This chapter is centred on the tension between public funding and public health, and on how decisions about resource allocation can shed light on the state’s intention about practices to select against disability. This is particularly relevant in relation to the broader analysis of eugenics in this book, because a eugenic intention might seem more likely if there is a state intention to avoid the higher costs of health and social care for disabled people. Although the mere fact that the parents of disabled children bear additional costs might not be sufficient evidence of eugenics, a more revealing examination of the state’s intention can be made through a comparison of different funding decisions. The chapter also examines two areas of decision-making where cost calculations might be relevant: in relation to decisions about public funding for the prenatal detection of Down syndrome, and to decisions about the treatment of very ill infants. While explicit cost–benefit analysis might seem to be ethically unacceptable, this analysis could nevertheless be an implicit consideration, and the concealment of this consideration could constitute a form of manipulation.

This chapter examines how state neutrality can be assessed by reference to the provision of certain information, with a particular focus on information provided through prenatal testing programmes. The information that parents receive about prenatal tests and procedures, and about disability, can be powerfully influential, and can shape the choices that are made. The chapter reviews a number of reasons why the provision of information might not reflect a neutral position: the information might be overly negative about disability, for example, and there is a risk that women will be blamed for any choice that they make. Although it must be acknowledged that it is not possible to have an entirely neutral framework, the chapter compares and evaluates different options that are thought to support autonomy. The chapter also considers nudge theory in order to critically assess both the state’s intention and some limits to individual choice. Although many of these limits are ones that the state cannot entirely avoid, it is important to consider how they put the parents in a particularly vulnerable position, where there is a risk of manipulation.

This Conclusion sums up the main arguments in the book, addresses some final questions, and suggests some future directions of travel. In particular, it returns to the eugenics question, and examines whether current practices in modern liberal states might be in line with a type of eugenics that does not involve state coercion, but that rather involves manipulation, and chiefly the manipulation of women. It also emphasises how an analysis of individual choice should be a secondary concern in our approach to the ethics of selecting against disability, and that the position of the state should be our starting point. The last part of the chapter offers additional reflections on the topic of starting points, and on the importance of thinking further about the nature of pregnancy.

I argue that there are lessons for both philosophers of science and for astrophysicists in the emerging literature on the epistemology of astrophysics. First, contrary to the manner in which it has sometimes been represented by philosophers, astrophysics is not a purely observational science. This complicates arguments that disparage the epistemic status of astrophysics in contrast with experimental sciences. Second, the epistemological structures of arguments in astrophysical research benefit from close philosophical analysis. Such analysis can reveal both important limitations and opportunities. In addition, I argue for a lesson for astronomers from the epistemology of astrophysics. Even when it involves purely observational research, astronomy is not necessarily epistemically inferior to experimental sciences. This is because observation is not generally epistemically inferior to experimentation.

Dark patterns are the subject of a surge of regulatory interest in the EU. Much new legislation in the areas of consumer law, data protection and competition law include provisions on dark patterns. Businesses use dark patterns to increase their revenue at the expense of consumers who purchase products they may not need, spend more time or give up more personal data than they would otherwise. Instead of focusing on the more normative issue of when dark patterns should be considered harmful, the chapter compares the different legal frameworks applicable to these practices and asks to what extent the increasingly fragmented EU regulatory landscape can offer effective overall protection against dark patterns. While useful complementarities may arise when parallel sets of rules target different concerns or protect different values, there are also risks of inconsistencies that may lead to either under- or overenforcement due to the fragmentation of the overall regulatory framework. The chapter submits that three needs result from the state of play and offers suggestions to improve the enforcement against dark patterns based on the current EU regulatory framework.

Kant’s thoughts on language as a practical tool of what he would call “pragmatic formation” in his pedagogical writings are often overlooked. If anything, Kant is read from selected passages of his third Critique as being opposed to the arts of oratory and persuasion. This chapter will canvas Kant’s supposed animosity to the persuasive employment of language – rhetoric, in a term – and detail the complexity that lies behind Kant’s reaction to language as a tool of action among moral agents. Drawing upon his anthropological lectures and writings, as well as his religious and aesthetics work, I will argue that Kant leaves space in his system for a moralized, and moralizing, use of persuasive language in human community. Language use can draw upon inclinations and desires in an agent, and thereby compromise their autonomy. Yet there are ways that Kant speaks of or hints at that use language in ways that move us to be free. Kant’s aesthetics also allows room for vivid presentations as a way to make clear to one’s listener what one already knows in a nonmanipulative manner; these presentation styles are tied in with Kant’s religious thought, as well as with the western rhetorical tradition in general.

