This paper investigates the conditions under which women are more likely to represent interest groups in parliamentary hearings, shifting attention from the content of advocacy to the identity of advocates. While existing research has focused on how interest groups gain access to legislative venues, it has largely overlooked who delivers these messages and how messenger characteristics shape political representation. Drawing on theories of gender representation, interest group advocacy, and source effects, we develop a framework that distinguishes between structural and strategic representation and examine whether gender is deployed as a symbolic and relational resource in legislative settings. Using an original dataset covering all interest group appearances in the Spanish Parliament from 1996 to 2023, and hierarchical logistic regression models with Bayesian inference, we analyze how organizational, institutional, and contextual factors shape gendered representation. The findings show that citizen groups are significantly more likely than economic organizations to be represented by women, and that female representation increases with the proportion of women MPs on parliamentary committees. Gendered patterns also vary across policy domains and hearing characteristics. Importantly, the results provide evidence consistent with strategic adaptation: interest groups appear more likely to select female representatives in gender-diverse institutional environments, suggesting that gender functions as a form of strategic signaling rather than solely reflecting internal organizational structures. These findings contribute to research on interest groups and political representation by highlighting how identity operates as a political resource, with implications that extend beyond parliamentary lobbying to broader debates on descriptive and substantive representation.

State legislative turnover is one of the most commonly included measures in state and legislative politics. Yet, few states count legislative turnover or maintain records of internal shifts and those that do often have differences in how these records are maintained. To help resolve these differences we introduce SEAT, State Exits & Annual Turnover, a new dataset tracking legislative turnover in all 50 states spanning 30 years. In brief, we review the importance of turnover as a measure and offer insight into state legislative resources. In doing so, we illustrate the breadth of the data, demonstrate its usefulness, and offer a brief replication-extension. Focusing on annual turnover rates, we find numerous discrepancies with existing measures and state records. This release offers a more up to date understanding of turnover and its variation, as well as an inadvertent call for better records and measurements.

In 1997, Malcolm Jewell published a review of state legislative research stating that there were great “difficulties and possibilities of doing comparative work.” Much of this difficulty lies with data and accessibility. As such, many of the foundational works in state politics, and particularly in U.S. legislatures, were rooted in single-state or small sample studies. In the 25 years since State Politics & Policy Quarterly started publication, comparative studies have become more common, allowing for better tests of “laboratories of democracy.” In this review essay, we document the extent to which state legislative studies have moved beyond single-state studies to larger comparative examinations. We outline the significant developments in the literature and highlight much of the notable research that has increased our understanding of state legislatures.

We demonstrate that the impact of descriptive representation on citizens’ perceptions of democratic processes varies with levels of representation and the nature of the issue decided. In a survey experiment, a committee decides on three policies that disproportionately impact women, but vary in whether individuals perceive them as moral or conferring targeted benefits. Our findings show that citizens associate descriptive representation with fairness. However, perceptions of some decisions, e.g., abortion, strongly improve with women’s equal and over-representation. On other issues—those perceived as offering women a targeted benefit—women’s over-representation reduces perceptions of fairness. These findings highlight the importance of exploring the interaction between decision-making body composition and policy agenda when seeking to understand citizens’ views of democratic policymaking.

Members of the majority party in Congress sometimes vote against bills that they prefer over the status quo. We estimate a model of congressional roll-call voting that allows for this kind of non-ideological protest voting. We find that protest voting has significant implications for roll-call-based estimates of ideology and other analyses that rely upon them. For example, a traditional item response theory model curiously identifies members of the Squad as relatively moderate Democrats, but our protest-voting-adjusted scores identify them as the most liberal members of Congress. We also find that previous studies may have underestimated responsiveness, the effects of ideology in elections, the utility of non-roll-call-based measures of ideology, and the increase in congressional polarization. Although the implications for most substantive applications are likely modest, our analyses suggest that future researchers can better measure legislative ideology by accounting for a small number of non-ideological votes.

Measuring party loyalty (and party effects, more broadly) in roll call voting has long been a contentious matter in the study of legislative behavior. While techniques for measurement in this arena are numerous, most of them suffer from a fatal flaw: they improperly (or insufficiently) separate measures of preferences from party effects. A significant part of this measurement challenge is the identification of (a) which roll calls leaders care about and (b) in which direction they desire their members to vote. In this paper, we use a novel dataset of party leader speeches from the 101st to 113th Congresses to develop a model of party loyalty and measure loyalty across members and time. Unlike existing techniques, we allow for party influence to vary across legislators and time. Additionally, our model provides estimates of legislator ideology and party loyalty disentangled from one another. Using these estimates, we explore the dynamics of loyalty in the contemporary Congress and unearth findings quite different from extant measures in the literature.

