This chapter examines the means by which the Constitution distributes powers between the states and national government, including the courts, and then explores the historical and judicial processes through which the federal government gained ascendancy over the states, considering key cases such as McCulloch v. Maryland (1819). To connect these issues to contemporary debates, a lower federal court's evaluation of the legitimacy of federal efforts to force state actors to work for federal agencies in enforcing immigration policy is considered in US v. Illinois (2025). The second portion of the chapter considers contemporary manifestations of federalism, including the increasing importance of the Eleventh Amendment in defining state sovereignty, with special consideration of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The final section briefly considers another form of concurrent sovereignty – that of Native American tribes. The relationship between the Native American tribes and the federal government, as well as the authority of the states, creates a unique constitutional dynamic in the United States, as demonstrated in McGirt v. Oklahoma (2020).

This chapter examines the Supreme Court’s state-sovereignty cases, particularly those involving sovereign immunity and the anti-commandeering doctrine. It argues that the Necessary and Proper Clause provides a textual basis for limiting Congress’s power to abrogate these state attributes. It critiques the Supreme Court’s modern federalism cases, like Printz v. United States, for relying on nontextual grounds, asserting that sovereign immunity and anti-commandeering principles derive from the Constitution’s structure and history, which view these as significant sovereign attributes the power to abrogate which cannot be delegated by implication. The chapter examines National League of Cities and its reversal in Garcia, highlighting tensions in applying federal laws to state functions. It argues that forcing states to enforce federal law or submit to citizen suits risks recreating the Articles of Confederation’s enforcement problems, potentially requiring the use of force against noncompliant states – a power the Framers rejected. Drawing on historical practices and the law of nations, the chapter posits that such powers require explicit constitutional authorization, reinforcing federalism’s vertical separation of powers and preserving state autonomy within the Constitution’s original design.

This chapter concerns immunities from jurisdiction. The first example is sovereign or state immunity, which is also closely related to the concepts of non-justiciability and act of state. The chapter traces the move from absolute to restrictive immunity in this respect, both in the UK and the US, as well as other states, through the case law. This has shifted attention to the distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign acts. The question of sovereign immunity and violations of human rights is also raised. The definition of commercial acts is also addressed, as is the definition of the instrumentalities and organs of the state. Immunity for senior government figures is discussed. The chapter then turns to diplomatic immunity in the light of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The question of the inviolability of the mission premises is covered, as is the immunity of the diplomatic bag and the immunities of diplomatic property and personnel. The chapter concludes with a review of consular immunities.

This chapter examines international obligations imposed on all States to protect and preserve the marine environment in relation to submarine operations. However, the sovereign immunity of military submarines significantly impacts both the applicability and enforcement of international marine environmental law. At present, nuclear powered and nuclear armed submarines pose the greatest environmental risks, and we discuss nuclear liability regimes, the possible relevance of nuclear-free zone treaties, and environmental obligations when decommissioning nuclear submarines. The obligation to prevent, reduce and control marine pollution may also be relevant in the context of sonar being used to detect submarines, as concerns have arisen as to the negative implication for marine mammals. While there have been various legal initiatives to address noise pollution, it is apparent that the consequences for military submarines is slight.

This chapter sets out the rationale for and provides an overview of the content of Submarines in International Law. It discusses a definition of submarines and describes a legal taxonomy of submarines; explaining how submarines may be categorized in a way that is legally relevant by considering the owner/operator, the purpose, their mode of power, and weaponry aboard. A critical consideration in addressing the international laws regulating submarine operations is the sovereign immunity that may apply and legal consequences of that immunity. Whether a submarine is nuclear powered or nuclear armed may also hold legal relevance. It is also important to acknowledge the growing private use of submarines for diverse reasons: criminal activity, research and for leisure. These uses are also regulated under international law and the chapter explains the different bodies of international law that are canvased in the book.

In this chapter, we assess the international law regulation of the newest forms of submarines, underwater maritime autonomous vehicles (UMAVs) and ask what changes for States’ rights and duties when an autonomous vehicle operates uncrewed and underwater. A core issue has been whether UMAVs are ships or not and we address differences emerging for floats and gliders particularly. Whether uncrewed submarines are ships or not has implications for navigational rights and duties. We also consider questions emerging under the law of armed conflict and distinctions for autonomous maritime systems (such as mines and torpedos). While State-owned and operated UMAVs are a primary focus, we also consider the international laws applying to the use of UMAVs by terrorists or criminals seeking to smuggle goods. This chapter concludes Part II of the book and brings together the key questions that remain to be answered in regulating submarines in international law.

