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The radicalization of Norwegian social democracy has led to a divergence from the positions held by trade unions and social democratic movements in neighboring Nordic countries. While the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) has adopted increasingly critical stances towards Israel, calling for boycotts and using strong language to condemn Israeli policies, trade unions in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland have maintained more moderate positions. The chapter shows that the Norwegian approach is unique among Nordic countries. The close relationship between the LO and the Labor Party, formalized through institutions such as the Cooperation Committee, has allowed these radical positions to influence government policy. The analysis suggests that Norway’s radical stance on Israel and Palestine is not just a continuation of historical positions but represents a significant shift. This change has led to Norway being perceived as an outlier, not only among its Nordic neighbors but in a broader European context.
Employing the historiographical model laid out by Walter Benjamin in his 1925 Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, this chapter suggests that the work of five very different and in some cases obscure composers can be taken to form a constellation that outlines the ‘idea’ of the British symphony. This idea involves a commitment to social democracy. The chapter argues for an identification of the British symphony with the ‘Cheltenham Symphony’ of the later 1940s and 1950s, grasped here as a musical embodiment of the post-war ethos of collective reconstruction. Anticipated by the oppositional leftism of Alan Bush’s Symphony in C, the post-war wave of symphonic composition saw the instantiation of a socialist realism in British music. The chapter suggests that the subsequent decline of the British symphony reflects a broader loss of confidence in the post-war project, leading to what could be interpreted as the death of the genre amid the Thatcherite devastation of the 1980s.
How can antisemitism persist in a social democracy that prides itself on justice and equality? In this book, Torkel Brekke provides a historical analysis and interpretation of how far-left anti-Zionism entered the political mainstream, using Norway as a case study. Drawing on antisemitic rhetoric and symbols shaped during the Cold War, the far left and the Palestine movement gradually influenced the core institutions of Norway's social democracy, especially the trade unions. While the 1990s brought hope for a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the darker global political climate after 2000 saw antisemitism reemerge in new, dangerous, and worldwide forms, even without support from the former Communist Bloc. By examining contested concepts and historical connections, Brekke's book offers a diagnosis of one of the defining political controversies of our time. It provides the conceptual tools that enable insights into current debates about antisemitism and Israel.
Hegel referred to Geist as 'self-conscious life' as a being which exists within a 'web' of sense it spins for itself both collectively and individually. As Geist collectively develops itself in history and in theory, it ties 'knots' in various parts of its web which then form the settled basis for further progress. John Dewey spoke of the fundamental 'deposits' laid down in history in the same way Hegel spoke of 'knots.' Both Hegel and Dewey thought that the kinds of obligations necessary in modern political life could only be actualized in terms of a larger conception of the good life individually and collectively led. However, Dewey argued that given the fact of democracy as a 'way of life' and not merely a form of government was the necessary replacement for Hegel's concept of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) as the living good in which the watchword is freedom.
Further developing the theme of competition between Mboya, Odinga and their respective international networks and domestic power bases, this chapter explores the impact of the cultural Cold War on the politics of newly independent Kenya. Although mainly focused on the organisations and activities supported by Mboya’s network, most notably the East African Institute of Social and Cultural Affairs, it also discusses rival efforts by Odinga to use the press, publishing and training to strengthen his own position within Kenya’s fractious post-colonial politics. The chapter details the extent to which Mboya’s activities received funding through CIA front organisations. The chapter is particularly concerned with the ways in which Kenya’s debates about development, which were the source of the disputes between the KANU government and Odinga’s new opposition party, were shaped by the publications and organisations aligned to Mboya. As public awareness of the origins of Mboya’s funding grew from 1967, the chapter concludes with an examination of the increasing criticism made of him from both the left and right in Kenyan politics and the enforced closure of the EAISCA.