Scholars typically assume that congressional party leaders whip their members and influence their voting behavior, but little evidence convincingly separates the effects of party leaders from the selection of members into parties. I find that a switch from a relatively moderate to a relatively extreme party leader causes rank-and-file members to cast more extreme roll-call votes (and vice versa). I further find that party leaders even influence the members who did not support their leadership bid, and rank-and-file members are less likely to cast partisan votes when there is no party leader. This study also sheds light on a historically anomalous period of Republican moderation, and it helps to explain the increase in congressional polarization over the past 50 years.

The literature suggests that legislative politics among European Union Member States is characterised by economic exchanges, and constrained by the social norms of a European community of legislators. Both views draw a clear line between the legislative process and the conflicts over sovereignty that have left their mark on treaty making and European public opinion since the 1990s. This article suggests revisiting this view, based on an analysis of why Member States have opted out of legislation from the 1970s to today. It argues that differentiation, while once a response to capacity problems of relatively poor countries, has recently become driven by sovereignty concerns of the Union's wealthy and nationally oriented Members that oppose the EU's intrusion into core state powers. The article presents evidence for the impact on legislative outcomes of factors so far thought not to matter. The results indicate greater European‐level legislative responsiveness towards national sovereignty demands than previously recognised. They underline that the nature of European politics has been changing with the EU's push into core state powers.

This paper examines how public support affects interest groups’ advocacy success across three distinct stages in the legislative process. We hypothesize that public support is vital for advocacy success when coalition agreements are negotiated, and it has a weaker effect when legislation is introduced in parliament by the governing majority but becomes stronger again when legislation is adopted. We assess these expectations for 55 Belgian policy issues. We combine evidence on legislative outcomes with public opinion data and a mapping of interest groups’ positions in the news. The results indicate that public support is key for advocacy success in the coalition agreement. However, the positive effect of public support weakens when legislation is introduced in parliament – the effect only materializes for initiatives by the opposition – and public support has no significant effect on advocacy success in adopted legislation. Instead, aligning with other groups and political parties becomes more consequential for advocacy success in later legislative stages. Still, on average, interest groups attaining their preferences in adopted legislation enjoy considerable public support. Our results thus underscore the relevance of distinguishing between legislative stages when analyzing interest groups’ advocacy success.

Some European law proposals are subject to scrutiny by national parliaments while others go unchecked. The analysis in this article indicates that the opposition scrutinises European Union law to gather information on the proceedings inside the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Yet whereas strong opposition parties scrutinise highly politicised law proposals, weak opposition parties tend to scrutinise those proposals that are negotiated under the non‐transparent fast‐track procedure. In addition, there is ample evidence that the leading minister initiates scrutiny in order to strengthen his or her intergovernmental bargaining leverage. Yet, this Schelling Conjecture presumes that the party of the minister is located between the expected bargaining position in the Council and the coalition partner. Any other domestic interest constellation could lead to scrutiny motivated by whistle blowing. However, an issue's salience helps us to separate the whistle blowing from the Schelling Conjecture.

Why are some legislators more effective than others in fragmented presidential systems? I argue that in Brazil’s fractionalized party system, legislative member organizations (LMOs) supply policy and political information that parties often lack, enabling lawmakers to advance bills. I test this claim using novel legislative effectiveness scores (LESs) for sponsors and rapporteurs in Brazil’s lower chamber. Quantitative results show that LMO affiliation is associated with higher effectiveness, but only in highly structured organizations. Public security LMOs boost both sponsorship and rapporteurship, while agribusiness LMOs increase rapporteurship effectiveness. Weakly organized LMOs show null effects. Party affiliation matters, but parties do not consistently provide information and coordination. Qualitative data identify two mechanisms by which strong LMOs operate: placing aligned members in key positions and leveraging expertise to shape agendas and voting cues. These findings recast effectiveness in Brazil as a function of cross-party informational networks rather than parties alone and identify scope conditions under which LMOs matter in other multiparty presidential democracies.

In multiparty systems, parties signal conflict through communication, yet standard approaches to measuring partisan conflict in communication consider only the verbal dimension. We expand the study of partisan conflict to the nonverbal dimension by developing a measure of conflict signaling based on variation in a speaker’s expressed emotional arousal, as indicated by changes in vocal pitch. We demonstrate our approach using comprehensive audio data from parliamentary debates in Denmark spanning more than two decades. We find that arousal reflects prevailing patterns of partisan polarization and predicts subsequent legislative behavior. Moreover, we show that consistent with a strategic model of behavior, arousal tracks the electoral and policy incentives faced by legislators. All results persist when we account for the verbal content of speech. By documenting a novel dimension of elite communication of partisan conflict and providing evidence for the strategic use of nonverbal signals, our findings deepen our understanding of the nature of elite partisan communication.