This chapter explores mediation strategies and discusses the way in which mediation mandates shape mediators’ different strategic choices. A central concern in the mandate for mediation is often to establish a framework for direct contact between the warring parties. This chapter deals with what can be regarded as the core of the mediation process: the strategies that mediators use to persuade the parties to reach an agreement or to facilitate a peaceful way forward. Mandates set some limitations and provide some opportunities in terms of which strategies mediators can use. In this chapter, we look at two strategy crossroads that all mediators face. These concern the order in which the various issues in the conflict are to be dealt with in the mediation, and how active the mediator ought to be in relation to the parties. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each of these different choices, and demonstrate the variations in these strategic choices based on the Nordic mediation experience.

This introduction sets the scene for the rest of the volume by surveying the main areas of existing communicative research on persuasion. Starting with the classic rhetorical approach, we describe the study of persuasive language on the level of microlinguistic features that often occur in discourse types such as politics or advertising. We then summarize the findings of persuasion research in classic pragmatics and discourse analysis, paying attention to such aspects as speaker’s credibility and expertness. We wrap up the discussion by deliberating on the work on malicious persuasion: propaganda, disinformation and misinformation, and the phenomena of filter bubbles and echo chambers. The chapter is concluded with the short outlines of the papers in the volume.

A realistic utopia is a utopia that respects basic constraints imposed by the Human Condition. This chapter explains why some kinds of political manipulation are not bad or wrong at all, and would accordingly remain operative in a realistic political utopia. The legitimacy of manipulation is first demonstrated with respect to five categories of the non-deliberative dimensions of political life: mobilizing, participation, negotiation, ruling, and ensuring stability. It is then demonstrated with respect to political deliberation itself. All of this applies to manipulation’s function in the two faces of democratic politics: cooperation and competition. The need for the “social lubrication” functions of manipulation is especially acute in politics, given the intractability of the coordination challenges on a society-wide scale. Specifically, manipulation is, at certain junctions, a necessary tool for overcoming motivational obstacles to the flow of political information in a way conducive to rational persuasion. In such ways manipulation is integral to the very idea of a functioning democracy.

The commonest view on the essential moral nature of manipulation is that manipulation is pro tanto wrong: it is wrong as such but, given countervailing considerations, can be all-things-considered morally justified. The argument in this chapter, in contrast, is that manipulation is not intrinsically morally bad. This claim has never been argued for systematically. Reviewing the most probable bad-making features associated with manipulation shows that none of them is necessarily exhibited by it. The chapter then lays out a broad phenomenological description of the many positive contributions manipulation makes to human life. This reveals manipulation as an indispensable “social lubricant” and an element of the good life for people. The main moral conclusions of this review are (a) that manipulation is (not only not necessarily bad, but) not even typically bad. And (b) that rational choosers “behind a veil of ignorance” would choose a society where certain kinds of (mutually enjoyable or prosocial) manipulation are part of the ordinary repertoire. This suggests, in turn, that manipulation does not necessarily disrespect the autonomy of persons – since they choose to be subjected to it. This constitutes a new argument against the charge that manipulation disrespects autonomy.

Since manipulation is a relation involving power over another, it is alleged that it necessarily manifests disrespect toward persons. The analysis in the chapter explores this claim and rejects it. The following broad arguments are advanced: (1) The essence of manipulation is treating others as if they are machines (mechanification); it is therefore natural to examine whether manipulation manifests the same disrespect involved in objectification. The analysis rejects this possibility. (2) The dichotomy between “respectful influence through rational persuasion” and “disrespectful influence via (soft) power” is deconstructed. It is important to treat others “as rational,” but this can involve various elements of soft power, and thus manipulation need not be disrespectful. (3) Even “treating as rational” is not necessary for respect – there are other modes of interaction and influence which manipulations can exhibit that are not disrespectful. Play is analyzed in this regard. (4) Manipulation is often essential for promoting respect for persons through politeness and shielding privacy. The chapter ends by considering the virtuous person as regards the use of manipulation.

Manipulation is pervasive in our lives, yet it is not well understood. Specifically, we lack a wide philosophical theory of manipulation. Such a theory will successfully answer two main questions: a question about the precise meaning of “manipulation,” and a question about its moral status. Prior to presenting a novel theory of manipulation in the following chapters, Chapter 1 offers an overview of the state of the art of philosophical thinking on manipulation. The semantic field of manipulation is constructed by three main concepts: rational persuasion, deception, and coercion. Manipulation cannot, however, be understood adequately on the basis of any one of these concepts, and there is no good theory that accounts for manipulation using a combination of them. The chapter reviews the many difficulties left open by notable attempts to provide an account of the concept of manipulation. The criticisms of those attempts raise the deeper suspicion that perhaps manipulation is not to be captured by a definition at all.