Chapter 6 explores developments in Czechia and Romania and once again assesses the validity of the book’s central argument – now by using a more qualitative approach to comparison. I begin by tracing processes in these two countries, where, following aligning junctures, mainstream leftist parties critiqued and moderated neoliberalism, thus remaining electorally strong and effectively constraining the electoral prospects of illiberals during most of the 2000–20 period. I then engage in comparisons with Slovakia and Poland to reassess the study’s core proposition vis-à-vis rival explanations of voting for illiberal parties. As the evidence supports the postcommunist juncture theory, I emphasize, on the one hand, the linkages between critical periods of early market reform and parties’ subsequent programmatic positions and, on the other hand, the relevance specifically of economic statism in terms of illiberalism’s chances of electoral success. Moving beyond the four cases, the final section offers a panoramic view of developments in Eastern Europe, which affirms the theorized linkages between postcommunist junctures, the evolution of the Left, and illiberalism’s electoral viability. With its focus on divergent legacies and comparative analysis, the chapter offers much evidence in support of the book’s main argument.
Chapter 5 examines path dependencies in Slovakia and Poland, where postcommunist junctures produced powerful illiberal reactions in the 2000–20 period. It does so by unpacking political and societal dynamics and emphasizing how illiberal forces reaped considerable electoral benefits. In both countries, mainstream leftist parties embraced the neoliberal agenda and (eventually) failed, with many of their former supporters becoming available for subsequent populist mobilization. As the Left’s failures occurred amid the rising salience of economic concerns, adaptive illiberals gained at the ballot box. While it stresses key similarities in terms of the core mechanism linking postcommunist junctures and illiberal electoral outcomes, the chapter also identifies important distinctions between reactive sequences in Slovakia and Poland. Indeed, bait-and-switch tactics may have defined junctures in both cases, but political configurations featured more nuanced distinctions specifically in terms of agency, which, in turn, conditioned important differences between illiberals in the two countries. Overall, whereas the patterns of similarity substantiate the book’s core theory linking early market reform legacies and illiberal electoral outcomes, the differences suggest that the critical juncture framework can be further refined – to which I return in the book's final part.
Social democracy may sometimes present itself as technocratic, but within its wider world of meaning, there are beliefs that speak to more radical change, even upheaval. The world of social democratic ideology is one of possibility, rather than something narrowly circumscribed. Using Charles Taylor’s concept of ‘common meanings’, this chapter explores the multifaceted nature of social democracy, which is significant for understanding how adaptable it has been as an ideological tradition. In elaborating what social democrats – and people on the centre-left more broadly – can think, the chapter presents analyses of literature from the twentieth and twenty-first century, with novels and poetry as representations of our social world. Rather than making empirical claims about what social democratic ideology is right now in a particular country or political party, the chapter explores the possible beliefs – very recognisable ones – of social democrats, and how those beliefs shed some light on the everyday dilemmas that people on the left of politics encounter. Three broad, common meanings of clear relevance to the world of social democracy are identified: money, class, and indignation. All three are discussed in relation to dilemmas social democratic actors must consider in contemporary politics.
Education has long been central to the social democratic agenda. In the postwar period, social democrats largely expanded access and reduced disparities through comprehensive schooling. By the 1990s, they shifted towards ‘Third Way’ social investment policies, incorporating market-oriented reforms, testing, and expanded childcare. The former was an ideological project that began with the demands of the party base and sought to persuade the electorate, while the latter was a more pragmatic project that started with broader electoral appeals and aimed to convince the base. Both, however, entered institutional contexts that varied in their receptivity to change. This chapter looks at political speech regarding education across these two periods to examine how social democratic parties adapted their rhetorical strategies to navigate the specific constraints of their political contexts. Using a hand-coded dataset of party manifestos from 1945 to 2022 across advanced democracies, it identifies four key rhetorical approaches social democrats employed in their educational speech: putting more emphasis, focus, clarity, and equity framing. The analysis reveals that while early social democratic rhetoric was more ideologically consistent and equity-driven, later discourse became more layered, ambiguous, and focused on economic outcomes.
