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This chapter “enters” the prison and examines the extensive body of empirical literature documenting the pains of imprisonment. Given the breadth of research, the analysis is necessarily selective, focusing on the principal frameworks through which these pains have been studied and classified across different populations and institutional settings. The chapter organizes these experiences into four interrelated domains that shape prison environments: deprivation, space and time, power, and relationships. While acknowledging variability across individuals and contexts, it emphasizes that prison pains most often manifest as severe psychological distress, accompanied by feelings of loneliness, disempowerment, dehumanization, and self-stigma, with profound implications for one’s sense of social self. Crucially, these pains do not stem necessarily from overt abuses or extraordinary deprivations. Rather, the diffuse combination of social isolation, lack of recognition, denied agency, neglect, and pervasive distrust renders imprisonment a chronically stressful and potentially traumatic experience. These factors, the chapter contends, are profoundly consequential because they undermine the fulfillment of basic social needs grounded in the fundamental human need to belong.
This paper is an act of remembrance, a testimony to the horrors inflicted on our lives and bodies as women prisoners of Tihar Jail No. 6, Delhi. It documents the struggles for life and survival of fellow women prisoners, and bears witness to the deaths of Fiza and Jesca. Through these experiences, I argue that the measures introduced in the lockdown prison during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic did not merely respond to a public health emergency, but inaugurated a field of penal experimentation that emboldened existing practices of custodial violence and sought to establish a new regime of impunity aligned with Hindutva politics. I demonstrate how isolation cells came to function as de-facto solitary confinement, how the jail manual was effectively suspended, how the right to life was stratified into hierarchies of “deservingness” by High Powered Committees, and how daily prison life was restructured through intensified surveillance.
Tort law has traditionally prioritized physical over emotional injury claims, due in part to insufficient methods of quantifying the latter. But advances in neuroimaging now make it possible to measure the distinct (and often chronic) neurological damage caused by PTSD, suggesting that it should be treated as both a physical and emotional harm. I argue that this recategorization may help PTSD victims win just restitution, especially for those from marginalized groups whose suffering has traditionally been overlooked and underappreciated by the legal system. Lingering probative and prejudicial flaws will likely limit current judicial applications of PTSD neuroimaging to citations of aggregate research. Until the technology improves in accuracy and sensitivity, individual PTSD neuroimaging on tort plaintiffs will fail to meet most state and federal evidentiary standards. When it does achieve sufficient reliability, neuroimaging precedent for traumatic brain injury may offer guidance on how to incorporate the technology without creating a “CSI effect” that harms plaintiffs unable to access or afford brain scans. PTSD neuroimaging may ultimately foster a greater appreciation for the physical toll of psychological illnesses, catalyzing the movement to dismantle the mind-body divide in tort jurisprudence.
African prison writings began to emerge as a recognizable literary genre in the early twentieth century during colonial rule when imprisonment became widespread and institutionalized. Thus, the initial development of African prison writings is a manifestation of and a confrontation with European colonial modernity, which used the carceral system as a coercive instrument against restive populations. The further transmutations of this genre are inseparable from political developments on the continent. Although a few prison writings were written by white prisoners, it was when Western-educated blacks were incarcerated for anticolonial agitations that African prison writing emerged in the form of resistance literature. Ironically, many postcolonial African regimes imprisoned an evolving black intelligentsia and dissenters. They in turn wrote about their imprisonment and expressed their disillusionment with the excesses of African nationalist leaders, most of whom had experienced imprisonment by colonial authorities. Currently, prison literature has diverged from its early anticolonial and antipostcolonial political focus. It now includes writings by and about prisoners inspired by neoliberal notions of human rights and the idea that self-introspection manifested in confessional writing is therapeutic and can reduce recidivism. This chapter explores the origin, entrenchment, and the current spread of African prison writings.
Chapter 4 delves deeper into the discussion around the torturous suffering inflicted in the name of the state and how that is legitimated. This chapter continues to find states to exhibit an existential interest in keeping the legality of some forms of suffering ambiguous and thus deniable (and non-justiciable to the extent possible), given the degree to which state authorities rely on them. Certain methods (solitary confinement, coercive interrogation and life imprisonment) have come to be bracketed away from the prohibition. This evokes the (often effaced) question of the formation of legality and legitimacy of state violence and brings into focus legal concepts, such as ‘lawful sanctions’, ‘minimum severity’, ‘inherent or incidental’, ‘discomfort’, ‘special stigma’, ‘triviality’ and ‘necessity’. These stand to be critiqued as being born out of political imperatives to exceptionalise so as to invisibilise and render deniable certain state practices. These categories, as will be argued, have worked to preserve the category of torture as aberrational and nearly unattainable.
