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What can this book’s performative theory of protest offer contemporary practices and analyses of protest? Developed with reference to two gatherings in the recent past, this theory provides neither a checklist nor rules to use in practicing, interpreting, and studying public gatherings. Nevertheless, the conclusions it draws about protest’s central criteria and the conventions it reconstructs at each register can inform a critical examination of the conditions under which other gatherings may have counted as political action or failed to. Moreover, the analytical arguments Unruly Acts makes about convention, publicity, and the relations between the gathered and their audiences bring questions of audience engagement to bear on performative and radical democratic thought. Briefly examining the January 6, 2021, Capitol storming and the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests, the chapter suggests that our ordinary ideas of protest have enduring force but are open to improvisation, public interpretation, and contestation.
What counts as a protest – and what sets it apart from a riot? This chapter introduces these as the key questions animating the book and specifies why they are especially urgent ones for the historically marginalized. It presents the book’s core argument, explaining that our ordinary ideas of protest see it as the material, affectively rational act of a political collectivity and proposes that public audiences make sense of a gathering based on these criteria of materiality, collectivity, and affect. While criterial conventions are the terms of protest and interpretation, however, they cannot determine a gathering’s political legibility. The chapter suggests that legibility is also a matter of relation and mutual attunement between those gathered and their audiences. The chapter distinguishes Unruly Acts from recent scholarship in political theory, explains why its performative framework is appropriate for the questions under consideration, and outlines its critical engagement with J. L. Austin and Judith Butler’s performatives. After describing the reconstructive approach the book adopts, the materials it analyzes, and the instances of public gathering under analysis – the 1992 Los Angeles Riots/Uprising and the 1994 anti-Prop. 187 march in the same city – the chapter concludes by summarizing the book’s plan.
By the early seventeenth century, England’s prisons were reaching breaking point. Prison unrest and rioting became increasingly common as prisoners agitated against reportedly parlous conditions, extortionate fees and abusive treatment. In the process, they formulated more general critiques of the prison system. Chapter 5 explores in detail an interrelated set of disturbances within London’s Fleet and King’s Bench prisons between 1618 and 1621. This period of collective violence and the petitioning that followed precipitated political and rhetorical shifts in prisoners’ arguments, from opposing corruption within prisons (based on local custom) to new calls for the abolition of imprisonment for debt (based on the ancient constitution). By this means, prisoners developed a diagnosis of their condition alongside a set of remedies that challenged prevailing carceral ideologies rather than reinforcing them. Thus, this chapter suggests that while political languages based on the past could help negotiate the terms of subordination, they could also directly challenge assumptions about social order.
Agitation in England’s prisons came to a head in unison with midcentury political tensions. By 1641, prisoners for debt had begun to connect their suffering at the hands of a supposedly corrupt and unjust legal system with developing national concerns about tyranny and arbitrary rule under Charles I. Indeed, the anti-carceral sentiments explored in Chapter 5 had not died out in the 1620s, but formed a tradition of prison politics that simmered under the surface of Caroline rule and increasingly intersected with concerns about political uses of incarceration. Chapter 7 thus explores the civil war legacy of prison activism and abolitionist arguments first developed in the 1620s, following them into a wider political realm. It reconstructs a new period of turmoil within the King’s Bench between 1640 and 1649. On the eve of civil war, prisoners republished abolitionist arguments developed in the 1620s, now placing particular emphasis on legal and political oppression. This agitation also provided the basis for new collaboration between prisoners and London’s radicals, facilitating exchanges of ideas that impacted upon prison activists, radical movements and contemporary political debates alike. Thus, prisons had become crucibles of radical thought and organisation as disaffection with state and legal authority fed into political conspiracy.
This chapter argues that disproportionate police brutality against Black people is a fact of every American generation because the systems of oversight are not designed to deter it. The history of unchecked misconduct shows that criminal charges are almost unheard of because police criminality is not perceived as criminal. Civil constraints also face numerous structural obstacles--from a failure to monitor to a range of doctrinal roadblocks judges have imposed on federal civil rights laws. Many cases never get to court because of administrative hurdles drafted into collective bargaining agreements. Despite a small number of exceptions, the consistent result is a mutual lack of trust between Black communities and the public safety officers they count on and a systemic lack of deterrence when policing goes wrong.