Across Europe, centre-left parties are a shadow of their former selves. This chapter argues for a voluntarist approach to understanding the left’s decline. It argues for the causal import of the dilution of the left’s traditional profile or “brand,” namely its shift to the centre on economic issues, the weakening of its class-based political appeals, and its growing association instead with ‘progressive’ positions on non-economic issues during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This transformation created a disjuncture between voters’ preferences on key issues and the policy options and political appeals offered by centre-left parties. The representation gap that emerged between centre-left parties and low-income, non-college-educated voters created an opportunity for other parties to capture such voters over time, particularly as new voters came into the system with very different views of what centre-left parties stood for. As a result, over the course of a generation right-populist parties replaced centre-left ones as the largest parties of low-income, non-college-educated voters in Western Europe.
This chapter examines the history of social democracy as an ideology implemented by a strategy of incremental reforms. It considers the purely electoral prospects of social democratic parties and asks whether it matters that they are in office. It then summarizes the current situation of social democracy. Finally, thinking about the future, it focuses on reactions of this movement to the spectre of climate change.
Australia has often been a striking and fertile ground for experiments in social democracy. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) is one of the oldest members of the centre-left party family, although it is often overlooked in broader accounts of social democracy. This chapter considers the record of the ALP from 2016 to 2025, under two leaders: Bill Shorten (2013–2019) and Anthony Albanese (2019–). Under Bill Shorten, the party’s agenda can be described as ‘technocratic social democracy’. It developed a wide-ranging, redistributive, policy-rich approach, albeit often using indirect or ‘technocratic’ fixes to existing policy settings. It was an ambitious agenda that was, however, soundly rejected at the 2019 federal election. Following this defeat, the party began a policy reset under Antony Albanese, which is best captured as ‘thin’ or ‘new’ labourism. Albanese’s agenda was focussed on labourist goals, seeking material gains for specific sectors of the labour force. It undertook a range of practical measures, often with little fanfare or overarching narrative. Overall, these varieties of practical social democracy have entailed significant trade-offs, and the ALP faces future structural threats as it continues to redefine its historic mission.
This chapter explores the transforming constitutional imaginary of the Scandinavian welfare states. Suggesting that the Nordic countries shared a distinctive interpretation of the democratic ideals during the heydays of the social democratic welfare state, the chapter argues that the breakthrough of neoliberalism has fundamentally transformed the Nordic constitutional imaginary. No longer connected to national and popular sovereignty, public participation, labour market arrangements or economic and social equality, Nordic democracy is today increasingly associated with rule of law, individual and human rights, as well as economic freedom. The chapter connects Nordic developments to the recent literature on the constitutional theories in neoliberal thought. Scholars like Samuel Moyn, Quinn Slobodian and Jessica Whyte have amply shown that many leading neoliberals strove to restrict or replace democratic procedures with constitutionally protected market arrangements. In a Nordic context, these ideas were put forward in the debates particularly in the 1980s, but more often than not connected to the processes of globalisation and Europeanisation since the 1990s. As a result, the Nordics ceased to represent a democratic alternative but conformed to the neoliberal mainstream that emerged with the End of History.
How do governments find the political capital to raise interest rates in pursuit of inflation stabilisation? Against common wisdom, this article shows that the ability of governments to exercise tight monetary policy largely depends on the level of unemployment insurance. Unemployment insurance is particularly useful to social democratic parties since their core constituency – labour – is the hardest hit by economic downturns. Empirical evidence from 17 OECD countries over thirty years demonstrates that high levels of unemployment insurance present a strong incentive for social democratic governments to respond more aggressively to positive changes in inflation. These findings resolve the puzzle of why partisan monetary cycles are not often observed in the literature and have important policy implications, given continued calls for scaling down social insurance.
Have concerns about equal rights and equal chances crowded out economic equality as a priority of left parties? Despite the increased importance of inequality in political science, this contentiously fought debate has been standing on shaky empirical foundations. While voter's equality preferences are well understood, parties’ equality emphases remain uncharted territory. This research note assesses whether the Left has replaced its emphasis on economic equality with a focus on equal chances and equal rights. Based on a new dataset of 300,000 party statements, we use online crowd‐coding to map the equality trajectories of left parties in 12 OECD countries from 1970 to 2020. We examine if trade‐offs between economic and non‐economic aspects of inequality have come to dominate left parties’ equality profiles. Distinguishing social democratic, green and far‐left parties, we refute a meritocratic or ‘woke’ crowding out of redistribution. Yet, Social Democrats have indeed forsaken the once complementary link between economic equality and equal rights in favour of a weak trade‐off.
