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David Frayman, London School of Economics and Political Science,Christian Krekel, London School of Economics and Political Science,Richard Layard, London School of Economics and Political Science,Sara MacLennan, London School of Economics and Political Science,Isaac Parkes, London School of Economics and Political Science
Studies of the effects of the police on crime suggest that a 1 per cent increase in local police numbers will reduce local crime by 0.5 per cent. As for the effect of crime on the wellbeing of residents, a leading British study estimated that a 0.5 per cent fall in crime would increase average life satisfaction by 0.0011 points (out of 10). In this chapter we combine these findings, calculating the BCR for one more police officer, using the Treasury approach, which values one extra point of wellbeing for one year at £15,258. The result is a healthy BCR of 12:1.
In Chapter 8, the ease of weaponizing technology is discussed, using the example of machine learning and general AI. The examination applies the lens of technological determinism to the growth of public–private efforts to develop AI that can harm and kill humans. Examples are provided of promising litigation in the US that would allow for attaching civil and criminal liability to human actors responsible for the conduct of AI.
How does the state deliver justice to citizens? Are certain groups disadvantaged whilst seeking help from law enforcement and the courts? This book charts, for the first time, the full trajectory of accessing justice in India's criminal justice system, highlighting a pattern of multi-stage discrimination and unequal outcomes for women seeking restitution from the state. To probe how discrimination can be combated, the book tests whether gender representation in law enforcement — in the form of all-female enclaves or women-only police stations — affects change. The book demonstrates how certain forms of representation can lead to unintended consequences. By utilizing a range of research designs, the book not only casts a light on justice delivery in the world's largest democracy, but also transports readers into the world of crime and punishment in India.
This article examines the ways Black women and girls in Detroit, Michigan, were criminalized and punished as they encountered criminal courts, indeterminate sentences, women’s reformatories, and police brutality from the 1870s to the early 1900s. Detroit was uniquely situated as a border city and a major destination in the Great Migration in the early twentieth century. Black women and girls fled vigilante violence, poverty, and segregation. Women sought new opportunities in the urban North. This article argues that criminal justice institutions laid the foundation for the criminalization of Black women and girls by the early twentieth century. Drawing on archival records, annual prison reports, and historical newspapers, the article traces the ways Black women were categorized and punished in criminal courts, women’s prisons, and encounters with police. The article brings together histories of the reformatory movement, urbanization, industrialization, and segregation to examine how the treatment of Black women and girls in Detroit put in place practices that expanded the carceral reach of the state and excluded people from freedom and opportunity along racialized and gendered boundaries.
The third arrest was of Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh), since Ducroux’s address book led police directly to him. Nguyen’s arrest was critical not only because police were getting closer and closer to the FEB network in Shanghai (he reported directly to Rudnik), but because his incarceration by British police in Hong Kong demonstrated so clearly the vitriolic anti-communism of the imperial powers (especially Britain and France). Nguyen’s arrest also provided an example of the ways Soviet networks functioned to free important agents.
This chapter moves the argument forward by detailing two local protective mechanisms that primarily protect communities through ties to state agents: disrupting operations and reducing targets. Disrupting operations encompasses activities that make it more difficult for state agents to deploy discretionary violence. This intervention ranged in practice from relatively quiet outreach to local police officials to more contentious efforts to provide sanctuary to individuals in grave danger. Efforts at target reduction involve limiting the prevalence and salience of communities susceptible to populist violence (in this case, drug users). In the Philippines, parish-based drug rehabilitation programs, usually in partnership with local state officials, were the most common form of target reduction. After using the parish-based survey to chart the overall distribution of these activities, the authors empirically substantiate their operation through qualitative and quantitative evidence, including parish interviews, experimental evidence from a sample of plausible Philippine police personnel, and survey evidence of ordinary Filipinos.
In the Philippines, the Catholic Church’s high levels of “moral authority” facilitated its local protective interventions. This chapter tests the generalizability of community protection to Brazil and the US, unique cases that nonetheless share key characteristics of populist state violence with Duterte’s Philippines. However, original data analysis replicating, as closely as possible, the analysis in the Philippines does not reveal strong protective effects. Neither is police violence in Rio de Janeiro related to the location of Catholic infrastructure, nor does clergy inclusion in police reform build support among American audiences. The chapter then explains this divergence with the Philippines by turning to lower levels of “moral authority” for religious leaders in Brazil and the US. Crucially, moral authority in those two cases is tied to powerful social cleavages (socioeconomics and race in Brazil, and partisanship in the US). In such environments, religious leaders may possess opportunities for narrower intervention, but will struggle to generate broader community protection.
