict and that highlight the significant possibilities of expanding our conception of civil-military relations writ large. This chapter explores how unpreparedness for the Korean War collided with the structural racism inherent in the nation’s segregated military, producing significant consequences for both the U.S. military and American society.
Throughout U.S. history, women have served and participated in war efforts in both official and unofficial capacities, playing central roles in furthering U.S. war aims and achieving the mission at hand. At times, military authorities have acknowledged women’s unofficial contributions by offering payment for services and access to postwar benefits. Military leaders have also recognized the value of servicewomen when personnel needs required them. Since the end of the Vietnam War-era draft in 1973, the U.S. armed forces have gradually opened military occupation specialties, including combat positions, to women. Yet in the civilian world and within the military ranks, resistance to women’s service remained steady over the decades. Critics have cited unit cohesion and readiness as reasons to keep women out of the forces, and they have also made cultural arguments grounded in the links between gender, power, and military service to oppose the mobilization of women. Although U.S. military leaders have opened opportunities for women due to pragmatic needs for personnel, Americans have held on to the notion that soldiers are men, and women belong on the homefront.
This essay critically examines the temporality of American war and surveys the persistence of armed conflict in U.S. history. “Wartimes” structure U.S. historical memory. Wartime is thought to be episodic, followed by peacetime. Instead, military conflict is endemic in North American history. Armed conflict was a means of European settlement in the Colonial Era. It was a method of westward expansion. War enabled national survival in the Civil War. It was a means of solidifying American power and influence in the world over time. The geography of war ultimately altered the character of the civilian experience. The Civil War deeply affected civilians, but this direct experience was lost when U.S. wars in the twentieth century were distant from North America. Major twentieth-century wars nevertheless affected the home front. As technology changed warfare, however, armed conflict became an abstraction for the U.S. polity. This undermined political restraint, enabling ongoing small wars, since the nation could go to war without U.S. civilians feeling that they were in a wartime.
The Korean War has been called the quiet war fought by a silent generation. Perhaps, more correctly, it should be described as the most remembered ‘forgotten’ war in history, with Google listing about 18,600,000 results. Indeed, aspects of the conflict have been forgotten. Even 70 years on, the literature is quiet on intelligence, with few historians or authors even discussing intelligence's role. Battlefield intelligence has been almost entirely neglected, except for the occasional mention in some American and British regimental histories. As Australia played a minor role in the Korean War, it is unsurprising that the part played by the Australian Army’s battlefield intelligence has hardly been mentioned.
The Commander's Eyes and Ears: Australian Army Combat Intelligence in the Cold War, 1945–75 explores the contribution made by the Australian Army's combat intelligence services to force commanders during the Cold War (1945–75), focusing primarily on the Australian Intelligence Corps. The book covers the support provided by intelligence resources to Australian and allied commanders on operations in Japan, Korea, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam. Through the lens of the Australian Intelligence Corps and other intelligence resources, the book pays special attention to significant events during this period, including the Japanese war crimes trials, the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan, the Korean War, the Malayan Emergency, the Indonesian Confrontation, and the Vietnam War. Criticisms of the Army's involvement, challenges faced by soldiers, mistakes made and lessons learned in these events are explored throughout.
This chapter focuses on the Chinese volunteers who fought in Korea during the Korean War. It looks at the interactions between the Chinese volunteers and North Korean civilians. It shows how the CCP strove to shape the emotions of the volunteers and inspire feelings of empathy toward North Korean civilians. Through using new North Korean source materials, it shows how the North Korean government sought to shape popular perceptions of the volunteers.
The epilogue explores the enduring legacies of this historical encounter between American soldiers and Chinese civilians. In the People’s Republic of China, the recurring persona of the Chinese victim facing American brutality, further popularized through propaganda during the Korean War, continues to influence popular Chinese anti-American nationalism. In the United States, while the occupation of China remains a largely forgotten history, practices in China created important precedents and patterns for US military involvement with other nations in the following decades. As tensions between the two nations reach new heights today, the legacy of this “lost era” continues to be contested through divergent historical accounts from both countries, shaped by radically changing geopolitical concerns. The shadow of the American occupation remains long and haunting.
This chapter revisits the role of prestige and credibility in the US decision to intervene in Vietnam in 1965. Why was the Johnson administration so concerned about losing prestige and credibility in Southeast Asia when the United States was widely acknowledged as the regional hegemon? This chapter argues that US hegemony in East Asia in the 1950s and 1960s was incomplete both in terms of its reach and “buy in” by key actors. That incompleteness in turn predisposed America’s leaders to place a premium on maintaining US prestige and credibility in the region and on the world stage. The imperative of protecting US reputation as a “guarantor” became a principal cause of the Johnson administration’s decision to fight in Vietnam in 1965. One implication of this argument is that the role of prestige and credibility concerns in shaping US decision-making is not a constant, it varies with the extent of US hegemony.
This chapter argues that the division of Korea has been wrongly attributed to Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Instead of being a result of the Cold War, the division itself was a cause of the Cold War. This chapter traces the history of US-Korean relations back to the nineteenth century, highlighting the growing interest of Americans in Korea which placed political pressure on US policymakers to support Korea in 1945. The chapter shows that American interest in Korea predated concerns over Soviet expansionism and was driven by factors such as the spread of Christianity in Korea, the desire to prevent Japanese domination in East Asia, and a sense of obligation stemming from a treaty signed in 1882. By reexamining the historical context of US involvement in Korea, the chapter challenges the prevailing Cold War narrative and offers a fresh perspective on the origins of the Korean conflict.
