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According to the English monk and historian Matthew Paris, when King Louis IX fell horribly sick to the point of death in 1244, his sorrowful mother Queen Blanche prayed to the Lord to preserve her son and the kingdom of France along with him. Placing relics of the True Cross, the crown of thorns, and the Holy Lance into contact with his body, she made a vow in his name that he would ‘assume the cross’ and journey to the Holy Sepulchre if he recovered his health (Figure 3.1). When Louis made a miraculous recovery, of his own free will he ‘solemnly took the sign of the cross on his shoulders’ and swore that he would undertake the journey to the Holy Land, assuming that the counsellors of his realm agreed with this plan.
Indigenous movements in Bolivia have long struggled for legal recognition and autonomy, culminating in constitutional reforms that formally recognise Indigenous jurisdiction as a key dimension of self-determination. This article argues, however, that the practical operation of legal pluralism in Bolivia is shaped less by constitutional design than by the institutional weakness of the Constitutional Court. Through analysis of the Zongo case, it examines how the Court’s pluralist rulings, while doctrinally affirming Indigenous jurisdiction and advancing intercultural and decolonial reasoning, remain ineffectively enforced, producing two interrelated consequences. First, Indigenous communities are continuously criminalised for actions undertaken within constitutionally recognised Indigenous jurisdiction. Second, criminalisation compels them to engage defensively with ordinary jurisdiction, generating juridification that destabilises collective authority. Together, these dynamics show how legal pluralism, when selectively enforced, operates in practice as neocolonial governance: Indigenous autonomy is formally affirmed yet subordinated by the persistent supremacy of ordinary legal power.
This article explores how interethnic marriage produces and governs ambiguous identities within legally pluralist port-city settings. Taking the construction of ‘Chineseness’ in the Dutch Batavia before 1850 as a case study, this article analyses how identity was contested, negotiated, and reconfigured in a colonial legal landscape. Drawing on archival records from the Batavia Kong Koan (the Chinese Council), this article argues that normative orders from the homeland, such as Confucian ethical distinctions between the ‘civilized’ and the ‘uncivilized’ and gendered prescriptions governing family life and female conduct, were not merely adapted to local conditions but were frequently disrupted by diasporic realities. Through case studies of interethnic marriages and female-initiated divorces, the article highlights how female agency within the Kong Koan’s hybrid legal regime fractured the ideological coherence of the Confucian moral order and exposed the instability of ‘Chineseness’ under colonial rule. Situated at the intersection of claimed Chinese custom, Dutch colonial statutes, and the everyday realities of interethnic co-residence, the Kong Koan did not preserve tradition so much as mediate and fragment it. Rather than reinforcing a fixed notion of identity, the institution became a mechanism for its continuous remaking. By locating identity within everyday social practice and the institutional logics of colonial governance, this article challenges essentialist conceptions of diaspora. It offers a historically grounded account of how an ethnic identity like ‘Chineseness’ was continuously unmade and remade at the intersection of multiple legal and cultural systems within colonial jurisdictions.
This article examines oath-taking within Sierra Leone’s plural justice system, where statutory law, customary norms and religious belief coexist. Using empirical fieldwork and African socio-legal theory, it analyses oath-taking as a culturally embedded practice which constructs truth, legitimacy and authority in formal courts and customary forums. While statutory regulation remains shaped by colonial frameworks including the Oaths and Affirmations Act 1930 and the Perjury Act 1911, customary oath-taking commands strong local legitimacy. Empirical findings reveal such practices may operate through fear, reinforce gendered power relations and lead to coercion and psychological harm. Using African legal pluralism and the cultural relativism–universalism debate, the article rejects rigid legal centralism and unregulated customary autonomy. It advances a contextual, rights-informed pluralist approach with minimum procedural safeguards rather than uniform regulation. Conceptualizing oath-taking within hybrid justice systems, the article proposes a “cultural leveraging” framework for strengthening justice institutions while safeguarding dignity, voluntariness and inclusion.
Matthew Craven, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,Sundhya Pahuja, University of Melbourne,Gerry Simpson, London School of Economics and Political Science
Chapter 9 reflects on the authors’ approach to redescribing the Cold War and its relationship to international law. It challenges conventional narratives by presenting the Cold War as a subject rather than an object, exploring its multiple manifestations and impacts on global legal and political landscapes. The chapter addresses three key themes: redescription, periodisation, and aftermath. It emphasises the plurality of international laws and Cold Wars experienced worldwide, disrupting the notion of a monolithic, bipolar conflict. The authors discuss the complexities of periodisation, highlighting how different perspectives can yield varying start and end dates for the Cold War. The chapter also explores the Cold War’s legacy in the present, arguing that its influence persists in contemporary global politics and international law. It challenges the idea of a clean break in 1989, suggesting instead that many Cold War dynamics continue to shape current events and legal frameworks. Finally, the authors present their work as both a critique of conventional Cold War narratives and a retrieval project, aiming at uncovering forgotten or marginalised perspectives on international law and global politics during this period. They call for a renewed appreciation of the legal experimentation, political non-alignment, and revolutionary possibilities that emerged during the Cold War era.