Protection at the Margins is a ground-breaking account of how and why religious actors protect local communities from state-driven populist violence. Focusing on Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte's notorious 'Drug War,' the book provides an intricate view of how religion, populism, and political violence interact on the ground. Drawing on original surveys of Catholic clergy, experiments with members of the Philippine National Police, spatial data on thousands of drug killings, and dozens of field interviews in these neighborhoods, the book shows how Catholic elites used moral commitment and institutional capacity to influence street-level bureaucrats with discretion over violence, work with secular partners, and challenge populist dehumanization. It also highlights obstacles to protection, in the Philippines as well as Brazil and the United States. Amidst rising global concern about populism and violence, Protection at the Margins generates new insights into how religious actors shielded communities in one of the world's largest mega-cities.
Policing has become a popular topic of inquiry in social science literature, but much of this attention has been confined to traditional forms of policing, focusing on state and municipal police departments or, in the case of schools, have focused on disciplinary policies. In seeking to expand the contours of what the scholarly community defines as police, we focus our attention on the origins of K-12 school policing. Specifically, using a multi-modal historical approach, we provide a history of when and why police were stationed in schools in cities throughout the United States. Focusing on the sequencing of events, we show that when the dominant White status quo is challenged by the movement of Black people into formerly White dominated areas and demands are made for education equity from those groups, the state responds by bolstering fears of violence from Black youth and implementing punitive state structures in the form of placing police officers in schools.
Organizations can behave narcissistically and criminally. Fraternities support a culture that encourages members to cheat and engage in predatory sexual behavior. White supremacist groups engage in retaliatory acts against minorities, Jews, immigrants, and others. Law enforcement agencies, while not narcissistic by nature, attract individuals who hold minorities in contempt. The border crisis led to contracts with Southwest Key Programs, whose staff sexually abused immigrant children.
This paper critically examines the legal and normative implications of remote AI weapons detection (AWD) systems currently under trial in England and Wales. Positioned as a technological solution to rising knife crime and counter-terrorism challenges, these systems claim to reduce reliance on traditional stop and search practices by identifying concealed weapons without physical contact. We make an original argument that such technologies invert the established logic of stop and search – effectively transforming it into a new concept of ‘search and stop’ – with significant consequences for individual rights and police accountability. Through a doctrinal analysis of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), relevant case law from the European Court of Human Rights and England and Wales, and the directed surveillance regime under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the paper addresses five core questions: (1) whether AI-generated outputs can satisfy the legal standard of ‘reasonable suspicion’; (2) whether remote scanning constitutes a ‘search’ in law; (3) the implications of these systems under equality law and police duties under PACE; (4) how the technology engages surveillance law and the right to privacy; and (5) what reforms or safeguards are needed for lawful and legitimate use.
A potentially powerful argument for police abolition appeals to root causes of crime. The root causes of crime are (e.g.) poverty and inequality caused by capitalism. By targeting crime at the roots, we can render the police obsolete and abolish them. I argue here that the root cause argument fails. Despite the suggestive metaphor, the fundamental causes of crime are deep and valuable, or in other words not uproot-able. They are essential to us, or we have good reason not to uproot them. To show this, I develop some simple models or recipes for crime inspired by Thomas Hobbes’s model of conflict in the state of nature and by contemporary theories of crime. The models suggest that at best we can manage these causes, and in turn the resulting crime. There is, however, no hope of fundamental reforms that do away with the need for social monitoring and sanctioning, or policing.
Concerns are rising over far-right support among security forces, given their role in upholding the state’s monopoly on violence. Such support raises fears that far-right ideologies could shape law enforcement practices and undermine democratic norms. Existing explanations often attribute this alignment to authoritarian and law-and-order preferences. Using data from the European Social Survey, this research note examines whether security forces are more likely than the general electorate to vote for far-right parties and identifies the attitudinal drivers of such support. The analysis finds no systematic evidence that security forces vote for far-right parties at higher rates than the broader population. Moreover, immigration attitudes—not law-and-order preferences—emerge as the strongest predictor of far-right voting across both groups. These findings challenge the common view that security forces are uniquely drawn to the far right for authoritarian reasons and underscore the central role of immigration politics in shaping far-right support more broadly.
This article examines how during the 1970s, state, media, and research institutions transformed bōsōzoku – the contemporaneous label for cohorts of motorcycle-riding youth – into an object of governance. Between 1972 and 1979, national news media, police bureaucracies, and legislative authority aligned to transform scattered riding practices into a unified phenomenon. Drawing on police white papers, newspaper databases, and research archives, the article reconstructs the recognition infrastructure through which bōsōzoku moved from journalistic trope to legally actionable population. Preemptive authority did not arrive as a leap but formed the endpoint of a system that had already taught officials what to see, how to count, and when to intervene. Checklists, roadside predicates, and standardized forms aligned across organizations and persisted even as youth practices shifted. The anxiety surrounding bōsōzoku reflected not merely concerns about traffic safety but alarm at working-class youth visibly rejecting corporate-loyalty paradigms of Japan’s “enterprise society.”