Thousands of federal policies have been produced by coalitions of executive agencies over the last few decades. Despite this, little attention has been paid to why agencies collaborate. The decision among relatively autonomous agencies to collaborate and therefore cede some of their power demands theoretical attention. I argue that agencies form coalitions to overcome legislative oversight attempts by activating veto points and exploiting collective action problems in Congress. Using data on dozens of agencies over twenty-four years, I find that agencies form policy-making coalitions when it helps them activate veto points and exploit collective action problems among their overseers in Congress: namely, committee freeriding in oversight and legislative gridlock in lawmaking. These collective action problems, in turn, inhibit Congressional attempts to overturn bureaucratically led policies and therefore allow agency policies to stick. Agencies form coalitions actively in order to insulate their policies against congressional oversight.

As global migration continues to intensify, legislatures in liberal democracies increasingly feature policymakers with direct experiences with immigration. Concurrently, scholars often argue that electoral accountability creates incentives to appeal to public opinion, which in the context of immigration policymaking favors restrictions over admission. In this paper, we study these competing dynamics among these immigrant legislators. We theorize that political institutions—particularly political parties—impede the sincere expression of legislative preferences among legislators that come from immigrant backgrounds. To begin, we present stylized facts about legislative behavior drawing on roll-call votes from the Canadian, British, and American legislatures. Drawing on 25 in-depth interviews with representatives, we find strong evidence that the threat of political party sanction and individual concerns about legislators’ own parties affects legislative decision-making. These findings contribute to our understanding of legislative accountability and highlight how the trend of increasing immigration to democratic polities does not directly translate to political representation.

On 1 March 2018, President Trump declared a 25% tariff on certain steel imports by invoking Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. The tariff pitted two of America’s most storied and interconnected industries, steel and auto producers, against one another and made allies out of longtime bitter political opponents on Capitol Hill. Later that same year, President Trump doubled down on the steel tariff when he initiated a Section 232 investigation on auto and auto parts imports. The auto industry blasted the proposal, while steel offered its strong support. This paper examines the congressional response to President Trump’s proposed auto tariff. Specifically, we explain why 159 MCs signed a letter opposing the tariff. After controlling for other factors, such as district interests and campaign contributions, we find that ideology matters more than party affiliation on whether legislators signed the auto letter. We also find the second dimension of the DW-NOMINATE score to matter, suggesting the strong presence of intra-party cleavages. Our findings highlight the complex nature of trade policy as a domain of bipartisan agreement amidst broader political polarization and at a time when traditional party platforms on the issue are rapidly changing.

Networks among legislators shape politics and policymaking within legislative institutions. In past work on legislative networks, the ties between legislators have been defined on those who serve in the same legislature or chamber. Online information networks, which have been found to play important roles in legislative communication at the national level, are not bounded by individual legislative bodies. We collect original data for over four thousand US state legislators and study patterns of connection among them on Twitter. We look at three types of Twitter networks—follower, retweets, and mentions. We describe these networks and estimate the relationships between ties and salient attributes of legislators. We find that networks are organized largely along geographic and partisan lines and that identity attributes—namely gender and race—exhibit strong associations with the formation of ties.

Increasing partisan polarization has characterized American politics for decades. On January 6, 2021, both Republicans and Democrats in Congress expressed their horror at the violent invasion of the US Capitol, leading to the popular perception—emphasized by media accounts—that the attack generated a rare moment of bipartisan unity. We argue that while members of both parties condemned the attack, a marked partisan divide characterized their messaging even as events unfolded. We analyze all 1861 tweets by members of Congress on January 6th and find that Republicans were significantly more likely to characterize the invasion as a protest grown out of hand, while Democrats described it as an attack on democracy. The results strongly indicate that partisan polarization was alive and well on January 6th and may help to account for Republicans’ shift toward normatively positive portrayals of the day in subsequent months.

Does an MP's localness affect their behaviour towards constituents? Existing research has shown biases in MPs' responsiveness to citizens based on citizens' sociodemographic and political traits and voters’ tendency to prefer ‘local’ MPs. Yet, we know little about whether MPs' localness affects their responsiveness to constituents. MPs' localness may influence their behaviour for strategic reasons and/or because of homophily. To explore this relationship, we conducted a field experiment in the United Kingdom where we asked legislators about their policy priorities regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. We found that local MPs do not differentiate in their responsiveness to constituents. However, non-local MPs are motivated by party affiliation and gender in their responsiveness to constituents, with ethnicity and class playing insignificant roles. Non-local MPs respond more to co-partisans than non-partisans and women non-local MPs are more responsive to women constituents. This experiment underscores the impact of (non-)localness on MPs' interactions with constituents.