This chapter examines narratival conflict within Greek courts over the legitimacy and scope of Muslim Family Law (MFL) in Thrace – the only European jurisdiction formally recognizing Islamic law. It identifies three competing judicial narratives: the Protective Narrative, which upholds the mufti’s jurisdiction as a treaty-based obligation; the Restrictive Narrative, which narrows that jurisdiction under constitutional and human-rights principles; and the Liberative Choice Narrative, which affirms minority exit rights and voluntary recourse to civil law. Drawing on content analysis of case law and extensive fieldwork, the chapter demonstrates how narratival incohesion between higher and lower courts has produced chronic legal ambiguity, undermined procedural justice, and eroded minority trust. It argues that Greece’s securitized approach to Islamic law – shaped by historical tensions with Turkey – has stifled harmonization and prevented internal reform within the mufti system. Ultimately, narratival conflict, rather than fostering pluralism, has entrenched uncertainty, alienation, and the double failure of both religious and civil justice.
Whatever law offers, it never does it alone. It always does whatever it does within societies where a lot else is going on. Law has to make its way in various terrains full of obstacles, rivals, and alternatives. Chapter 9 explores some of the consequences of this ever-present buzz, movement, and competition for the ways law works in societies. Above all, it stresses the complexity of social causality that lawyers often ignore. Law sends messages. Once sent, they compete with messages from other sources, often more salient for many people, and they will be variably received, interpreted, and acted upon depending in part on the relationships between the centre and various ‘semi-autonomous fields’ and ‘indigenous orderings’ that occupy the society. In many of these fields other sources of norms and settlements will be available and sought. This is not a pathology but a reality. Those concerned to temper power need to take it into account.
This chapter explores the concepts of territory and jurisdiction in the Greek and Roman worlds, challenging modern assumptions rooted in the state-centric, post-Westphalian model of international law. It argues that ancient understandings of space, sovereignty and legal authority were fluid, overlapping and shaped by networks of cities, trade routes and personal affiliations rather than fixed territorial boundaries. The chapter examines how jurisdiction operated through principles of personality and polity, with legal pluralism prevailing across empires. Roman legal innovations, such as the concept of jus gentium and the universal jurisdiction of emperors, are analysed as early forms of supranational legal authority. The chapter also addresses the limits of jurisdiction, including the treatment of pirates and the emergence of humanistic legal protections. By tracing the evolution of spatial and legal thought from the polis to the Roman Empire and into late Antiquity, the chapter reveals how ancient practices laid conceptual foundations for modern international law while remaining distinct in form and function.
Edited by
Jessika Eichler, Max-Planck-Institut für ethnologische Forschung, Halle,Mario G. Aguilera, Max-Planck-Institut für ethnologische Forschung, Halle
This chapter shows that the CBD regime contains provisions on benefit-sharing, consent-like rights, and the recognition of indigenous and community conserved areas (ICCAs) that help implementing Indigenous rights to land, natural resources, cultural rights, FPIC, and self-determination, and complement protection thereof in the context of biodiversity protection. This contribution also argues that the CBD regime gives rise to four new categories of collective rights of Indigenous Peoples that are not (fully) protected under IHRL: the right to benefit-sharing, the right to genetic resources, the right to traditional knowledge (TK), and biocultural rights. These rights bear a good potential for additional protection of collective rights because they apply to situations that would otherwise not be covered under IHRL, illustrative being the entitlement to genetic resources. In terms of the theoretical contribution of these rights, this chapter demonstrates that the CBD legal framework contributes to reinforcing legal pluralism, by assessing Indigenous Peoples’ entitlements to TK and, indirectly, to genetic resources in light of Indigenous customs, practices, and procedures. The chapter concludes that Indigenous Peoples’ rights protected under the CBD framework do not perfectly coincide with the categories of environmental rights due to their main object and substantive nature.