Chapter 1 discusses Linton Kwesi Johnson’s poems on Black youth, which intone a politics of resistance in the 1970s and early 1980s in the contexts of anti-Black violence, aggressive policing, and riot. For Stuart Hall, “policing the crisis” is tantamount to policing the category of “Black youth” as the social category through which the structural features of crisis become violently inflicted. LKJ’s dub poems “sound the violence” across Dread Beat and Blood, Inglan Is a Bitch, and his landmark poem on the 1981 Brixton Uprisings, “Di Great Insohreckshan,” which I read in the pages of Race Today (1982), where it was first published. The chapter concludes by discussing the poet’s literary acclaim with the Penguin publication of Mi Revalueshanary Fren in 2002. The arc of LKJ’s career – from a space of autonomy and advancing a politics of resistance to his literary recognition and canonization even as his writing illustrates how racial violence and social inequality persist and deepen – distills the movement of this book as a whole.
Chapter 5 studies the ways in which Bhanu Kapil and D. S. Marriott, two innovative British Asian and Black avant-garde writers based in the US, renovate lyric to invent a poetics of riot in the twenty-first century. The surplus of crisis – or what Joshua Clover has theorized in Riot. Strike. Riot as the new era of uprisings due to surplus economic immiseration disproportionately affecting racialized populations – appears in experimental form, which I call “surplus lyric.” In Ban en Banlieu, Kapil composes a cross-genre experimental poem to mediate instances of racialized violence against women spanning London, New Delhi, and the Bay of Bengal. In contrast, Marriott gives lyrical expression to a poetics of riot through his adaptations of the London-based underground musical genre of grime in his collection Duppies. Kapil and Marriott hold in common a political stance that envisions not progressive transformation but rather a radical abolition of the structures that perpetuate racial violence in Britain and elsewhere.
Wetland projects were a leading example of improvement in action in early modern England, offering a counterpoint to many unrealised schemes and dreams that litter the archives. But such ventures were fraught with paradoxes: property rights were transgressed to make more certain ones, while drainage created new floods. Centring the engineers, investors, landowners, settlers, and labourers who propelled improvement on the ground, this chapter examines how their ambitions were altered and restricted by the polarised environmental politics that emerged in Hatfield Level. Improvement was a risky endeavour and the costs of conflict were high. Asking how contemporaries evaluated its ambiguous results in Hatfield Level, this chapter charts the revival of wetland improvement by the network of reformers that coalesced around the ‘intelligencer’ Samuel Hartlib in the mid seventeenth century. The experience of conflict surfaced in debate about, and experiments with, technologies of improvement, which promised to marginalise social negotiation and environmental contingencies.
What should we make of the dramatic appearance of the Leveller leader John Lilburne in Hatfield Level in 1651, at the height of a decade of anti-improvement riots? This unusual contact between central radicalism and rural unrest destabilises binaries between a zealous minority driving civil war conflict and indifferent provincial subjects. Fen projects instead expose the pluralism of political ideas in seventeenth-century England. These crown-led ventures polarised notions of justice and became entangled in the events and debates propelling the English civil wars. In Epworth Manor, commoners across the social spectrum asserted an inalienable ‘just right’ to wetland commons in the face of royal and republican coercion. The strength of customary politics extended far beyond the parish, becoming a powerful means to articulate opposition to improvement in conflicts that moved between wetlands and Westminster. Central governors ultimately struggled to exercise a monopoly over legitimacy or violence in Epworth, where collective action across almost a century repelled efforts to turn their commons into theatres of state power and national productivity.
This chapter traces British American cities as distinctive political spaces that helped pioneer the concept of citizenship, a term that originally meant a city resident, and stood at the forefront of much of the political protest leading to the war for independence. However, from their inception, most American cities were subordinated to their provincial legislatures which were dominated by rural interests. Meanwhile the concept of citizenship came to be associated more with a set of actions rather than a place people lived. All the largest cities were occupied during the war, forcing residents to make difficult decisions and heightening the distrust leveled against them after the war. After the war, most urban residents remained minorities subordinated to the interests of mostly rural polities. Once the cradles of citizenship, most cities were not further empowered as polities by the American Revolution, but continued to be or were more sharply constrained by rural elites after the war concluded.
