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This chapter shifts away from the informational problems that are the focus of the earlier chapters and analyzes the second main rationalist explanation for war, the inability of countries to make binding agreements combined with future incentives to renege on agreements; in short, commitment problems. It begins by analyzing the classic commitment problem of exogenous shifting power, whereby one country is growing more powerful over time. It then analyzes shifting power under incomplete information, and the new issue of reassurance signaling, where the goal is to credibly signal compatible interests rather than strength. It then analyzes the commitment problems present when countries negotiate over issues that affect future military power, such as strategically valuable territory. The chapter then analyzes how a prominent credible signaling mechanism, military mobilization, can induce commitment problems by causing a power shift during a crisis. Finally, the analysis shows how issue indivisibility and risk-acceptant leader preferences can be conceptualized as commitment problems. The exercises ask the reader to analyze many different aspects of commitment problems.
This chapter analyzes crisis bargaining models under complete information. It begins with a finite-action model in which the disputed good is treated as indivisible, and shows that war can occur even under complete information because of the indivisibility. It then analyzes an ultimatum divisible-good model, establishes the existence of a bargaining range of agreements that both sides prefer to war, and shows that war never occurs under complete information. It then introduces a status-quo division of the disputed good and formalizes the notion of a country being satisfied or dissatisfied with the status quo. Finally, it analyzes two infinite-horizon crisis bargaining models loosely based on the Rubinstein bargaining model, which is also presented and analyzed. It is shown that the results of the infinite-horizon models are largely similar to those of the simpler ultimatum model, and hence the latter is generally preferred in applied work. The exercises ask the reader to analyze many variants of crisis bargaining models, applying the baseline model to many different theories of international conflict.
This chapter applies the commitment problem logic to situations where it seems unrelated. More specifically, it applies when states can take more of the bargaining good than agreed to, when the size of the bargaining pie depends on pre-war investments, when the bargaining object cannot be cleanly divided, when the parties have risk-acceptant preferences, and when they can incur debt to gain an advantage in war.
This chapter presents the bargaining model of war. The basic approach of the bargaining model is to frame the onset, prosecution, and termination of war as a bargaining process: war represents a failure of two sides to reach a peaceful bargain settling a dispute over an issue such as a territorial border, and during war states continue to bargain, searching for a peace settlement both sides prefer over continuing to fight. Using very little math, the chapter introduces a number of key concepts, such as ideal points, reservation points, reversion outcomes, and bargaining space. It also lays out three possible bargaining model explanations as to why wars break out: when the sides disagree about the likely outcome of a war; when at least one side doubts the credibility of the other side to abide by commitments to peace; and when the issue under dispute is perceived to be indivisible. The chapter also develops information and commitment credibility perspectives on bargaining during wartime, and how wars eventually end. It applies these ideas to a summary of a quantitative study of the effects of peacekeeping on civil war outcomes, and to a case study of World War II in the Pacific.
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