Edited by
Jessika Eichler, Max-Planck-Institut für ethnologische Forschung, Halle,Mario G. Aguilera, Max-Planck-Institut für ethnologische Forschung, Halle
This article examines Mapuche law (az mapu) through the lens of socio-environmental rights and explores its role in a transmodern discussion of legal pluralism. Challenging Western legal norms, the authors assert that Indigenous resistance is a fundamental right undermined by liberal positive law. They trace the colonial history of Indigenous peoples in Abya Yala and Wallmapu, advocating for alternative conceptions of justice and law to address entrenched asymmetries and colonial violence originating in the conquest of America. A transmodern framework is offered to envision Indigenous rights beyond Eurocentric colonial metaphysics. Within Latin America and Abya Yala, proponents of positive law confront a critical juncture regarding Indigenous rights, their existence, and revival. The dynamics of az mapu in Wallmapu are analyzed via transmodernity and legal pluralism, revealing the interconnected dimensions of environmental justice essential in the early twenty-first century. Ultimately, the authors link the Indigenous rights debate to the broader climate crisis—marked by eco- and ethnocidal threats such as global warming—and propose a decolonial understanding of justice. This approach reconfigures human-nature relationships and emphasizes that the severe socio-environmental crisis demands responses grounded in contextual rights like Mapuche az mapu and its intrinsic bond with itrofillmogen (all living things).
Edited by
Jessika Eichler, Max-Planck-Institut für ethnologische Forschung, Halle,Mario G. Aguilera, Max-Planck-Institut für ethnologische Forschung, Halle
The recent recognition of the Rights of Nature (RoN) in the legal sphere presents significant challenges in its implementation. In modern States, justice is predominantly a human domain, based on the assumption that only in this realm can objectivity supersede subjectivity, rationality override emotionality, and the social transcend the natural. Consequently, the recognition of the Rights of Nature has required judicial systems to strive to overcome anthropocentric perspectives in order to advance biocentric and ecocentric frameworks. However, a critical question arises: How can non-human entities be formally recognized as subjects of justice? What poses a challenge for Western justice systems seems to be inherent in Indigenous justice systems, where the spiritual, human, and natural realms are not compartmentalized. The nature-culture nexus has been integrated from the perspectives of communities that maintain direct relationships with and dependencies on land and water sources, highlighting the relevance of worldviews that transcend segmented anthropocentric perspectives. To shed light on these challenges, this chapter proposes a theoretical-methodological analysis grounded in political ontology and the biocultural approach, aiming to facilitate dialogue between State legal systems and Indigenous customary law. We argue that biocultural rights and the recognition of legal pluralism offer the advantage of recognizing the role of communities as interactive participants in their territories, presenting an alternative for the decolonization of the Rights of Nature.
Edited by
Jessika Eichler, Max-Planck-Institut für ethnologische Forschung, Halle,Mario G. Aguilera, Max-Planck-Institut für ethnologische Forschung, Halle
This chapter delves into the concept of ‘Rights of Nature’ (RoN) through a semiotic lens; in particular, the ethnological semiology of Jean Baudrillard has significantly influenced this contribution. RoN challenges conventional anthropocentric legal paradigms by integrating Indigenous cosmovisions in Western jurisprudence. By examining legislative examples such as New Zealand’s Te Awa Tupua Act and Australia’s Yarra River Protection Act, this chapter assesses whether these recognitions faithfully reflect Indigenous viewpoints or merely adapt nature into pre-existing Western ontological (legal) philosophies.
RoN frequently intersects with Indigenous cosmovisions, suggesting a profound, metaphysical significance beyond Western legal constructs. This discussion illuminates the evolving character of RoN and its interplay with legal pluralism. The incorporation of RoN into Western legal systems unveils a dynamic where Indigenous knowledge is recognised but simultaneously streamlined to conform to established legal structures.
The chapter further contemplates the possibility that RoN may simply codify Indigenous rights without capturing the full depth of Indigenous perspectives. Ultimately, RoN signifies an endeavour to broaden the legal recognition of nature and its purported intrinsic values, albeit at the risk of misrepresenting Indigenous knowledge as mere extensions of Western legal ontology. In doing so, RoN adorns itself with the Indigenous symbol and ritual to advance environmental politics.
This Article argues that the classic “what is law” question deserves more attention in EU legal studies. First, it shows that questions about the nature and concept of law are of great practical relevance for EU law. Second, the Article endorses a distinctively realist outlook on EU law. This analysis concludes that a realist(ic) concept of EU law cannot be distilled from legal realism as a theory of adjudication. What is needed instead is a theory of law that can account for the social reality of EU law by weaving together law’s ideational and material dimensions. From the realist perspective, EU law is neither autonomous nor singular. This inquiry into the nature of EU law illustrates why different variants of legal and constitutional pluralism and inter-legality provide insufficient tools for theorizing EU law. Moreover, it challenges the EU’s current “politics of legality” and problematizes the law-power relationship in EU law, depicting the concept of law as key to the EU’s prolonged authority crisis.
This volume makes a legal theoretical contribution to the emerging regime of indigenous environmental rights, drawing on the law, theory, sociological and anthropological approaches. Firstly, it introduces key developments in the field of international human rights law and international environmental law, dealing with contemporary trends but also foundational principles and rights. It then addresses one of the most influential strands, that of (transformative) legal pluralism and its decolonising effects on the law. And in a final part, it uncovers a known conceptual divide, distinguishing between anthropocentric and eco-centric approaches, thereby identifying key developments in the human rights field and rights of nature discourses. The book brings together experts in the field and also creates the space for scholarly dialogue, conceptually and beyond, which ultimately provides answers and directions in the field of indigenous environmental rights, to newcomers and specialised scholars alike.