From his 1982 conviction for killing a police officer and death sentence to the 2010 commutation of that sentence to life-in-prison-without-parole, Mumia Abu-Jamal has experienced and studied mass incarceration intimately as a political prisoner. At the local level, Mumia’s case is a microcosm of the period of the 1970s and 1980s in Philadelphia – the highpoint of rogue white supremacy within the city’s police department and the District Attorney’s office. At the macro level, the period of his incarceration spans the decades of exponential carceral expansion in the US that began in the 1980s. In the more than four decades since his 1982 conviction, the Abu-Jamal has penned thirteen books and thousands of short radio commentaries from prison, most notably Live from Death Row, which features harrowing, first-hand accounts of aging men and their struggles for medical care in the face of physical illness, younger men who are psychically and spiritually pulverized by guard brutality, barbarous conditions, humiliating body cavity strip searches, and the unnatural social isolation of death row imprisonment.
Albert Woodfox was incarcerated for forty-three years and ten months in Louisiana’s prison system, almost entirely in solitary confinement. His memoir, Solitary, foregrounds an intense entanglement of antiblack captivity and carceral confinement within the prison plantation known as Louisiana State Penitentiary, Angola. This chapter articulates critical moments in Albert’s life that transcend the boundaries of narration and description in order to uncover his knowledge of social death and slavery’s carceral afterlife. From internalizing and accepting racialized abuse at the hands of the criminal legal system during his youth, to witnessing mass captivity and racial terror inside Angola’s prison plantation, to facing a lifetime of separation from kin while surviving political retaliation under the torturous conditions of prolonged solitary confinement, Albert’s narrative reveals how the logics and architectures of slavery’s past endure as the social foundations to present-day mass incarceration.
Research informed by sociological neoinstitutionalism often frames organizational reactions to legal norms as either loose coupling, where formal legal commitments are only weakly aligned with actual practices, or tight coupling, where strong internal or external compliance pressures drive close alignment. This article introduces a third pattern – contentious coupling – where some organizational members attempt to realign practices with legal commitments, but these very efforts provoke pushback from others, resulting in substantive yet constrained success. This paradox is key to understanding the widespread yet limited effects of legal rights. I illustrate contentious coupling by examining how international human rights law has shaped solitary confinement reform in Taiwan. While hierarchical enforcement led by rights advocates and policymakers has successfully reduced prolonged solitary confinement, it has also alienated frontline correctional officers by triggering a sense of relative deprivation and perception of hypocrisy, encapsulated in their complaints of a “human rights upsurge.” In response, these officers engage in two forms of passive resistance – formalistic care and resistance spillover – both of which undermine the authority of human rights and hinder their capacity to transform correctional culture.
Despite international calls to abolish the use of segregation in prisons, the practice has been defended by some Canadian correctional workers as a sometimes-necessary practice to preserve prisoner and staff safety. Informed through a lens of risk and the socio-legal literature on segregation, the current interview study explores perspectives on segregation from 28 correctional officers (COs) employed in provincial correctional services at a prison in Atlantic Canada. COs expressed a need to continue using segregation—albeit less often and under reformed contexts—to ensure safety for prisoners and staff and preserve prisoner accountability. Findings indicate COs recognize the structural, situational, and personal factors and complexities that shape decisions to impose segregation. They call for increased available resources to improve prisoner safety, dignity and wellness, prevent harm and self-injury, and reduce the use of segregation. We conclude with recommendations for provincial and territorial correctional institutions to consider moving forward.
Prolonged solitary confinement is inconsistent with international minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners and may constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. In a series of recent cases, appellate courts in Canada have curtailed the use of prolonged solitary confinement in prisons on the basis that such detention is “grossly disproportionate” and “cruel and unusual.” But these judgments in the penal context have not resulted in comparable regulation of seclusion in forensic psychiatric hospitals. Seclusion in these contexts is often comparable to solitary confinement in prison and carries with it the same serious risks of lasting harm. This article comparatively reviews the legislative and policy framework that regulates the use of seclusion in different provinces in Canada. The article argues that case law on prolonged solitary confinement in the penal context has application to the forensic psychiatric context and that a failure to more closely regulate the use of seclusion may render this type of mental health legislation and treatment unconstitutional.
In solitude, as with any human experience, choice is an important driver. We know that humans, in general, like having some decision-making capability, or at least the perception of it. Positive time spent in solitude stems from the desire to be with ourselves, and we talk about how to exercise choice to be more comfortable and stronger in solitude. Simply wanting to avoid other people does not unlock its benefits and opportunities. The fact that you choose to devote your morning walk, drive to work, or shower time to solitude is what matters in building an enduring practice of everyday solitude. In this chapter, we also consider involuntary solitude, like prisoners in solitary confinement and pandemic lockdowns. This chapter also looks at what it means to have a "preference for solitude," the importance of understanding motivation in why we’re choosing time alone, and what it means to have the right framing and expectations for solitude.
That international law progressively recognises and prohibits emergent forms of torture and related ill-treatment has become widely accepted in the anti-torture discourse. The premise that torture's techniques and contexts change is taken to shape juridical recognition, representation and response. Authoritative international treaties, such as the UN Convention Against Torture, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, are therefore deemed ‘living instruments’ – influenced by social and scientific change as channelled through the doctrine of dynamic interpretation. This article argues, however, that these premises are not sufficiently empirically grounded and, far from faithfully reflecting social and scientific changes, invoke critiques around the ideological and epistemological registers of advocates and adjudicators. Taking scholarship on dynamic interpretation and forms of state violence which do not leave overt physical marks as paradigmatic entry points, this article problematises torture's juridical conceptualisation and contextualisation through a critical theoretical lens.
