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This chapter theorizes the activity of public interpretation in making a protest un/intelligible. It draws on the wide range of public responses to the Riots/Uprising and identifies two levels of interpretation at play: between those on the streets who projected the practice of protest into new circumstances and their public audiences; and between different public audiences – hegemonic and alternative, the latter connected to Black counterpublics – whose ways of making sense of the gatherings exemplify practices of understanding and interpretation, respectively. Though both indicate shared expectations of protest, hegemonic and alternative discourses thematized different substantive issues: in the former, racial tension appeared as a central thematic, while disagreements about the proper course of collective action and conversations about the gatherings’ political intelligibility dominated the latter. These respective substantive issues emerged as core themes because of the different interpretive frames each brought to bear, namely, of standpoint, temporal scale, and perspectival plurality. Both began in interpretive equivocation, but hegemonic discourses coalesced quickly around a riot understanding of the events, while alternative ones were characterized by an interpretive plurality that enabled no final understanding to dominate.
This chapter provides an overview of and reflection upon the chapters in this textbook. It uses the philosopher Aristotle to frame its reflections on theory, empirics, and normativity. It locates the chapters into three categories: social scientific (explanatory), historical (understanding), and normative (evaluative). While this does not capture the fullness of each chapter, it provides a way to see what they do in relation to wider trends in International Relations. In addition, the chapter looks to the contribution that these chapters and this textbook make to debates on globality and plurality - that is, how this textbook as a whole contributes to moving beyond the provincialism of Western International Relations theory.
The conclusion clarifies the historical trajectory and the systematic and the systematic upshot of The Life of Freedom in Kant and Hegel. Regarding the historical trajectory, it delimits the new understanding of the transition from Kant to Hegel it has argued for. Rather than depicting Hegel as leaving Kant behind, the investigation has revealed that Hegel’s account has led us deeper into Kant’s problems and has made it possible for us to reaffirm them as part of the vital dialectic of freedom. In terms of the systematic upshot, the chapter clarifies the ways in which we can understand autonomy in terms of living self-constitution. I distinguish the basic freedom of self-constitutive entities shared by living and spiritual beings from the practical freedom of spiritual beings. I clarify the way in which the self-constitution of spiritual beings rests upon and remains dependent upon their self-constitution as living beings. I show that for self-consciously self-constitutive beings, the form of their life necessarily remains a problem. I sketch the necessary internal and external plurality of this form of life, its reflexive character, its self-transgressive nature, and the freedom it requires vis-à-vis its own form. To develop a clear understanding of this form of life, we need a critical theory of second nature.
This book offers a wholly new way of thinking about the ideas, struggles and practices that constituted the 'historical' Cold War. In particular, it seeks to redescribe and defamiliarise what we might think of as Cold War international law in order to bring out a rich but now obscured plurality of law and legal forms during the period and to make visible the ways in which we live and work in the aftermath of this legal order. This book challenges the dominant myths about the history of the Cold War, arguing that far from being defined only by ideologically rivalry, the US and the Soviet Union were engaged in a conjoint project of world ordering.
This chapter provides an overview of major theoretical approaches to morphosyntax in second language acquisition. The chapter starts with an overview of major data collection measures that are used to study morphosyntactic phenomena, including production data, judgment data, and online tasks, self-paced reading in particular. The applications and limitations of the different data collection measures are addressed. The chapter subsequently considers the debate between representational deficit approaches vs. missing surface inflection approaches to difficulties with inflectional morphology in the second language, examining these approaches in the domain of verbal inflection. The chapter then moves on to approaches that consider feature reassembly and morphological (in)congruency and discusses studies in these two frameworks in the domain of number marking on nominals. The chapter concludes with a summary and suggestions for future research.
This chapter and Chapter 9 offer a detailed reading of central arguments in The Human Condition. A striking fact about this study of the “active life” is the absence of any discussion of morality, apart from minimum obligations to keep promises and forgive unintended consequences of action. The chapter sets out the problem, and then offers a conjecture about what moved Arendt to neglect morality: her fear that moral constraints would handcuff human action, which in her view makes life meaningful. The following chapter analyzes that conjecture in depth. The remainder of this chapter sets the stage by examining central themes and vocabulary in The Human Condition. It explains what Arendt means by “human condition”, unpacks her concepts of labor, work, and action and the risks of confusing them, and explains why the human condition of natality (“unto us a child is born”) matters so crucially.
“Common sense” has multiple meanings, some of them familiar and others less so. This chapter pursues the themes of Chapter 6 by disentangling five meanings of common sense and examining how Arendt uses them in her own epistemology. Hers, I argue, is a version of social epistemology, in which the reliability of empirical knowledge turns not only on our own capacities but also on the comparison of our judgments with those of others. Even though Arendt was deeply concerned about skepticism and the collapse of common sense, and occasionally wrote about the philosophical problem of radical skepticism, this chapter argues that she ultimately rejects the problem rather than attempting to solve it.
