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David Frayman, London School of Economics and Political Science,Christian Krekel, London School of Economics and Political Science,Richard Layard, London School of Economics and Political Science,Sara MacLennan, London School of Economics and Political Science,Isaac Parkes, London School of Economics and Political Science
In the UK 32 per cent of public expenditure is on transfers to individuals. The most obvious justification for these payments is the ‘diminishing marginal utility of income’. Absolute wellbeing (0–10) is a linear function of log income. So if we give an extra £1 to someone on half average income, their gain in wellbeing is twice as much as if the £1 went to someone on average income. The BCR for transfers to people on half average income is 2:1. However, we do have to allow for the fact that poor people have lower average wellbeing and for the external disbenefit of income inequality.
The biggest transfer is the state pension. As the population ages, the cost of this spirals up. Since people of a given age are now healthier, an obvious response is to raise the ‘state pension age’ (when people become eligible). What are the effects of doing this? In 2018–20 the pension age was raised from sixty-five to sixty-six. We can estimate the effect of this on the wellbeing of people aged sixty-five. On average, their wellbeing fell by 0.12 points (out of 10).
To evaluate the raising of the pension age, we can imagine putting it in reverse. If we monetise the wellbeing benefits of this and compare them with the cost to the state, the resulting BCR is 0.24:1 – not high.
We study the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on public pension spending (PPS) in Japan from 1997 to 2024, employing the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach alongside kernel-based regularized least squares (KRLS), a machine learning method that does not require a predefined functional form. The results show that higher EPU is negatively associated with PPS in the long run, while short-run estimates indicate a significant positive association. The KRLS results show a somewhat larger negative association compared to the ARDL model, and estimates across EPU quantiles indicate that the negative association varies across the EPU distribution. Heterogeneity analysis further shows that the negative association differs between the pre- and post-Abenomics periods and strengthens during major global shocks, particularly the 2008 global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on these findings, we discuss the policy implications and identify directions for future research.
Financial stability in later life remains a pressing concern in the UK as limited pension contributions leave many individuals financially insecure in retirement. While research has mostly focused on work histories to explain the differences, other structural, cultural, and personal factors have received less attention. Using a lifecourse and capabilities approaches, the aim of this article was to explore factors that influence financial planning for later life. The study employed a photovoice methodology with sixteen participants (forty-five-plus years) from Hampshire, England. The study offers novel insights into factors that either positively or negatively affect financial resilience in later life or the ability to plan for it (financial mindsets and behaviours; access to financial knowledge and guidance; prioritising immediate needs in the cost of living crisis; imagining retirement and preparing financially). The study emphasises the importance of de-homogenising individuals’ experiences and highlights the need for lifelong financial education.
Inequality in Russia skyrocketed in the 1990s. The wealthiest businesspeople became oligarchs while average Russians struggled to cover the cost of their basic needs. In this chapter, we examine the rise of inequality in post-communist Russia, and the role that social services – like healthcare, education, and pensions – played in socioeconomic well-being. We show that, with increasing inequality, the provision of social services suffered due to the government’s lack of capacity and finances. The 2010s was a period of rising oil prices and better economic performance. Inequality decreased in recent decades and the provision of social services dramatically improved. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, social policy has increasingly relied on cash payments, including to Russian men in the poorest regions who enlist to fight in Ukraine. At the same time, rising inflation, especially for food, hurts the most for those who are already the worst off.
Malaysia is a rapidly ageing country. Relative to the United Kingdom, its social protection systems are underdeveloped. What is more, its political structure and social practices are different from those of the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the political economy of ageing seems to suggest a stark contrast when the two countries are considered alongside one another. Nevertheless, when programmes concerning income for the retired and the provision of care services for the frail elderly are considered, there are more similarities than might have been expected. Both countries face problems with inadequate pension coverage, and the paper considers how more of the self-employed might be brought into savings plans. In both countries, there is debate on whether pension savings should be directed towards investments in the domestic economy. Both countries face a rapid increase in the number of the ‘oldest old’—those most likely to need support, and policymakers are asking themselves how provision for these people should be improved. This article points out how fiscal constraints have led policymakers in the United Kingdom as well as in Malaysia to encourage the family to increase the part they can play. But in both countries, family members, especially women, are no longer willing, or even able, to carry out ‘traditional’ roles. There are lessons to be learnt in both directions. Moreover, in both countries, more attention should be devoted to understanding and explaining the economic and societal consequences of demographic change.
Mid-century corporate executives received most of their compensation from salaries and cash bonuses, making them highly vulnerable to the top marginal income tax rates. Because executives were also able to negotiate custom pay packages, they adopted policies to dodge those rates. Most importantly, executives were influential in spreading and legitimizing tax dodging not only within their own companies, where they could affect the nature and structure of their own pay packages and those of their employees, but they could influence compensation, benefit and perquisite, and reimbursement policies at thousands more companies in part by lobbying for legislative and regulatory action that officially sanctioned these new policies. Although executive tax dodging was not the only reason corporations partnered with the government in creating the plans that form the backbone of our employer-sponsored retirement and health insurance systems, as well as the stock-based compensation that helped to drive the wealth and pay gap between executives and workers, it was a powerful force in a system that has endured for decades.