This chapter covers the Democrat Party’s first term in office (1950–54), focusing on two aspects of this period: first, its leaders’ consolidation of power; second, the ways in which their economic policies of lower taxes, expanded credit, and increased investment depended on close relations with the United States. To secure economic and military aid, Democrat Party leaders sent soldiers to fight in the Korean War and continuously reminded US officials of Turkey’s strategic value. Drawing on diplomatic archives from the United States, Britain, and Turkey, this chapter reveals the dynamics of these negotiations. Moreover, the chapter shows how control of economic policymaking was a crucial arena of intraparty power struggles, both among the top leadership and at the provincial level. Again, looking at examples from Balıkesir and Malatya, we see how tensions increased between the parties during the early 1950s. We also see how the DP’s control of government allowed it to steer projects to provinces it controlled and penalize provinces that rejected it.
Alliance formation typically entails some risk of abandonment, wherein an ally may not honor its obligations in the future. When potential security partners’ preferences are misaligned, this risk looms large, discouraging mutually beneficial investment in an alliance. How can a prospective ally credibly reassure an uncertain patron that their preferences align, to mitigate abandonment risks and elicit a security commitment? We show formally that pre-alliance bargaining with third parties is one way to do so. When the patron holds abandonment concerns, the prospective ally can reassure the patron by making greater concessions to the patron’s existing allies, but more hard-line demands of its rivals. This finding implies that the prospect of an alliance can alternately promote conflict with a prospective patron’s enemies and forestall conflict with its friends. Indeed, we show that incentives for pre-alliance reassurance can result in war, even with perfect asset divisibility, no commitment problems, and complete information among the belligerents. The results are illustrated by China’s intervention in the Korean War and Australia’s post-World War II rapprochement with Japan, which were motivated largely to foster security cooperation with the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively.
The Cold War divided East Asia. Beginning around 1978, the communist People’s Republic of China implemented market-based reforms that unleashed spectacular economic takeoff, but which were not accompanied by corresponding political reforms. After a bloody war, Korea has remained divided between an impoverished and isolationistic communist regime in the north and the non-communist south. Japan’s postwar “developmental state” economy boomed, and by 1981 Japan had become the world’s largest automaker. Trade wars with the U.S. led to a sharp increase in the exchange value of the yen, however, and the bursting of the Japanese bubble economy in 1990. In Vietnam, after the defeat and withdrawal of French colonial forces, massive American military intervention in support of the non-communist south became deeply controversial. Eventually the U.S. disengaged, and Vietnam was reunified by communist northern forces in 1975. The Cold War therefore ended, somewhat surprisingly, with communist regimes still entrenched in East Asia in mainland China, Vietnam, and North Korea.
This chapter is a study of India’s involvement in the Korean War, particularly in the later stages of that war and in bringing it to a close through the successful negotiation of an armistice agreement. The period under review is 1950–1953. The Korean War is an insightful case study because it combines a study of the beginnings of Indian diplomacy at the UN with Nehru’s idea of Asia.
Even South Korea's President Roh Moo-Hyun had to obtain permission from the United Nations Command (UNC) in order to cross the dividing line between the two Koreas on his way to the summit with his counterpart Kim Jong-Il in Pyongyang. The UNC has used its authority to grant permission to cross the dividing line as a wedge in the inter-Korean Railway Projects, and the United States government, which commands the UNC, has been engaged in a tug-of-war to preserve the armistice regime and the Cold War order in Northeast Asia.
This paper examines the little-known and long forgotten overseas deployment of Japanese minesweepers to North Korea in 1950 and the events that led to postwar Japan's only known deployment to a combat zone that led to the loss of Japanese life.
This essay is a comparative legal study of the use by the United States and South Korea of state of emergency powers before and during the Korean War. Beginning with the violent suppression of the Cheju Uprising in 1948, a succession of states of emergency was proclaimed in South Korea and the United States throughout the Korean conflict (1948-1953). The essay examines the context in which these emergency laws were conceived and their relationship to state-sponsored mass violence against the civilian population.
Bruce Cumings, Professor Emeritus at the University of Chicago, spoke with Haeyoung Kim of the Korea Policy Institute on August 23, 2023 about the current geopolitical landscape in East Asia, prospects for U.S.-Korea relations, and intellectual interventions made over the course of his career.
The Cold War conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, fought in the context of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, differed in the nature of surrender. After the first year of the Korean War, the war became a stalemate. However, the fighting ended only with an armistice two years later. The delay resulted in part from an ideological dispute between the belligerents. American negotiators insisted that POWs be allowed to refuse repatriation to the country for which they fought; the Communists insisted on compulsory repatriation. The armistice allowed POWs to choose, and the Communists were internationally embarrassed because large numbers of Chinese and North Koreans refused repatriation. The major American intervention in Vietnam was fought primarily as a guerrilla campaign, with some large-scale battles. The Americans made little headway, and protests against the war expanded. After Nixon won the 1968 presidential election, he first tried carrot and stick means to convince the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese to cease fighting. When these failed, he and Kissinger maneuvered to end the American intervention by any means necessary. The Paris Peace Accords granted nearly all the enemies’ demands so that the United States could withdraw American troops. Withdrawal amounted to utter surrender.