Chapter 2 provides the historical context of the Ghana–Togo borderland region. I show how the border communities I have visited manifested both plurality and unity, showing strong remnants of Ewe unity despite the border but also dissensions reaffirming the border as a separation. I then delve deeper into the roots of the historical in-betweenness of the border region explaining the multiplicity of political communities layered on top of each other from the precolonial period to the 1956 plebiscite. Finally, I analyse the scholarship’s approach to nation-building projects arising from the border region in the 1950s. While the literature on political activism in the border region concludes on the failure of the diverse political projects that arose, the persistence of these projects today is not fully explained. I argue that the palimpsestic and interconnected nature of political communities in the borderlands contributes to explain this phenomenon – which suggests that other frameworks smaller than the Westphalian conception of nation-state are at work.
We are used to thinking about person, number, and gender as features to which the grammar is sensitive. But the place of animacy is less familiar, despite its robust syntactic activity in many languages. I investigate the pronominal system of Southeastern Sierra Zapotec, identifying an interpretive parallel between animacy and person. Third-person plural pronouns, which encode a four-way animacy distinction in the language, exhibit associativity, a cluster of interpretive properties that have been argued also to characterize first- and second-person plural pronouns. Building on Kratzer's (2009) and Harbour's (2016) theories of person, I propose a plurality-based semantics for animacy that captures their shared properties. The compositional mechanism underlying this semantics ties person and animacy features to a single syntactic position inside the noun phrase. This enables an understanding of these features' shared relevance to syntactic operations, including those underlying pronoun cliticization. In these Zapotec varieties, it is constrained both by person (in the well-known person-case constraint) and by animacy.
In China’s pastoral regions, both formal and informal rules are embedded in society and are continually negotiated and reassembled according to social, cultural and political contexts. In particular, the de facto rules governing rangeland use and access are much more intricate and dynamic than de jure property rights as set forth by statutory law. Through the lens of legal pluralism, this article examines the multiplicity of customary practices in Saga, a pastoral village in Amdo Tibet, where pastoralists develop rangeland practices in multiple contexts to manoeuvre in their struggle for inclusion in wealth building and the right to access rangeland and natural resources. Through three cases of customary practices – grazing bans, pasture patrols and communal summer grazing – this research demonstrates how pastoralists interpret and tailor rangeland governance to meet their expectations. A plural context-based hybrid rangeland governance is visible in Saga, where in response to changing de jure rules, de facto rules are deeply rooted in social, cultural and emotional dimensions. Rather than becoming fixed, de facto rules and practices are always evolving in response to the local context where multiple types of de jure rules apply.
The third chapter of this guide to improving your BSL focuses predominantly on use of the signing space around the body, and pays particular attention to improving your use of pointing, perspective and collocation. Section 3.1 provides detailed explanation of the way that interlocutors make reference to many different things during a conversation and explains that this act of referencing (or pointing) in this way is called ‘deixis’. Several types of deixis are illustrated, along with following discussion of how correct use of perspective and collocation are important. The following section, 3.2, provides examples of common errors made in relation to pronominal and temporal deixis and how to correct them. This includes explanation of the typical perspective and collocation errors that are made when learners overuse the signing space. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 provide exercises that a BSL learner can do to improve use of pointing and to enhance awareness of the perspectives that are evoked when the signing space is used correctly.
This chapter presents an up-to-date overview of what we know about contemporary grammatical variation in England, drawing on a range of sources such as traditional and variationist dialectological investigations, as well as those using new technologies such as smartphone apps and Twitter feeds. It begins with an assessment of how common the use of non-standard morphosyntax is vis à vis Standard English, before presenting a well-cited list of the most widespread features that are claimed to be found right across the country. The chapter then describes contemporary non-standard grammatical variation in England, examining, in turn: verbs, negation, adverbs, prepositions, plural marking, pronouns, comparison forms, articles and conjunctions. Beyond an account of contemporary morphosyntactic variability, this survey also helps us to locate those linguistic features and those geographical areas about which we hold very little up-to-date information, and, in the light of reports of widespread traditional dialect levelling, points to those non-standard features whose vitality appears to be precarious.
Federations present difficulties for prevailing theories of constituent power, which usually attribute ultimate constitution-making authority to a singular people. This article examines how a ‘pluralized’ constituent power functions in federal systems. It argues that the operation of plural constituent power in federations reflects a distinctive model of constitutional formation according to which a ‘polity of polities’ is established and sustained through the maintenance of a tension between plurality and unity.
The author makes the case for a new understanding of the role of consent in international law. She begins by noting that the question of consent should be as central to international law as it is in other fields of law because legal norms give rise to power relations and impose constraints upon those to whom they apply, and those in power want these constraints to be accepted. Yet, the question of consent was, as the chapter claims, never raised in the classical era when State sovereignty made it possible for States to adopt international norms without their subjects’ consent. With the Enlightenment, however, the people’s consent through representation became the foundation of domestic law. Yet, most of the time, representation is, according to the author, formal and serves to justify the law as if it were produced by the general will. Because international law reflects the fickle concurrence of States’ wills, the world community’s law does not rely on popular consent. The world community is confronted with difficult challenges, and it needs, more than ever, norms that can meet this moment.