Pension policies are an increasingly important topic in British elections. This paper discusses what the first year under a Labour government has meant for pension policy, drawing on the Labour Party’s pre-election pledges, before critically considering future directions of pension policy and areas not currently addressed by the Labour government, or where policies could go further. The paper argues that structural inequalities in the labour market and the pension system persist, with consistent evidence of gender and ethnic inequalities in labour market participation, the nature of such participation, pension outcomes, and a range of financial and non-financial wellbeing indicators. Placing adequacy and fairness at the heart of Labour policy can send a strong message on the government’s part of understanding the complex interactions of opportunities and costs across the lifecourse for individuals from diverse backgrounds, and anticipating further demographic and socio-economic changes in the British society and economy.
Dehlvi’s 1914 memoir raises the possibility that the women of the Meerut were not bazaar prostitutes but “women whose men had been imprisoned” – “respectable” women, wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters. Building on this clue, this chapter asks who were these women, why were they at the cantonment, and how did they regard the British? For answers, this chapter turns to “family pension” records from the 1850s. What emerges are soldiers’ family relationships and, from the British point of view, their scandalous nature. British “Pension Paymasters” came to argue that many bereaved women receiving pensions were not what they claimed to be, namely, war widows. Official distrust of such women grew dramatically in the mid-1850s, largely based on a narrowing definition in the official mind of what constituted legitimate marriage. The result was the denial of pensions to these women and, not infrequently, their criminal prosecution, especially in the region of Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh, whose marriages were deemed insufficiently legitimate. Pension fraud investigations also revealed, in the western reaches around Delhi, the Punjab, and Afghanistan, secondary marriages to younger women.
This research presents the design, pricing, and consumer testing results of a potential private financial product that integrates retirement savings with social care funding through contributions to a supplemental defined contribution pension scheme. With this product, some contributions will be earmarked specifically to cover social care expenses if needed post-retirement. Our research indicates that offering benefits that address both retirement income supplementation and social care funding in a combined approach is appealing to consumers and could help overcome behavioural barriers to planning for social care. As with established defined contribution schemes, this product is designed for distribution in the workplace. Employees can contribute a portion of their earnings to their pension accounts. Employers may partially or fully match these contributions, further incentivising participation. In addition to financial support, participants will gain access to social care coordination services designed to facilitate ageing at home. These services will help retirees navigate care options, coordinate necessary support, and optimise the use of their allocated social care funds, ultimately promoting independence and well-being in later life.
This chapter concentrates on changing provision for retirement over time. In the first years of the republic when funds were scarce and civil wars constant, reform was repeatedly thwarted by recurring conflict both internal and external. Lack of funds further aggravated the State’s inability to provide. Acute instability, commonly known as ‘the anarchy’ followed, making attempts to reform the retirement system futile. In the mid 1840s the Peruvian State was able to provide pensions thanks to the advent of money linked to the sale of the bird-dung fertilizer called guano. President Ramón Castilla was able to pass new legislation and pay more. And it was at this point that institutionalization started to really gather pace. During the fourth period the State continued to provide generous pensions, but this was not enough to ensure stability and at mid-century civil war returned, impacting retirement policies. Finally, the fifth period is concerned with the policies implemented after mid-century when the military court, the fuero was dismantled. State capacity grew and more attention was given to following regulation and ensuring entitlements had been legally acquired.
The introduction presents the main arguments that will be developed in the book and how letters and petitions that were found in the military archive are the basis from which to argue that the military was an institution in the first half of the nineteenth century. The nearly one thousand case studies provide the information that makes it possible to understand the Peruvian armed forces. This chapter also covers the historiographical debate by discussing the notion of caudillos and how although most of the new republics have been seen as controlled by armed men on horseback, the military can be described as an insitution that while having a colonial origin, transformed throughout the wars of independence. The way in which those who became members of the armed forces is analyzed in detail showing that a social system of protection for those who were part of it developed from the colonial systems Comparisons are made with the cases of the United States, France, Spain and the rest of Latin America. This section ends with a description of the book’s structure and a description of each chapter.
In this book, Natalia Sobrevilla Perea reconstructs the history of the armed forces in nineteenth-century Peru and reveals what it meant to be a member. By centering the experiences of individuals, it demonstrates how the armed forces were an institution that created social provision, including social care for surviving family members, pensions for the elderly, and assistance for the infirm. Colonial militias transitioned into professional armies during the wars of independence to become the institution underpinning and sustaining the organization of the republic. To understand the emergence and weaknesses of nineteenth-century Peru, it is imperative to interrogate how men of the sword dominated post-independence politics.
