Chapter 3 analyzes some of the ways that stereotypes harm people’s sense of self and identity. One way is through expressive harm, which is the harm that results from the unwitting and inevitable perpetuation of stereotypes. Stereotypes have a pervasive cultural power that enables them to control people’s thoughts, feelings, behavior, and social interactions even when people actively disavow the stereotype. Other ways that stereotypes harm people’s sense of self and identity are through the internalization of oppressive social scripts, which ascribe motivations and expectations for behavior, and through stereotype threat, in which people inadvertently and paradoxically act in ways that correspond to stereotypes even as they are trying hard to avoid fitting stereotypes. When people with mental illness internalize oppressive social scripts and experience stereotype threat, they incorporate negative stereotypes into aspects of their experience and identity, which damages their identity and sense of self and also diminishes their autonomy.

The final section reflects on the future of white supremacy, challenging the notion that it is an intractable, unchangeable force. While acknowledging its stubborn persistence over three centuries, the final reflection argues that describing racism as “timeless” or “complicated” often serves to justify inaction. It points to recent global protests following George Floyd’s murder as evidence of growing solidarity across different justice movements. These intersecting struggles against various forms of oppression – from police violence to denial of indigenous land rights – suggest increasing recognition of how different systems of power reinforce each other. The conclusion emphasizes that major social systems have fallen before, and encourages readers to imagine a future beyond white supremacy without limiting themselves to short-term or small-scale thinking.

This chapter investigates the mechanisms of sexist domination and women’s apparent complicity in their own oppression in the Vindication of the Rights of Woman. It takes as its starting point Wollstonecraft’s claim that aristocratic women are as birds in cages who swap their freedom and reason for clothes and food. I ask whether this can be interpreted as a form of adaptive preferences, and, secondly, existentialist bad faith. I argue that while these theories are useful for understanding Wollstonecraft’s schema, they do not suffice to explain it.

Despite negative effects on their health and social lives, many informal carers of people living with dementia claim to be acting in accordance with a moral obligation. Indeed, feelings of failure and shame are commonly reported by those who later give up their caring responsibilities, suggesting a widespread belief that professional dementia care, whether delivered in the person’s own home or in an institutional setting, ought always to be a last resort. This chapter, however, suggests that this common intuition gets things the wrong way around. The most serious injustices engendered by present-day dementia care services are contingent on broader societal structures – they can thus be ameliorated relatively easily (if resource intensively). Informal dementia care, on the other hand, carries similar risks of injustice and is much more resistant to structural reform. While there may be moral obligations to provide informal dementia care in present-day societies, then, they arise because of the deficiencies of professional care, not the virtues of its informal counterpart.

The framework set out in this book reconceptualises the problem of dementia care as a problem of power and social exclusion. At every stage, the goal should be to empower recipients of care to meet their own needs and participate fully in social life as equals, necessitating restrictions on the power of carers and radical changes to our cultural assumptions about and depictions of dementia. Though few would disagree that Western dementia care services are in need of reform, the book’s emphasis on social equality means that the depth and character of the proposed reforms differ significantly from many of those under public discussion. Indeed, as demonstrated in this chapter, significant changes would be needed to the way the UK treats people living with dementia under the law in order to support the reforms recommended in this book.

Secure dementia units (SDUs) rely on a degree of coercive control that might strike many of us as intuitively unjust. This chapter, however, cautions against the idea that justice demands their elimination. Setting out the limits of community care models, it makes the case for the limited use of suitably reformed SDUs. While they ought not to be the first choice for meeting the care needs of people living with dementia, the chapter defends the view that these institutions are essential to the social care infrastructure of a just society.

The case highlights how White privilege penetrates the welfare system in unsuspecting ways. Public assistance programs, like TANF, play an important role in helping families face economic crises. However, the way these programs are implemented can block already vulnerable populations from getting the help they need. White privilege is a CRT tenet that can impact the experiences of welfare recipients. According to CRT, whiteness can perpetuate advantages for White individuals and conversely convey burdens for people of color. Understanding White privilege can help workers to understand some of the unique reasons why individuals end up on public assistance in the first place, and how implicit biases impact the way people of color receive or do not receive benefits.

This chapter addresses the rights of company members to protect their own interests or those of the company. The chapter focuses on the rights of shareholders in a company limited by share capital, but the principles and rules discussed here apply equally to members of companies limited by guarantee. The legal protections and remedies discussed here can arise in a number of situations.

This chapter is concerned principally with the legal remedies that can be sought by minority shareholders. We will see that these are mainly found in the Corporations Act, but we begin by looking at the common law history behind the statutory provisions. Then we turn to the statute, the three main remedies being actions for oppression and unfairness, the statutory derivative action, and the winding up remedy. The chapter then looks at three other forms of legislative action: injunctive relief, access to company information, and the use of civil proceedings by ASIC.

This chapter identifies and examines the elements determining the legal content of any given theory of, or positive law provision for, the human right to resist. It reviews the primary triggers or conditions for activation, indicating the ‘right to resist what’, including ‘tyranny’, ‘oppression’, and ‘other violations’. It reviews the secondary triggers or conditions for activation, indicating the ‘right to resist when’, in particular the necessity condition. It also reviews both aspects of the personal scope, being the rights-holders, indicating ‘who may resist’, and also the duty-bearers, indicating ‘whose corresponding duty’. It identifies a four-fold typology of legitimate ‘object and purpose’, or ‘right to resist why’, being for human rights enforcement, for self-defence, for self-determination, and for ‘peace’ or human security. The final element examined is the material scope of application, or ‘right to resist how’, identifying three competing approaches to permissible means, and affirming proportionality limitations and other applicable limitations in international human rights law and international criminal law, as well as grounds for discretionary non-exercise. This general analytical template for identification and comparison of elements and therefore content is then applied to the evidence of legal sources of the right considered in Chapters 5–7.

This chapter explores Schopenhauer’s views of the political systems in North America, Europe, and China. Schopenhauer understood the United States as a modern republic geared toward maximum individual freedom. He also took note of its high levels of interpersonal violence. Importantly, he repeatedly returned to US slavery as the most egregious example of institutionalized exploitation and brutality. In his treatment of the United States, he then connected republicanism to slavery and concluded that they were tightly associated. Schopenhauer’s argument against American republicanism does not, however, suggest that he endorsed traditional European monarchies. Against both North America and Europe, Schopenhauer instead held up the example of China as an advanced state that was hierarchical and imperial and yet resolutely nontheist. For Schopenhauer, China combined political stability and peacefulness with a philosophically sound atheism and thus demonstrated the realization of his political and his philosophical ideals.