Distilling an extensive literature on the First and Second Great Reform Acts, Chapter 3 argues how the Whig view of the period – a view that still largely informs political science research today – overstates both the progressive ideology of reformers and the democratizing effects of the two bills. It also includes two periods that are difficult to fit into a reformist narrative and are subsequently downplayed in most accounts of the English democratization. The first is the several decades of political reaction marked by the crushing of the Luddite movement (1811–1813), the massacre at Peterloo (1819), and the passing of the Six Acts (1819). The second is the repression of the Chartist movement between 1834 and 1848. Both episodes reveal how the British state generally responded to mass protests demanding political change. Rather than conceding to the demands of would-be revolutionaries, the state developed its coercive forces – most notably the police and the Home Office – to meet the new challenge. Even after the Second Great Reform Bill of 1867, political elites still felt they had largely dodged democracy.
In The Resilience of the Old Regime, David Art reevaluates the so-called first wave of democratization in Western Europe through the lens of authoritarian resilience. He argues that non-democrats succeeded to a very large degree in managing, diverting, disrupting, and repressing democratic movements until the end of the First World War. This was true both in states political scientists have long considered either full democracies or democratic vanguards (such as the UK and Sweden), as well as in others (such as Germany and Italy) that appeared to be democratizing. He challenges both the Whiggish view that democracy in the West moved progressively forward, and the influential theory that threats of revolution explain democratization. Drawing on extensive historical sources and data, Art recasts European political development from 1832–1919 as a period in which competitive oligarchies and competitive authoritarian regimes predominated.
Using a sensational case of murder from 1899 as a lens, this chapter explores how little the Belgian capital’s authorities really knew about and how little they actively engaged with what they referred to as la pédérastie. It shows that the police lacked both the mandate and the means to focus on something they clearly deemed a minor nuisance. Unlike in Britain and Germany, homosexual relations between consenting adults in private were not illegal. Unlike in France, where the legal situation was similar, Belgium’s more decentralized make-up impeded the formation of effective and efficient law enforcement authorities even in big cities. No unit epitomized the growing pains of an underfinanced police force in a booming city more than the vice brigade. Policing sex in public was difficult and unrewarding. As the records of dismissed cases reveal, the police and the courts regularly found themselves instrumentalized in the settling of personal scores and they were often forced to retreat in frustration over mutual or unverifiable accusations. Most exasperating of all was the insurmountable wall of secrecy, solidarity, bribery, and obstructionism they faced when dealing with the queer world.
Chapter 3 shows that although urban denizens increasingly sought to prevent loss, possessions still went missing on London’s streets. In response, Londoners established and developed systems of reclamation. Institutions such as the Goldsmiths’ Company and the Bank of England were important in developing systems for dealing with lost plate and bank notes. However, alongside these systems, in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century, the capital’s residents also benefited from the great age of print culture. Londoners printed handbills and had them pasted up around the city, but a big change took place with the onset of newspaper publications. Newspapers such as the London Gazette and daily newspapers such as the Daily Courant included advertisements for lost watches, strayed dogs and servants who had runaway. As the chapter shows, the efficacy of such notices was at times bolstered by thief-takers, but as the century rolled on, the advertisement themselves became more popular. The chapter shows how urban denizens often sought to simply reclaim their possessions rather than pursuing the prosecution of the thieves who so often ‘found’ them.
Personal experiences with public officials influence how those officials are perceived. We question whether these experiential effects extend to other officials. If people draw on what they know to make inferences about unfamiliar evaluative targets, then interactions with one actor may shape evaluations of other independent actors. Focusing on police and courts, analyses of data from two surveys reveal that personal interactions with public officials produce spillover effects on appraisals of officials in different sectors. The findings indicate that experiential spillover constitutes an underappreciated force in public opinion, one that operates outside the control of the actors being evaluated.
For most of the period from the end of the Ancien Régime to 1818, there was a form of state censorship of the stage: a bureaucratic censorship process. This chapter stretches as far back as 1402 to understand the culminative measures that shaped a play’s path on the eve of the Revolution – in both Paris and the provinces – before analysing the numerous and, at times, conflicting Revolutionary orders relating theatre surveillance. It argues that the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (August 1789) transformed such censorship from a necessary part of the creative process to a coercive force. It also demonstrates that although the Revolution is remembered for the ‘freedom of the theatres’ with the law of 13 January 1791, bureaucratic censorship was swiftly reintroduced, and the process was expanded during the Revolutionary decade and solidified further under Napoleon and the Restoration.