Following the gains of the Civil Rights era, African American political thought entered a period of reconstitution and reimagination in response to widespread backlash. While the violence of post-Reconstruction Jim Crow was not replicated, the retreat from racial egalitarianism was evident in conservative political ascendancy, the reshaping of public discourse around freedom and equality, and bipartisan efforts to minimize the significance of racial injustice. This political and social environment prompted African American thinkers to reconsider traditional liberal and socialist frameworks, shifting attention to questions of identity, culture, history, and narrative.

Amid declining organized political agitation, African American thought diversified. On the right, Black conservatism and Afrocentrism emphasized personal responsibility, moral virtue, and cultural reclamation as tools for empowerment. On the left, Black feminists, critical race theorists, and prison abolitionists interrogated structural inequality and exposed the limits of liberal institutions. Across ideological divides, these thinkers shared skepticism of the welfare state and multiracial democracy, focusing instead on alternative strategies for justice, including ethical community formation, narrative, and historical memory.

This chapter answers the question, posed in Chapter 3, of who owes reparations for the wrongs of the past. The chapter defends the view that people in the present can be responsible for the actions of people in the past if we share a kinship or association with those people. The chapter discusses a distinction between core and penumbral agency and argues that we can be morally responsible for what happens in our penumbral agency even if we do not take responsiblity for these occurrences. Relying first on discussions of moral luck, the chapter aims to show that we are morally responsible for areas beyond our active agency already. Then the chapter discusses some alternative conceptions of agency, first relying on some Indigenous views of kinship, then relying on one reading of agency during the transatlantic slave trade. The chapter does not defend this conception of agency against more narrow views, but rather presents them as an important alternative to narrow, will-based views of agency.

This chapter is a critical evaluation of DEI, which became confused for racial reckoning and a target for the continuing backlash. It argues that there are two strains of DEI, the more popular corporatized DEI that seeks enhanced institutional belonging and economic pluralism and the more inclusive DEI that values increased representation of groups left out. Only inclusive DEI offers remedial possibilities for racial reckoning. Historically, both versions of diversity emerged as compromise positions for true racial accountability after remedial objectives were discarded by the Supreme Court in cases like Bakke. However, the viciousness of recent attacks on diversity and DEI by both conservative judges and the second Trump administration demonstrate its continued importance as an idea associated with racial reckoning, which must be vigorously defended on First Amendment grounds or risk the disappearance of Black presence and the erasure of Black identity.

The epilogue reviews the central conclusion—that racial reckoning must focus mainly on material accountability for cumulative racial inequality, especially at the local and state level—before summarizing many of the principles, goals and strategies discussed in the previous chapters. For instance, a key principle is to view policies about the way public goods are distributed through the lens of racial equity, even if the solution is to pursue race-neutral means. An underlying goal is to promote democracy through the deconcentration of social capital. The strategies that follow include specific, mostly localized policy choices in the areas on which the book focuses: place-based inequality, the racial wealth gap, racial health disparities, deterrence of police misconduct, DEI and equitable growth at the local level. There is also a brief example of a reparations program for urban renewal.

Chapter 7 covers the first German challenge to Anglo-American hegemony, culminating in World War I. Germany rose rapidly from unification to confront the United Kingdom, its ascent partly attributable to an imperfect replication of the British model of commerce and colonies. Yet while the English hesitated to practice cold economic warfare, when the shooting finally started they were quicker than the Germans to blockade the adversary and bring commercial pressure on neutrals. London took only half-steps after the war to restore the trading system, making numerous discriminatory compromises that multiplied with the onset of the Great Depression.

This chapter looks at the relationship between papyrology and race from a historical and disciplinary perspective. European imperialism, from Napoleon’s expedition onwards, enabled the legal and illegal transfer of a hundred thousand papyrus fragments from Egypt to Europe and North America. The process was sustained by White race supremacy ideas, which most scholars embraced, according to which Egyptians and their Ottoman ruling elite were incapable of appreciating the real meaning of antiquities, including manuscripts, putting at risk their preservation. The accumulation and archival of papyri in European and North American collections went hand in hand with a programmatic exclusion of Egyptians from studying the material and was functional to the creation of a new academic field, papyrology, controlled by White classicists. The chapter’s conclusion opens question about future directions, regarding both colonial collections and institutional inequality.

Chapter 6 analyses how legal procedures were included in the Paris Peace Treaties in order to solve one of the most sensitive and politically controversial questions of the post-war order: the payment of reparations from former Central Power governments or individuals to Allied individuals. In accordance with the peace treaties, 39 Mixed Arbitral Tribunals were established after 1920 to decide on private Allied claims for damages that had occurred during the war due to acts by former Central Power governments or individuals. The fact that an international court system permitted private individuals to raise claims against foreign governments was seen as a radical novelty; and even more so since tens of thousands of claimants throughout Europe and beyond attempted to receive compensation for claimed losses. From an Allied point of view, these new tribunals served justice, deemed to be at the core of the Paris Peace Treaties system. Yet, for the former Central Power governments, their legal advisers, and scholars, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals were nothing but elaborate examples of victor’s justice characterized by unclear competences and applicable law.