Prosecutor v Al Mahdi (Al Mahdi) has repeatedly been criticized as a “missed opportunity” for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to engage with Islamic law. However, an in-depth analysis of trial transcripts reveals that the ICC is already deeply engaged with Islamic normativity, albeit in ways that reproduce colonial patterns of recognition: it refuses to recognize the jihadist institutions as a legal order while simultaneously validating Sufi religious practices as authentically Islamic. Combining a praxeological law-in-action approach with scholarship on legal pluralism and colonial recognition, we argue that the ICC cannot adjudicate such cases without making implicit determinations about legitimate and illegitimate forms of Islamic practice. In our view, Al Mahdi thus reveals the inherent limitations of international criminal law when confronted with alternative normative orders. The politics of recognition at work here echo colonial practice, demonstrating how international criminal justice transforms and reifies the very normative systems it claims to engage with.
As the French empire expanded throughout northern and western Africa and from Pondicherry in India east to Royal Vietnam, a new secular mission came into being, one married to the contradictions of aggressive imperialism, a revolutionary past, and democratic governance. Civilisation was elevated to the rarefied realms of imperial law. French colonial administrators and jurists equipped with the prejudices of the metropole carried with them a powerful vision of republican empire to the Mekong, the great river system that lies at the proverbial heart of mainland South East Asia. Yet republican colonialism was undermined by below. In Indo-China, young radicals, jurists, politicians, journalists and scholars engaged in bitter fighting with the creation of a panoptic model of state surveillance, economic exploitation, political repression, racism and the ambiguities of French republicanism. From the creation of the Indo-Chinese Union in 1887 to its demise in 1954, the multiple transformations of legal boundaries in Indo-China reflected the evolving international relations and anti-colonial agitations in Asia. They formed a crucial conjecture in the history of international law.
Across multiple jurisdictions, Indigenous and ethnic communities have sought recognition and protection of the legal rights of rivers as part of broader activist agendas seeking greater legal and political control over their lands and resources. Yet the legal scholarship tracing these cases of ‘river rights’ has often ignored the role of activism in driving and shaping river rights frameworks, as well as the broader implications of these frameworks for community activist agendas. In this article, we examine two legal cases in which Indigenous and Afrodescendent peoples have used legal and extralegal strategies to secure protection for the rights of rivers: for the Piatúa River in Ecuador and the Atrato River in Colombia. In both cases, we find that communities are strategically leveraging river rights frameworks, alongside constitutional and human rights protections, to assert and enhance their territorial autonomy. While the project of recuperating territorial autonomy is incomplete in both cases, our comparative analysis confirms that these cases should be seen as incremental steps in a broader project of transforming community relationships with government institutions, local authorities, and the courts, enabling more pluralist territorial governance to emerge over time.
This article examines the relevance of ‘deliberative’ constitutionalism – the idea that democratic deliberation ought to inform our expectations of constitutional law and processes – to constitutional moments in non-state contexts. More specifically, it explores the ways in which extending a deliberative constitutional lens to non-state spaces can both enrich our understanding of the legal-political dynamics within these spaces and, in turn, inform the field of deliberative constitutionalism itself. To do this, it takes an empirical approach to interpret and analyse a constitutional process through which a university student union reinvented its own democratic structures, in significant part through a ‘deliberative mini-public’ of everyday members. Drawing on interviews, observations and records, it demonstrates that a deliberative constitutional lens maps onto and usefully interprets the democratic process in this context while also offering empirical insight into an underexplored dimension of deliberative constitutionalism: that is, connections between deliberative approaches ‘to’ constitutional reform and the resulting constitutional features ‘from’ which subsequent political deliberation flows. It shows how the former carries ‘through’ into the latter by way of the internalization of deliberative norms resulting from both direct and indirect experience with deliberative approaches.
The Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) was developed to introduce simple, up-to-date business laws in its member states. It has various goals, including harmonizing business laws, attracting foreign investment in its member states and promoting broader economic integration across Africa. At its initial development stage, OHADA chose a path dependence route, which positively impacted the achievement of some of its initial goals. While OHADA has been widely praised for its efficient business laws, its commitment to path dependence is likely to create a trap for the organization, hindering its further progress. This article analyses the unification of law in African former colonies from the critical perspective of path dependence theory. It examines how OHADA’s legal choices have impacted its various objectives at different stages of its development. Ultimately, the article proposes that OHADA amend its legal framework to achieve its broader aspirations.