Converting nouns to verbs was a regular neologistic habit for Elizabethan writers, part of their ludic lexical approach. Known as conversion or zero-derivation or nominalization, it is a specific subset of the rhetorical figure anthimeria (the substitution of one part of speech for another). Shakespeare has a variant of noun–verb conversion that is not generally shared by his contemporaries: the use of proper nouns as verbs (‘Petruchio is Kated’; ‘She Phebes me’; ‘it out-Herods Herod’; ‘I would not have been so fidius’d for all the chests in Corioles’). In this chapter I explore how Shakespeare teaches his audience to ‘read’ these coinages; what they do for character in drama; how the Coriolanus example differs from the other occurrences; and what is at stake when we find two occurrences of proper-noun–verb conversion in the Shakespeare apocrypha.

This chapter discusses the importance of the phenomenon of epistemic relativity for Plato’s metaphysics and conception of truth. The argument from epistemic relativity, applied to attributes in the phenomenal world, is Plato’s favored strategy to highlight the need for a separate ontological domain of intelligible essences exempt from relativity. It is also a starting point for his metaphysical conception of truth. After a general discussion of the Platonic perspective on relative attributes, I introduce a set of terminological distinctions that help to categorize his various uses of the truth terminology. I then turn to the Phaedo, as it is the first dialogue to provide a broad exposition of Plato’s new metaphysical vision. I trace the various characteristic aspects of his truth terminology, as they emerge throughout this dialogue, and link them to his idea of philosophy and the underlying metaphysical conception. The last section discusses how a passage in the final proof of immortality qualifies the stark metaphysical dichotomy of truth and appearance by pointing to the possibility of certain kinds of determinate truth pertaining to objects in the phenomenal world.

This chapter argues for the Sophist’s background role in the genesis of the Stoic lekton. It shows the Stoics engaged critically with the ‘gigantomachy’, siding with the Giants by making bodies the sole beings, while introducing ‘something’ (τι) as a supreme genus. The chapter then explores how the Sophist’s question about sentence signification (261d–262e) likely prompted the Stoic reply that a sentence signifies an incorporeal axiōma, a proposition that subsists but may not hold.

This chapter examines how Plutarch, in the De E apud Delphos, integrates the Sophist’s ontological distinction between true being and appearances with the Timaeus’ cosmology. It argues Plutarch that uses the Timaeus to answer the Sophist’s unresolved question about the ontological status of images, identifying the Sophist’s ‘that which perfectly is’ with the Demiurge. Thus, the dialogues are mutually illuminating and a genuine Platonic doctrine of the causes must take into account both.

This chapter draws on Frantz Fanon’s concept of the zone of nonbeing to argue for a deeper engagement with the lived experiences and ontological realities of colonized and racialized subjects in higher education. It applies Fanon’s insights to the affective and epistemic infrastructures of higher education institutions, examining how visibility, audibility, and legitimacy are unevenly distributed across academic spaces. The chapter contends that decolonization requires the development of new political concepts grounded in lived experience, historical struggle, and claims to dignity, rather than reliance on abstract theorization or essentialist identities. By resisting both reductive positionality and the reproduction of colonial logics through fixed categories, the chapter foregrounds anticolonial thought as a site of conceptual and political innovation. It argues that politically grounded conceptual work can revitalize decolonization efforts and open new horizons for higher education by reframing decolonization as an ontological and political project attuned to struggle, relation, and transformation.

The paper discusses Plato’s understanding of ontological truth (alētheia) with reference to the etymology of the Greek word as a noun deriving from lanthanein, ‘to escape notice’. Taking its start from Heidegger’s characterization of alētheia as Unverborgenheit, the paper reviews passages from the Homeric poems and key passages from Plato’s Republic, Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Philebus. The result of this analysis is that Plato’s understanding of ontological truth does not depend on etymological considerations but rather relies on archaic views of the correspondence of being and thought.

Chapter 9 brings together the rich terrain of perspectives on change, revealing how our underlying assumptions shape what we see, how we act, and what strategies we favour. It challenges the idea of a ‘best’ perspective, instead encouraging a flexible, context-sensitive approach. With an emphasis on self-awareness and reflexivity, the chapter shows how recognising – and experimenting with – different viewpoints can open new paths for collaboration and problem-solving. But it also comes with a warning: clinging too tightly to one way of seeing can obscure the bigger picture. At its core, this chapter is a call for intellectual agility, urging change leaders to stay curious, balanced, and aware of the lenses they – and others – bring to the table.

The Introduction outlines the aims and structure of the book. It begins by situating the Cambridge Social Ontology (CSO) project within the Cambridge tradition and outlining its critique of mainstream economics. It then presents the two central components of CSO, Social Positioning Theory (SPT) and Critical Ethical Naturalism (CEN), as complementary accounts of the social and ethical constitution of human life. Attention is given to the ethical and political dimensions of SPT and to the way CEN provides its ontological and moral grounding. The discussion further examines CEN’s Aristotelian roots and its potential to offer a coherent alternative to dominant moral frameworks. The final section introduces the comparative focus of the book, which explores the relationship between CSO and Amartya Sen’s contributions to political economy and ethics. Together, these sections establish the theoretical and methodological basis for the analysis that follows and clarify the importance of ontological consistency for reviving political economy as a comprehensive social science.