The practice of solitary confinement (SC) is established within the literature as a common occurrence of torture within the prison system, andmany international and national human rights organizations have called for its abolition. A somewhat more contentious topic in the literature is the practice of force feeding (FF) of hunger-striking prisoners. The paper aims to make a case against FF by establishing a parity argument that states the following: If SC is considered an immoral practice (and indeed it should be), it should follow that FF is morally impermissible as well. In conclusion, this paper will argue that FF of hunger-striking prisoners is a violation of their fundamental moral rights and constitutes cruel and inhumane treatment and, therefore, should be abolished.
This chapter discusses the theoretical controversies surrouding the death penalty, the status of the death penalty under international human rights law, the death penalty in the United States and China. It also explores other cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishments including mass incarceration, life imprisonment, shackling, and solitary confinement.
The chapter seeks to correct an apparently widespread misimpression that animals are afforded greater protections against solitary confinement than human prisoners in the United States, and to encourage greater collaboration among animal and prison reform advocates. The United States’ dubious distinction of being a world leader in solitary confinement of both human prisoners and nonhuman animals offers an opportunity for discourse and collaboration for those fighting such conditions in different settings. With the goal of laying groundwork to facilitate such discourse and collaboration, this chapter details and analyzes the current scope of legal protections for social animals against solitary confinement in the United States.
This paper examines whether the interpretation of Article 30 of Geneva Convention III that allows the use of solitary confinement for prisoners of war with psychosocial disabilities is still valid in light of the new standards of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. It proposes two alternative interpretations of Article 30 to demonstrate why isolation based on disability is unlawful and concludes that the use of solitary confinement on prisoners of war with psychosocial disabilities should be prohibited.
Chapter 6 outlines the growing momentum of prison reform, enacted by a broad range of prison reformers and within the prison administration itself, towards producing reforms of punitive penal regimes, including separate confinement. Critiques of late nineteenth-century prison regimes noted the continuing high incidence of mental breakdown in prisons and the detrimental effect of severe prison regimes. The chapter highlights how individual campaigners and campaign groups lobbied for the end of the separate system and for rehabilitative penal policies. However, while the Gladstone Committee inquiry of 1895 was hailed as a turning point, and the severity of prison discipline was eased earlier in Irish prisons, in practice change was ‘glacial’. The residue of the nineteenth-century prison system arguably remains with us today, in the physical structures of prison estates, in prison disciplines that still emphasise order and uniformity, in the retention of large numbers of mentally ill people and the imposition of solitary confinement, no longer a philosophy and method of reform, but a means of dealing with disruptive behaviour among prisoners and shortages of prison staff and resources.
This chapter shows how the derangement of the senses and isolation of the individual that are idealised modes of Romantic and post-Romantic verse are hideously intensified in the contemporary supermax. Its focus is on solitary confinement in US prisons as a way of preventing the formation of solidarities. As such, it explores the conditions for producing poetry in prison: different models of the workshop, reform and revolution, and imprisoned writers’ relationships to the carceral and poetic institution. It discusses the trope of incommunicability in prison writing. It discusses the psychic and physical effects of life ‘in the hole’, drawing on writings by numerous well-known and lesser-known imprisoned poets. It ends with the claim that it is the contemporary abolitionist movement that is the true inheritor and defender of the Romantic imagination.
This chapter offers a history of solitary confinement as a disciplinary technique, which emerged in the late eighteenth century as a replacement for the chaotic and degrading spectacle of corporal punishment. Key to that history are the ‘separate’ and the ‘silent’ regimes, whose most influential exponents were in the US, at prisons in Philadelphia (Eastern State) and New York (Auburn). The chapter uses the figure of the chaplain, and the inventive ways prisoners circumvented controls on their speech and inspection of their souls, to contextualise the solitude and introspection of the Romantic lyric. These contexts are rendered much more specific in readings of Wordsworth’s poetry of solitude and of penal discipline, and his evolution from the compassionate friend of ‘The Convict’ in Lyrical Ballads to the patron of capital punishment in his ‘Sonnets upon the Punishment of Death’.
Ashley Smith’s experience in the adult prison system flowed from certain of its systemic features. This article considers whether and how it is possible to reconcile the basic commitments of sentencing law, including the legal aims of punishment, with that systemic portrait. The youth court that ordered Smith’s transfer to adult custody relied upon an idealized conception of adult imprisonment, just as ordinary adult sentencing courts do. Judges purport to stipulate the severity of punishment, but tend not to consider how prison conditions will shape the severity of the sanction. Even where a particular defendant is likely to face unique difficulties in custody, courts tend to take notice in limited and rare ways. Smith’s experience in adult custody challenges us to more clearly identify, and to consider extending, doctrinal sentencing rules that represent a judicial concern with the effects and prospects of imprisonment in particular cases.