In the Later Roman Empire (AD 300–650), power seems to manifest itself mostly through legislation, bureaucracy, and an increasingly distant emperor. This book focuses instead on personal interaction as crucial to the exercise of power. It studies four social practices (petitions, parrhesia, intercession, and collective action) to show how they are much more dynamic than often assumed. These practices were guided by strong expectations of justice, which constrained the actions of superiors. They therefore allowed the socially inferior to develop strategies of conduct that could force the hand of the superior and, in extreme cases, lead to overturning hierarchical relations. Building on the analysis of these specific forms of interaction, the book argues for an understanding of late antique power rooted in the character and virtue of those invested with it.
Offers a wide-ranging yet nuanced account of the articles and reviews of The Rite of Spring that emerged in the Parisian press – the daily newspapers and specialist music and theatre journals – around the time of the premiere in May 1913. In doing so, this chapter seeks to chip away at some of the myth-making and exaggerated rhetoric that has contributed to our (mis)understanding of the supposedly riotous first night at the newly built Théâtre de Champs-Élysées, Paris. Close examination of the press reveals what, or rather who, most angered or else stupefied spectators and how choreography, music, decors and costumes were regarded by a select audience. Broader social and political tensions come to the fore as reports in the press are read in the context of a wider cultural history of the period.
Ideology can be understood as a type of cultural system, a set of interrelated meanings that are symbolically mediated through semiotic devices such as metaphors. Ideologies underlie social orders as well as help people make sense of their environment and decide on courses of action. While much has been said about ideology, little has been written on the sources of ideological change beyond pointing to ideological entrepreneurship. Even less has been written on the relationship between violent and disruptive social movements and ideology beyond pointing to the ideological motivations for the movements. We contend that extreme protests are often triggered by an ideological crisis, that is, an intolerable disconnection between the ideology adopted by some group and the current circumstances or, alternatively, an inability of their ideology to make sense of their current situation. Moreover, extreme protests are a form of ideological work, as they are often sources of ideological inspiration, development, and change.
The aim of this study is to elucidate the genesis of communality in the urban street. Although in the modern world cities have long been seen as research laboratories, in today's context of globalization they are becoming more radical and dynamic; they are becoming experimental theatres of social change. Since the end of the twentieth century, the political and economic reorganization of the world order is producing dramatic changes in various societies throughout the globe. This is bringing about changes which tend to standardize society and atomize individual subjects. These changes are seemingly connected, but they do exist alone, separately. In this complex situation, we are confronted with the fundamental question, how can people construct communality transcending differences among them? The present study looks for an answer to this question, paying special attention to collective violence in the urban street, where ‘emergent but real’ norms are constructed among the rioters and the communality genesis mechanism is activated. In order to make a case for this urban communality, the analysis focuses on events in the streets of Nairobi at the time of the Second Liberation of 1990s and during the Post-Election Violence of 2007–2008. People with different political and religious affiliation and ethnic identity were involved in violent urban riots. They were originally strangers, but they generated new social order and norms. In the street, they constructed and shared a provisional communality, which was emergent and fluid but also real and firm.
During the Tokugawa period, commoners developed increasingly sophisticated methods of challenging what they perceived as unjust government policies or unethical behavior by the wealthy. Popular movements coalesced around petitions that stated grievances. They typically took the form of mass demonstrations that required preparation, organization, and leadership. Even urban food riots had a logic to them. In many cases, they erupted after women had called on merchants to feed the poor, and they followed a code for conduct that cautioned against stealing. In the early nineteenth century, farmers created village leagues that employed representatives to manage issues with regional implications and make their case for commercial policies. In some instances, they argued that all human beings are equal, an argument made unsuccessfully by outcaste villagers. Villagers commemorated popular movements in chronicles and tales, mixing fact and fiction in the interests of a good story, and they remembered their fallen leaders in memorial services.