This chapter examines Amartya Sen’s ethical writings in relation to Critical Ethical Naturalism (CEN). While Sen’s capability approach and later work on ethics are often read as alternatives to consequentialism and deontology, he never presents them as a systematic moral theory. His emphasis on freedom, capabilities and functionings reflects an implicit realist orientation which some, notably Martins and Lawson, interpret as ontological in character. Lawson further suggests that Sen’s framework might be viewed as a special case of CEN. It is argued, however, that the two projects diverge: Sen’s ethics rests on implicit ontological tensions, whereas CEN is explicitly grounded in ontological coherence. The chapter highlights these tensions, contrasts the orientations of the two projects toward Aristotle and mainstream ethics, explores the sources of Sen’s ontological reticence, and considers the form of embedded liberalism shaping his stance. It concludes by reflecting on whether limited synthesis between the two frameworks is possible.

The conclusion offers an overview of the book’s central arguments. It first reflects on the development of Critical Ethical Naturalism (CEN) within a particular interpretation of Aristotle, showing how this alignment strengthens both its ethical content and its role within Cambridge Social Ontology (CSO). Situating CEN in this way provides a richer ontological grounding for understanding human flourishing and supports the broader project of reviving political economy on realist foundations. The discussion then revisits the comparison between CSO and Amartya Sen, highlighting that while both seek to integrate ethics and economics, they rest on contrasting ontological orientations. Sen’s reluctance to engage systematically with ontology produces conceptual ambiguities that limit the coherence of his framework. The conclusion also considers how Nussbaum’s and Robeyns’s liberal presuppositions reinforce these tensions. It closes by reaffirming the necessity of ontological inquiry for conceptual clarity, ethical critique, and the revival of political economy as a comprehensive social science.

This chapter examines Amartya Sen’s complex relationship with mainstream economics through a Veblenian lens. While Sen’s contributions to development economics and the capability approach are widely seen as transformative, his continued reliance on formal methods reveals an underlying ontological tension. Drawing on Thorstein Veblen’s original use of the term neoclassical, the chapter argues that Sen embodies the same duality Veblen identified in his contemporaries: an implicit recognition of a causal-processual social ontology characteristic of an evolutionary orientation, coupled with a taxonomic conception of science grounded in event regularities. For Veblen, this combination defined the ’neo’ and the ’classical’ aspects of neoclassical economists. Sen’s work, it is argued, remains neoclassical in precisely this Veblenian sense. Analysing this tension helps explain the persistence of ontological inconsistencies across Sen’s corpus and clarifies the diversity of interpretations his work continues to attract within economics.

This chapter examines the key features of Critical Ethical Naturalism (CEN) through a sustained engagement with Aristotle’s ethics and politics. Four central dimensions of CEN are explored. First, its account of humans as community beings, mutually constituted and co-developing, is illuminated through Aristotle’s notions of character friendship and our intrinsically political nature. Second, the Aristotelian conception of eudaimonia clarifies CEN’s understanding of human flourishing. Third, CEN’s claim that all humans are, in a sense, ethical naturalists, owing to their inherent dispositions to care, is reconsidered alongside Aristotle’s view that rational agents choose to endorse caring tendencies not merely because they are natural but because they are good. Finally, the chapter explores CEN’s recognition of human vulnerability and the social conditions that inhibit care, drawing parallels with Aristotle’s critique of defective political systems. Aristotle’s notion of organic social development also deepens the analysis of authenticity in CEN and its relation to human flourishing.

This chapter examines the interpretive consequences of Amartya Sen’s ontological reticence. While Sen recognises the social world as open and processual, his continued reliance on formal, taxonomic methods generates a deep tension that shapes how his work has been received and operationalised. It is argued that the plurality of interpretations surrounding the capability approach reflects not theoretical flexibility but ontological ambiguity. Drawing on developments in Social Choice Theory and mainstream empirical modelling, the chapter shows how Sen’s framework has been adapted within methodologies that presuppose closed systems, thereby diluting its relational orientation. It then contrasts these uses with heterodox applications that foreground an evolutionary outlook. Finally, by examining the contributions of Nussbaum and Robeyns, it is highlighted how liberal conceptions of personhood reinforce ontological inconsistencies and preliminary counters to their claims are offered. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the stakes of these tensions for the future development of the capability approach and its role in the revival of political economy.

This chapter articulates what methodologism as pragmatism means. A central tenet of this view is that doing is constitutive of both meaning and knowing. Methodologism holds that meaning and knowledge arise from following a method – a procedure oriented towards achieving the desired outcome of fixing beliefs or keeping rational conversation going. This framework applies to all epistemic practices. Moreover, methodologism asserts that what is known is not independent of how it is known, thereby bridging the gap between ontology and practice. This line of thought has important precedents in the work of William James, John Dewey, Thomas Kuhn, and others. Crucially, it is the community of practitioners who determine what counts as correctness or incorrectness. Given the diversity of communal rules and regimes of reasoning, pluralism emerges as a natural consequence. Membership in and choice between communities thus carries normative weight. Discursive rationality allows for comparisons between communities in terms of their rationality. Ultimately, it is not merely useful but an ethical obligation – a societal duty to uphold rational practices as a condition of human flourishing.

This chapter explains how the Romantic gnoseology goes together with the concept of a dependent subjectivity. Indeed, the Romantics imagine their ontology as based on relationships (rather than on identity) and, consequently, the self as entangled in a mesh of reciprocal dependencies. This perspective on the Romantic gnoseology begins with the notion of ‘experiment’, which for the Romantics is a genetic method through which the subject–object dualism is undermined. Thinking of philosophy as an experiment implied, for them, accepting that the human being does not dominate nature but is instead constantly influenced by it. The deep relationship between the knower and the known is manifested in feeling, which reveals the primordial connection between subject and object and is at the core of the relational idea of the self. The relational ontology underlying the Romantic conception of feeling is even more evident in their analysis of love as a universal force that unites beings to and in the Absolute. Love designates the network of relationships constitutive of Being, of which the self is not the apex.