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Over two million bureaucrats serve in the US federal government under various employment contracts. Minju Kim's Taming the Careerists asks how the design of those contracts – specifically, the features that strengthen or weaken job protections – shapes the behavior of bureaucrats and, in turn, American foreign policy. While past studies identify tools that help the president control the bureaucracy, Kim demonstrates that the president can additionally control the behavior of bureaucrats by weakening job protections, which makes bureaucrats more accountable to presidential preferences. The book shows that bureaucrats adjust how they implement policy based on the structure of their job protections, and that weakening these protections can unintentionally disrupt the stability of foreign economic policy. Drawing on administrative data, policy memos, interviews, and computational text analysis, Kim reveals the trade-off between accountability and stability, shedding light on the personnel management rules that quietly sustain the daily work of America's foreign policy bureaucracy.
This chapter examines how conditional tenure as a contract feature shapes bureaucratic behavior, focusing on the distribution of trade compensation by the Department of Labor. The analysis centers on the implementation of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), a program consistently supported by the Democratic Party to help American workers displaced by international trade. The TAA program is administered by bureaucrats who must demonstrate three years of high-quality service before securing permanent appointments. Using daily TAA petition records from 1975 to 2020, the chapter shows that TAA petitions were less likely to be certified and more likely to face delays under Republican presidencies than under Democratic ones – but only when handled by investigators who had not yet attained tenure. These findings demonstrate that even career bureaucrats, though not directly appointed by the president, can be susceptible to partisan pressure when their job protections are limited.
Bureaucrats in democracies and international organizations are frequently criticized for lacking democratic accountability. Across time and countries, elected officials have expressed frustration over the challenges of controlling behavior of bureaucrats. How do political leaders attempt to exert control over bureaucrats, and how do bureaucrats respond in turn? More importantly, what do these responses mean for the implementation of foreign policy and global governance programs? Taming the Careerists addresses these questions within the context of US foreign policy, emphasizing how job protections embedded in bureaucrats’ employment contracts shape behavior of bureaucrats in foreign affairs. This introductory chapter presents the book’s central argument, explains its significance, and provides an overview of its structure.
This chapter examines how renewal as a contract feature influences bureaucratic behavior, focusing on the decision-making of commissioners at the International Trade Commission in trade remedy cases. It leverages the institutional change created by the Trade Act of 1974, which eliminated the possibility of commissioner reappointment and thus shifted their contracts from renewable to nonrenewable terms. The analysis shows that, after the reform, commissioners were more likely to cast votes that reflected their own judgments rather than aligning with the chairperson's preferences. These individual-level dissenting votes contributed to ITC rulings that were less tied to the orientation of the chairperson’s political party.
This chapter introduces contract design as a mechanism through which presidents can influence bureaucratic behavior, distinguishing it from other established tools of bureaucratic control. It elaborates on the carrot-and-stick framework and explains how removal, renewal, and conditional tenure function within that structure. Drawing on this framework, the chapter derives three empirical expectations and outlines how they will be examined in subsequent chapters. Because Taming the Careerists centers on implementation of foreign policy in trade and immigration, the chapter also explains the rationale behind this case selection. Finally, it describes the data and methodological approaches used to evaluate the empirical expectations.
This chapter examines how removal as a contract feature shapes bureaucratic behavior, focusing on its effects on the adjudication of H-1B visas for high-skilled foreign workers. It centers on unilateral appointees – bureaucrats directly appointed by the president who can be removed at will. The chapter shows that the rise in H-1B visa denials following the Trump Administration’s Buy American and Hire American Executive Order is associated with a higher concentration of unilateral appointees within the Department of Homeland Security. Using internal policy memoranda and computational text analysis, the chapter identifies the mechanisms through which these appointees influenced the processing of H-1B applications.
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