In the midst of the great recession, the Spanish Socialists Worker’s Party (PSOE) lost the Government and experienced a process of instability while trying to reconnect with its electorate. The party’s strategic response was embracing highly inclusive deliberations on both key institutional and policy issues that eventually sparked tensions and division. These internal debates led to the introduction and implementation of other democratic innovations, such as direct votes and consultations that substantially transformed key features of the PSOE’s organizational model. The article discusses the main features and problems of such deliberations and democratic innovations, and their wider consequences.
After analyzing the tension between capitalism and liberal democracy, this article explores two ways that the political left has tried to navigate this tension. Both these strategies prevent parties of the left and the center-left from exposing capitalism's undemocratic implications, while also helping to discredit political democracy. Unable to unify working people and ordinary citizens against the suffering that capitalism inflicts on them, the left inadvertently makes it possible for the far right to channel people's discontent in ways that attack liberal democracy and turn working people against each other. Last but not least, the discrediting of democracy that results from these processes gives rise to a vicious cycle by also encouraging the adoption of neoliberal policies, which further intensify the subordination of democratically elected governments to capitalist interests.
This chapter examines West German efforts to admit refugees from Chile. It argues that the rhetoric of antifascism mobilized by the Chile solidarity movement was influential during the government of Willy Brandt (1973–1974), because the key pillars of the Social Democratic Party (youth organizations, trade unions, and regional party structures) endorsed the admittance of refugees as antifascist fighters, and members of the Free Democratic Party also sanctioned the admittance of refugees from Chile. However, following Helmut Schmidt’ accession to the chancellorship in 1974, securing political asylum for refugees from Chile became far more challenging and nearly impossible for political refugees from Argentina. This is because Schmidt and fellow government officials opposed left-wing solidarity during a time in which the focus shifted towards stabilizing the economy and combating left-wing terrorism. The government’s stance forced the solidarity movement to emphasize their humanitarian motivations. As the case of Helmut Frenz’s engagement demonstrates, the politics of emergency coexisted with a market-critical understanding of the violence perpetrated by the Chilean military regime.
This chapter examines efforts by government officials to blunt the impact of social movements on their human rights policymaking. Grassroots solidarity advocates tried to save the victims of the Argentine military regime – including West German citizens ensnared in the Dirty War – broaden the refugee admission program to Argentinean political refugees, and end abuses in the Colonia Dignidad in Chile. Government officials and mid-level Social Democratic politicians did not welcome these demands because they saw activists demands as unwelcome intruders in the making of foreign policy. Yet the Social-Liberal coalition’s attempt to shove aside popular advocacy for human rights in Latin America failed in the face of solidarity advocates’ refusal to give up. State officials and mid-level Social Democrats responded with a technocratic human rights policy that prioritized expert knowledge over the demands of social movements.
Contrary to Central America, the politics of emergency remained an essential framework for solidarity activists with the Southern Cone. However, these activists mobilized an explicitly market-critical interpretation of the human rights problems in Chile and Argentina. Grassroots human rights advocates criticized the lack of thoroughgoing judicial accountability, and the continuation of the economic policies imposed by the outgoing military regimes. Government officials, conservative politicians, and market-friendly NGOs such as the IGFM rebuffed these demands. They endorsed market-friendly democratization, the cornerstones of which were a negotiated ending to military rule, continuation of the neoliberal reforms initiated by the military regimes, and the non-prosecution of most perpetrators of human rights abuses. Pro-Pinochet activists favored a protracted process of democratization in Chile to ensure the continuation of his economic policies. This clashed with the efforts of Christian Democrats Heiner Geißler and Norbert Blüm, who wished to speed up the end of Pinochet’s rule and endorsed the acceptance of left-wing political asylum seekers to the FRG on humanitarian grounds.