After the shallow stabilities of the mid 1920s, marked by Locarno and modest economic recovery, the Great Depression returned Europe to crisis. The Versailles order crumbled, from Stresemann’s western conciliation to national minority protections. Then, presaged by his predecessors’ burial of reparations and plans for rearmament, Hitler’s aggressively distinctive program unfolded: accelerated German restoration; economic autarky; racially defined Lebensraum in the east; heedless antisemitism. In response, Britain and France wavered. French policy oscillated among cynicism, fatalism, and confusion. Prioritizing imperial security, Britain decisively rearmed, aiming to counter Japan and Italy, while containing Hitler in western Europe. By 1937, under new Prime Minister Chamberlain, that approach solidified into “appeasement”: satisfying Hitler in eastern Europe would reduce Britain’s European obligations; free its ability to protect the Empire; create time to rearm. With the naivety of imperial arrogance, Chamberlain expected Hitler to be lastingly bought off. During the intensifying brinkmanship of 1937––1938, culminating in the Munich Conference, he followed that course to its end.

The rules of state responsibility are set out in the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. This chapter introduces the basic features of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, beginning with an explanation of what constitutes an internationally wrongful act. It then discusses the circumstances precluding wrongfulness that may be invoked by states seeking to avoid responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. The chapter then covers the aftermath of an internationally wrongful act, which can involve legal consequences, such as reparations, as well as countermeasures. This chapter focuses specifically on the responsibility of states, rather than the responsibility of international organizations or individuals.

Reparation programmes for redressing human rights harms form a central pillar of transitional justice. Reviews about the success of such programmes, however, remain mixed: in terms of outcomes, they often fail to meet the justice needs of affected populations; in terms of process, there is agreement about the importance of meaningful participation, but only a minimal understanding of how to carry this out effectively. To develop a sound theoretical framework to guide actors interested in developing reparations programmes, this chapter builds on the theory of relational justice to provide both an instrumental and legal justification for inclusive processes in the design, implementation, and evaluation of reparations programmes. We argue that reparative processes should be mindful of building and repairing relations, especially between affected populations and the government that failed to protect them. We conclude by proposing four criteria we believe are fundamental for taking a relational justice approach to reparations.

Victims’ demands for reparations are epitomised as a non-violent resistance to the violence they have suffered. The chapter explores how victims resist state narratives, coercive tactics, and violence in their claims for reparations, reflecting on the long-term impact of such resistance. Drawing on interviews with over 100 victims across six case studies, the chapter develops three themes around resistance: social mobilisation; self-repair; and the struggle for reparations. It examines various forms of non-violent resistance, including bottom-up approaches, documentation of violations, and the creation of subalternate perspectives. The chapter also addresses the role of social movements in reparations, emphasizing the dynamic process of collective identity formation, grievance framing, and the negotiation of justice. In conclusion, the chapter underscores the importance of understanding reparations as a multi-faceted struggle involving legal, political, and social dimensions, and the need for continued advocacy and research to address the complexities and challenges faced by victims in their pursuit of redress.

Governments command tax revenue to provide services. The US government’s revenue is lower than that in Western European nations. The latter provide services such as universal healthcare, paid parental leave, and free education. A large portion of the US government’s revenue supports the military, which comprises almost half of the world’s total military expenditures. The richest 400 American families pay the lowest tax rate today, in sharp contrast to their paying the highest share in the 1950s. The federal government borrows to pay for services rather than resort to taxing the rich. Americans seem more accepting of not redistributing wealth than Western Europeans. Policies not supported by the elite are unlikely to become law. Poorer people are less likely to vote in the US. Since the 1950s, US states with the most liberal policies have had better mortality trends than conservative states. Americans prefer medical care spending over public health and social spending. Neoliberalism has increased economic inequality and produced a rightward political shift. Reparations can improve racial inequalities

Abstract: This chapter considers three key types of international judicial remedies, exploring their content, availability, and behavioural influence. Through Mere Adjudication, an adjudicator establishes the existence, applicability, and content of legal rules. Through a Declaration of Breach, a court declares that a party’s conduct violates legal obligations. Where a violation is found, international courts often establish Consequential Duties, determining how a wrongdoer must act to bring an end to its violation and provide reparation for injury. Overall, international judicial remedies seek to prevent states’ adoption of unilateral remedies, grounded on their own understanding of the law and facts. International courts are unable to determine the application of coercive measures against states. Thus, every remedy is a communication regarding either the interpretation of the law or the application of this law to conduct. Judicial pronouncements have remedial value if they are able to mobilise pro-compliance forces, internal and external to states, by which the international normative framework guides state conduct.

Chapter 3 argues that the Kremlin’s main goal was to win the war as quickly as possible. Its second goal was to impose friendly governments to help with the war effort and to ensure future control. Its third policy objective was the economic exploitation of occupied areas. The well-being of civilians did not register as an issue unless the Red Army’s ill-disciplined conduct became a political problem. The countries that fought against the Soviet Union – Romania, Hungary, and Austria – faced more severe occupation policies than Bulgaria or Yugoslavia.

This chapter examines the drastic deterioration of US–Soviet relations from 1945 to Stalin’s death in 1953. It argues that the “cold war” was neither inevitable nor an objective reality. Instead, the shift from negotiation to confrontation was spurred by misconceptions, and the intense mutual enmity stemmed from subjective constructions as much as divergent fundamental interests. US leaders’ expectations that America’s unrivalled economic strength and monopoly on nuclear weapons would lead the USSR to go along with US plans for the postwar world collided with Soviet leaders’ determination not to be intimidated or to relinquish their domination of Eastern Europe. Journalists and propagandists on both sides worked to reshape public images of their former allies, stoking fears and inflaming ideological differences that had been set aside earlier. Key US officials, particularly George F. Kennan, exaggerated the US ability to shake the Communist system’s hold on the peoples of the USSR. through propaganda and covert action. Meanwhile, Soviet propagandists misleadingly depicted American media demonization of their country as part of US preparation for war against the USSR.