This chapter traces British American cities as distinctive political spaces that helped pioneer the concept of citizenship, a term that originally meant a city resident, and stood at the forefront of much of the political protest leading to the war for independence. However, from their inception, most American cities were subordinated to their provincial legislatures which were dominated by rural interests. Meanwhile the concept of citizenship came to be associated more with a set of actions rather than a place people lived. All the largest cities were occupied during the war, forcing residents to make difficult decisions and heightening the distrust leveled against them after the war. After the war, most urban residents remained minorities subordinated to the interests of mostly rural polities. Once the cradles of citizenship, most cities were not further empowered as polities by the American Revolution, but continued to be or were more sharply constrained by rural elites after the war concluded.
This essay examines the reciprocal contest of wills as mediated through the use of political violence from roughly 1773 to the end of the war in 1783. In other terms, it covers the escalating application of violence and how that led to outright war in April 1775, as well as the war itself. In both periods, violence was used to influence the will of one’s opponent and the political preferences of the undecided—but sometimes its political intent was exceeded, with escalatory effects. Three broad categories of violence are considered here. The first, “intimidative and catalytic” was primarily associated with the period from 1773 to 1776, in which violence was used by both sides, mostly publicly, to force political opponents to accede or step aside. Some of those efforts at intimidation catalyzed further violence, leading ultimately to armed military confrontation. Once the war had begun, the strong conventions associated with “war” shaped military behavior by both sides’ regular forces, although not always successfully, and always subject to logistical requirements. These behaviors form the second category of “Regular and Logistical.” The third category, “Retaliatory” was primarily associated with peripheral militia forces, which were much less restrained by the customs and usages of war, and often instead indulged in escalating retaliation.
Violence helps to define revolution as a mode of historical change; however, violence is a factor, not an actor, in history. Widespread violence in a variety of forms persisted in France despite three constitutions (1791, 1795, 1799) and their accompanying claims to end the Revolution. The popular violence that began in 1789 helped to eliminate the vestiges of feudalism and abolish inherited privilege. In 1792, rural revolts, urban riots, and foreign war served to bring down the monarchy and promote social leveling. Dismantling the old order provoked widespread resistance, which inspired state-authorized terror, exceptional justice, and mass executions on an unprecedented scale in 1793-94. Royalism, Jacobinism, religious resistance, continuing war, and politicized vigilantism all fueled continuing cycles of violence after 1794. Economic chaos, parlous policing, and partisan judges also prolonged an endemic violence that ranged from solipsistic banditry to armed counter-revolution. These multivalent forces of instability could only be tamed by enhancing and depoliticizing the repressive powers of the state. Efforts both to ensconce the republic and contain violence, notably by militarizing justice, enhancing repression, and limiting democracy, spawned a growing liberal authoritarianism after 1797. Reducing factionalism, banditry, and regional resistance fostered a security state and personal dictatorship in 1802.
Chapter 1 defines the concepts of “protest” and “dissent.” It defends public protest on marketplace, self-government, autonomy, and tolerance grounds. The chapter explores the communicative and other characteristics of public protests and demonstrations. It examines public attitudes toward protest and protest movements and the state’s typically violent and negative responses to public protest. The chapter examines the typical purposes or goals of public protests. Finally, it responds to several arguments about protest “fatigue” and the continued efficacy of public protest as a means of democratic change.
The mass street demonstrations that followed the 2020 police murder of George Floyd were perhaps the largest in American history. These events confirmed that even in a digital era, people rely on public dissent to communicate grievances, change public discourse, and stand in collective solidarity with others. However, the demonstrations also showed that the laws surrounding public protest make public contention more dangerous, more costly, and less effective. Police fired tear gas into peaceful crowds, used physical force against compliant demonstrators, imposed broad curfews, limited the places where protesters could assemble, and abused 'unlawful assembly' and other public disorder laws. These and other pathologies epitomize a system in which public protest is tightly constrained in the name of public order. Managed Dissent argues that in order to preserve the venerable tradition of public protest in the US, we must reform several aspects of the law of public protest.