How do social relationships among government officials shape information flows within bureaucratic hierarchies? Classic principal–agent theories emphasize information asymmetries as a source of inefficiency, yet we know far less about the actual nature of communication within bureaucracies. We argue that patron–client ties embedded within formal hierarchies play a central role in structuring internal information flows. Lower-level officials with patronage ties to higher-level leaders have incentives to conduct informal information campaigns that signal diligence and competence as a way to compete for political favors. Using newly assembled data from China—including a rare corpus of internal emails between city-level patrons and county-level clients, as well as original datasets on county governments’ public responses to citizen complaints—we find that client counties communicate more frequently with higher-level officials, more often highlight their diligence in addressing complaints, and more actively defend themselves against accusations. However, client and non-client counties perform similarly in how they respond publicly to citizen complaints. These findings reveal how patronage relations can increase upward information flows without impacting public-facing performance. More broadly, these results suggest that communication in nondemocratic settings may serve to strengthen informal political ties.

Authoritarian regimes have long faced governance challenges arising from decentralization, as central governments struggle to control local government behavior due to information barriers. This paper argues that promoting the disclosure of local government information to the public is an effective strategy to alleviate issues associated with decentralization. Using a policy mandating the disclosure of local government information on social governance as a quasi-natural experiment, we examine its impact on a critical governance challenge emerging from decentralization – the decline of county seats. Using China’s county-level panel data (2015–2022) and a difference-in-differences approach, we find that local information disclosure significantly promotes county seat development. Specifically, it increases land allocation for both economic and public service purposes, thereby breaking the vicious cycle between deficient public services and economic stagnation. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that these effects are more pronounced in counties with higher citizen responsiveness and more constrained fiscal capacity.

Previous research conducted in closed autocracies indicates that government propaganda can deter opposition, shift political attitudes, and influence emotions. Yet the specific mechanisms and contextual factors influencing how and when propaganda works remain unclear. We theorize how power-projecting government propaganda works differently for government supporters and opponents in polarized electoral authoritarian regimes, focusing on emotional reactions, sense of societal belonging, and downstream effects on contentious political behavior. Through two preregistered surveys in Turkey (N = 6,286), we find that supporters exposed to propaganda videos feel a greater sense of belonging and are more susceptible to engage in pro-government activities. Opponents report heightened anger and anxiety and seem deterred from protesting. However, the latter effect weakened during the highly contested 2023 electoral campaign. These results indicate that propaganda can help electoral authoritarian regimes deter anti-government action and encourage pro-government action, but that its deterrent effects may weaken during periods of high mobilization and contention.

Over the past decade, China has significantly expanded its security cooperation with other authoritarian regimes, yet existing research struggles to capture the informal and ambiguous nature of these relationships. This article develops a new conceptualisation of ‘security ties’ grounded in the logic of authoritarian rule. Security ties are sustained interactions that contribute to regime survival and unfold across five functional domains: diplomatic and military contacts, support for regime security, military capacity building, non-combat operations, and wartime support. To capture variation, this article analyses security ties along three dimensions: depth, durability, and domestic involvement. As a proof of concept, the framework is applied to China’s security ties with ten representatively selected autocracies between 2019 and 2024. The analysis reveals that China’s ties to Russia are by far the deepest, most durable, and institutionalised. Ties to other autocracies are more selective and uneven. Military capacity building emerges as a central but varied pillar, while cooperation aimed at regime security and wartime support remains limited to a narrow set of partners. The article advances debates on authoritarian alignment by conceptualising it as a differentiated web of security ties rather than a cohesive alliance, and it offers a framework for systematically analysing autocratic security cooperation.

Do salient episodes of state violence affect citizens' willingness to pay taxes for different social purposes in the long run? In this article, I answer this question using an original dataset that geolocates individuals who were seriously injured during the anti‐communist Romanian revolution of 1989. Using the number of casualties within different regions as a source of quasi‐exogenous variation, I show that the places from which more casualties come have systematically lower levels of tax morale. I argue that these results arise because there has been no clear break with the authoritarian past in Romania, and many citizens still associate the current political elites with the former communist rulers who perpetrated the violence of December 1989.

International sanctions are one of the most commonly used tools to instigate democratisation in the post‐Cold War era. However, despite long‐term sanction pressure by the European Union, the United States and/or the United Nations, non‐democratic rule has proven to be extremely persistent. Which domestic and international factors account for the regimes' ability to resist external pressure? Based on a new global dataset on sanctions from 1990 to 2011, the results of a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) provide new insights for the research on sanctions and on authoritarian regimes. Most significantly, sanctions strengthen authoritarian rule if the regime manages to incorporate their existence into its legitimation strategy. Such an unintended ‘rally‐round‐the‐flag’ effect occurs where sanctions are imposed on regimes that possess strong claims to legitimacy and have only limited economic and societal linkages to the sender of sanctions.