This chapter draws out international laws applicable to ensure the navigational safety of submarines and to establish what laws apply when a submarine is ultimately lost at sea. The discussion is concerned with both military and private submarines during times of peace. To avoid collisions, submarines must account for surface traffic as well as submerged traffic and deploy appropriate signals and sounds. Submarines prompt distinct questions with regards to navigational safety. Where a submarine is in distress and ultimately sinks, consideration is further needed as to international law rules on search and rescue, as well as the law of wrecks and possible salvage. For submarines that have been lost at sea for a long time, safeguarding underwater cultural heritage may become a key consideration. When lost at sea, the relevant laws are comparable to other ships or warships but the difficulty rests in the interaction of those rules.

This chapter provides an introduction to the core concepts of US law, for those with an HCI background but not a legal background. The chapter covers the history of U.S. law, the basic constructs of the U.S. legal system, the core sources of legal rules: constitutions, statutues, regulations, and case law, differences between civil and criminal law, the differences between law and policy at the federal versus state level, searching for and using legal resources, and how to apply basic legal principles to HCI research.

The present chapter examines whether, and if so to what extent, customary international law applies within the internal legal sphere of the EU, that is, between EU member states within the EU law’s scope of application as well as in their legal relations to the EU. In essence, the relevance of customary international law within the EU’s internal legal sphere is about the EU’s assertion of autonomy and self-containment that has been unfurled by the CJEU. The analyses of key areas of customary law (e.g. diplomatic relations, sovereign immunity and equality, rules of responsibility) reveal a complex picture of the its rules’ relevance within the EU. They play a more tangible role in the relationship between EU member states, first and foremost in sovereignty-related areas, than in member states’ legal relationships to the EU. Nevertheless, the present chapter shows that despite being a ‘new legal order’, the EU treaties still constitute a subsystem of public international law, albeit one which manifests typical characteristics of self-containment.

Future naval and air forces will be comprised increasingly of unmanned and autonomous systems. Nearly 100 nations and nonstate actors currently operate unmanned and autonomous systems to support combat operations. These platforms have proven their ability to enhance situational awareness and improve mission performance. Unmanned systems will be used to augment manned platforms and will conduct missions that are considered dull, dirty and dangerous, thereby reducing risk to human life at a reduced cost. Introduction of these systems and vehicles will require states to modify how they characterize these platforms under international law as ships, warships, commercial aircraft and state aircraft to ensure that they are able to legally perform the missions that they have been designed to perform. This will require filling gaps in domestic and international law and regulations to better regulate and control the employment of these systems in the marine environment to ensure safety of navigation and overflight and protection of the marine environment.

Justiciability doctrine also dealt with the amenability of states to suit in the federal courts, an issue the Court addressed in Monaco v. Mississippi, which found a general principle of state sovereign immunity embedded in the Constitution. The Court also continued to limn the controus of the law authotizing suits under limited circumstances against state officers charged with enforcing allegedly unconstitutional state laws. And, in an important and confusing decision the Court invoked standing and political questions rules to avoid deciding whether the proposed Child Labor Amendment had expired because of the lapse of time or asserted procedural irregularities in state ratification processes.

Section B provides an overview of certain important preliminary legal matters that are of relevance to any discussion of nuclear weapon issues. They include sovereignty and certain aspects of the law of State responsibility, including countermeasures.

In Leviathan, Hobbes uses his new theory of authorization to explain the nature of corporate persons. While On the Citizen lacks the theory of authorization, it includes several accounts of corporate persons. In On the Citizen, Hobbes suggests that a group forms a corporate person when its members accept obligations to support a sovereign, when the members are all compelled to act in concert, or when the members of the group adopt voting rules for making decisions. Hobbes also uses his analysis of the commonwealth as a corporate person to argue for the sovereign’s immunity in On the Citizen much as he does in Leviathan. Generally speaking, the Leviathan account of corporate persons is superior to the ones in On the Citizen. However, Hobbes needs the voting rules account from On the Citizen in order to explain how democratic and aristocratic assemblies can serve as sovereigns. Since he tries to replace the voting rules account with the authorization account in Leviathan, this raises a problem for him that he does not appreciate.