This chapter locates the Sophists within the context of earlier Greek wisdom traditions and efforts by a variety of individuals (from Hesiod to Parmenides and Pindar) to establish and communicate their own poetic and/or intellectual authority. The Sophists participated in long-standing debates over the relationship between sophia and technê, and over tensions surrounding physical versus intellectual skills, learning, and teaching. They also looked back to the practice of wisdom and maxim collection. There was no dominant tradition under which one could unify the manifestations of sophia in Archaic and early Classical Greece; this complexity was an important aspect of the sophistic inheritance, and is the background against which we must measure individual efforts to claim distinctive achievement. The analysis traces the importance of Hesiodic and quasi-Hesiodic wisdom collections, the emergence of the inquiry into nature and of intellectual and cultural experts known as “sages” (sophoi), and the representation of sophia in sympotic and epinician poetry.
This essay approaches David Tracy’s theme of conversation (‘which animates … the whole posture and method of Tracy’s career’) primarily as social and civil practice. Tracy’s Plurality and Ambiguity (1987) is brought into conversation with present-day cultural critic Sherry Turkle regarding how digitalised communications magnify the ‘interruptions’ of plurality and ambiguity that Tracy suggested mark all conversation. Some early critics suggested that Plurality and Ambiguity: (1) insufficiently considered the ambiguities of one’s interlocutors in conversation; and (2) ignored imperatives for some participants to resist powerful others’ framings of the rational task. Here, our digital situation can help highlight how deep down plurality and ambiguity stretch within any given conversation; as well as how socially fragile and crucial this phenomenon of conversation is. The world of deliberately designed digital platforms highlights how there is always some particular design to ‘the table’ at which conversation participants convene. Theology must learn the necessity of building a culture of genuine theological conversation by means of deliberate and detailed design decisions.
In this book, Rachel Teubner offers an exploration of humility in Dante's Divine Comedy, arguing that the poem is an ascetical exercise concerned with training its author gradually in the practice of humility, rather than being a reflection of authorial hubris. A contribution to recent scholarship that considers the poem to be a work of self-examination, her volume investigates its scriptural, literary, and liturgical sources, also offering fresh feminist perspectives on its theological challenges. Teubner demonstrates how the poetry of the Comedy is theologically significant, focusing especially on the poem's definition of humility as ethically and artistically meaningful. Interrogating the text canto by canto, she also reveals how contemporary tools of literary analysis can offer new insights into its meaning. Undergraduate and novice readers will benefit from this companion, just as theologians and scholars of medieval religion will be introduced to a growing body of scholarship exploring Dante's religious thought.
Since its appearance on the Western landscape three centuries ago, modern capitalism has given rise to a mythology that, unlike previous socio-economic orders, is so powerful that it can function without an ethical embedding – or simply create one in its own image. This essay argues that this end-of-ethics talk is premature, and only obscures the fact that capitalism is plural in its political and ethical forms, and equally varied in its social organizations and relation to the state. Rather than capitalism everywhere creating a homogeneous ethical landscape by bulldozing intermediary institutions and extra-market value spheres, capitalist societies have given rise to an agonistic plurality of political and moral embeddings and contentions. The essay explores this diversity through a comparison of modern capitalisms in Western, East Asian, and Islamic world areas.
This chapter explores three dimensions on which logical plurality may arise. The first is concerned with the application of logic. Traditionally, logic was taken to be universally applicable in the sense that a deductively valid argument can be applied in any discourse or inquiry whatsoever. Some pluralists oppose that view by arguing that there are arguments which, though deductively valid, cannot be applied across the board. Deductive validity, on that view, is domain-dependent. The second dimension concerns semantics. Typically, if logics differ in their logical vocabulary, then they will draw the line between valid and invalid arguments in different ways. Even if the logical vocabulary of two logics is superficially the same, the sets of arguments the logics classify as valid may differ due to differences in the meaning of the logical vocabulary. The third dimension concerns the nature of validity. The most substantial kind of pluralism amounts to claiming that there is more than one extra-systematic relation that qualifies as a relation of logical consequence. The chapter outlines both the pluralist and the monist positions on those dimensions and identifies some core commitments.
In the Oresteia’s central scene, Cassandra tells of being cursed by Apollo to foretell the future but be disbelieved. The Trojan princess, who “cheated” the god in a violent sexual encounter, who survived her city’s extirpation, goes to her own known doom bravely, predicting Agamemnon’s death and vengeance to come. Yet there is an unexplored aspect to this famous and moving scene – Cassandra’s hint of her own continuation in the afterlife. It seems (eoika) to her that she will soon be singing prophecies in Hades. This chapter argues that attention to Cassandra’s potential afterlife changes how we view her prophecies of death and vengeance, her rebellion against Apollo and Clytemnestra, her bravery, her language of closure, and the ironies each of these entail. Moreover, the “poetics of plurality” uncovered in Cassandra’s statement and its uncertain status sophisticate and perhaps even reverse our understanding of her fate.