Compliance with court decisions is essential for the rule of law. Generally, regimes comply with decisions that serve their interests; however, compliance with decisions against government interests is less certain. In 1947–2005 and 2014–2023, the Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) decided many politically important cases in favour of the prevailing authoritarian and hybrid regimes. However, between 2005 and 2013, although the SCP reached decisions against the government’s interests in politically important cases, the government still complied. Why would authoritarian and hybrid regimes, such as those in Pakistan between 2005 and 2013, comply with decisions in politically important cases that were against their interests instead of disobeying or ignoring them? Very few studies have addressed this puzzling phenomenon. This article argues that increasing public support for courts coupled with reinforcement mechanisms—supported by both the judiciary and external actors—contributes to such compliance. The article concludes that a combination of social, political, and legal factors is essential for compliance by authoritarian and hybrid regimes in politically important cases.

Why do some countries cooperate in international negotiations while others do not? This paper examines how regime type and trade relationships jointly shape cooperation among states. While prior research claims that democracies are inherently more cooperative and that trade fosters collaboration, we argue that neither factor alone sufficiently explains patterns of cooperation. Drawing on 1,567 documents submitted by World Trade Organization (WTO) members during the Doha Round negotiations (2000–2012), we analyse cooperation between country pairs (dyads) using hurdle models to assess both the likelihood and extent of cooperation. We find that democracies are not uniformly more cooperative but become so only when high levels of trade interdependence exist. Similarly, democracies also cooperate with authoritarian regimes when intensive trade relationships are present. These results challenge the assumption that democratic governance naturally generates cooperation, showing instead that economic incentives play a decisive role. The study advances understanding of international cooperation in complex multilateral negotiation settings.

Extensive research showcases that authoritarian propaganda can cultivate support and deter protest during “normal” times. This study examines authoritarian propaganda’s efficacy during crises and policy changes when the regime needs it most. We posit that various propaganda strategies, including “hard” and “soft” rhetoric, have significant limitations during crises. Hard propaganda’s heavy-handed slogans could signal regime strength but may also legitimize “rightful resistance” against local authorities, limiting its protest-deterrence effects. Soft propaganda may lose persuasiveness due to presenting contradictory arguments during policy changes. We leverage the turbulent period of China’s COVID policy reversal to conduct an original survey experiment in December 2022. Our findings reveal that pro-reopening hard propaganda weakens its protest-deterrence effects by reinforcing belief in protest righteousness. Moreover, inconsistent soft propaganda lowers public evaluations of China’s COVID response, diminishing its persuasive effects. Our study highlights significant limitations of authoritarian propaganda during crises and policy changes.

This article examines how authoritarian regimes use legislative institutions to coopt rival elites and induce policy cooperation. Theories of cooptation under authoritarianism emphasize two mechanisms: economic rents and policy concessions. Despite the persistence of these mechanisms in the literature, evidence of their effect on policy outcomes remains limited. In this paper, we develop a theory of legislative cooptation, or the intentional exchange of economic rents and policy concessions to legislators in exchange for policy cooperation. We test our theory using a novel dataset of 150,000 roll-call votes from the Kuwait National Assembly that spans the entirety of Kuwait’s legislative history. We leverage the regime’s participation in the legislature to establish a measure of legislative cooperation and use this measure to estimate the efficacy of mechanisms of cooptation in inducing conformity with its policy agenda. Both mechanisms effectively elicit cooperation: but they have different strategic and normative implications for our understanding of how representation emerges in non-democratic contexts.

How does the public support a coalition in which pro-democracy advocates and policy-based protesters join forces in street protests? When policy-based and pro-democracy groups protest together, they create a collective action frame that includes a policy component and a democracy component. In this article, I develop the frame salience theory, arguing that support for a policy–democracy protest coalition depends on which component of the joint frame is perceived to be more dominant. I argue that in authoritarian regimes, the policy component typically dominates the coalition because it is more accessible and available to the public. This perception shifts public support for the alliance towards the baseline level of support for the policy movement. In other words, public support for the alliance defaults to the baseline level of support for the policy movement. I find evidence for my argument using a survey experiment administered to 1,209 Vietnamese respondents. This article highlights a dilemma pro-democracy groups face: joining policy-based movements may boost support, but sustaining democracy after the protest becomes challenging.