In 1987, the United Nations Brundtland Commission defined sustainability as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” In recent years, the sustainability agenda has grown in importance, with many countries, regulators, industries shifting to implement sustainable practices. For retirement funds this means providing a lasting income in retirement for members, whilst ensuring a positive contribution to society and the environment. Retirement funds, with long-term liabilities, are therefore well placed and can play a significant role in contributing to the overall objective. This paper explores how retirement funds in various countries are progressing this agenda. We then introduce a sustainability reporting index, which measures the breadth and quality of how retirement funds can report on pricing in social and environmental externalities in the provision of a pension promise. The sustainability reporting index includes the financial inclusion aspects of retirement funds as well as how social and environmental externalities can be factored into the running of a fund and how its assets are invested. It explores the key areas that need to be monitored, the types of data required and the types of analytics that can be used by various stakeholders. The sustainability reporting index is intended to provide a benchmark against which various stakeholders can measure the effectiveness of their approach in pricing in these externalities. Actuaries of retirement funds can use the framework to go beyond focussing purely on the financial aspects of a fund, incorporating material non-financial aspects to ensure the provision of a sustainable pension income.
This chapter addresses the implications of the 100-year-life for the future of work and the law of work. To begin with, longer lives will pose severe actuarial challenges to all existing strategies for ensuring retirement income security. At least without a dramatic (and probably unjustified) shift of social welfare expenditures into support of nonworking seniors, most people will probably have to work longer, if they are healthy and able, to generate enough income for retirement. The chapter then turns to how the law of work might have to change to accommodate longer working lives. Leaving aside the law of age discrimination (addressed in another chapter), longer working lives will recast longstanding debates over job security and will highlight the need to make work and work schedules less demanding, especially as workers age. This chapter will explore these challenges and how demographic changes will intersect with changing technology and its impact on the nature and number of jobs.
For about a decade from the late 1990s until the early 2000s, the Chinese state commanded loss-making and other small- and medium-sized enterprises to dismiss tens of millions of older (over age 35), unskilled workers, as it prepared to join the World Trade Organization and the global market. These uncompetitive laborers were left with little or no income or benefits, and many protested. In response, the regime instituted a so-called “social assistance” program, which, this paper shows, did little to address the predicament of these people; the legacy of their layoffs remains to this day.
This report explores key considerations in relation to adopting a dynamic discount rate funding approach and the impacts of doing so in a range of areas, including funding volatility, investment strategy and end game objectives. It considers the advantages and disadvantages of this approach from the perspective of a range of stakeholders and the challenges that need overcoming in order to fully implement and support the approach, for example data challenges and the new skills required in the industry. The report includes sample modelling to highlight the practical issues that arise when adopting this approach. It describes a step-by-step approach for assessing the risks to be considered when determining an appropriate level of assets to provide funding for a sample set of pension scheme cash flows, as summarised in the table below.
Steps involved in determining the funding buffer and discount rate
Step 1
Create an asset portfolio based on best estimate liability cash flows
Step 2
Adjustment for investment costs
Step 3
Buffer: allowance for asset-side risks
Step 4
Buffer: allowance for asset-liability mismatch risk (reinvestment and disinvestment risk)
Step 5
Buffer: allowance for liability-side risks
Step 6
Buffer: consideration of risk diversification when determining the buffer
It also considers how a dynamic discount rate approach fits within the proposed future funding regulations. Finally, the report puts forward recommendations for the IFoA, Scheme Actuaries and TPR.
Consequences of schemes adopting a dynamic discount rate approach could include very different investment strategies with investment in a wider pool of assets, less use of leveraged Liability Driven Investment, fewer schemes targeting buy-out as their end game strategy and an increase in technical work for actuaries in advising on the optimisation of asset and liability cash flows.
I agree that a good pensions system should embody some form of collective risk pooling and that this would be to the advantage of everyone. There are some difficult issues of adverse selection to be solved, however. Moreover, egalitarian concerns are of crucial importance in most countries and they require to go further than collective risk pooling and to take into account that society is more than a system of self-interested monetary transfers between and within cohorts.
This paper is a contribution to a symposium on Michael Otsuka’s book, How to Pool Risk Across Generations. Following Otsuka, one may distinguish three distinct systems of cooperation within a standard pension arrangement: the retirement system, the longevity risk pool and the investment risk pool. It is important to observe, however, that only the retirement system constitutes a genuine system of intergenerational cooperation, the other two are essentially intragenerational, in that they pool risks among members of a cohort. Otsuka is faulted for being occasionally less than clear on these distinctions.
Michael Otsuka argues that collective pension schemes are forms of social cooperation on equal terms for mutual advantage and thus, matters of social justice. In this way Otsuka wants to understand collectively funded pensions in Rawlsian terms. I argue that not all forms of social cooperation are the same and that the specific kind of social cooperation Rawls has in mind is, in at least three central respects, different from the kind of social cooperation involved in the collective pension schemes Otsuka describes.
This article examines premature withdrawals from pension funds that were initiated as responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. It looks at withdrawal programmes both in emerging market and in advanced economies. Although measures might have been expedient in countries where social protection systems (social assistance and job furlough schemes) are relatively underdeveloped, they could also be regressive. Furthermore, they undermined the concept of pension funds as retirement income resources and, in some cases, they might threaten people’s living standards once they became old. The paper also suggests that such withdrawal programmes have a populist flavour.