This chapter examines how early British social anthropology developed formal approaches to context that paralleled Wittgenstein’s logical contextualism. It focuses on Radcliffe-Brown’s structural-functionalism and its similarities to Tractarian logic, while contrasting this with Malinowski’s more fluid approach. Through examination of the Cambridge School of anthropology and its influence, the chapter demonstrates how a particular culture of context emerged in early anthropology that privileged formal, logical structure.

Chapter 5 argues that Hegel’s interest in the Concept Logic is to determine when a concept and its object are in a “true” or fully unified relation. This requires developing both the least adequate logical relation of concept to object, which he calls judgment, and the most adequate such form, which is the syllogistic form of teleology. For Hegel, what best corresponds to its concept is what is conceptually constituted. And Hegel’s model for conceptual constitution is a teleological process governed by some universal. It is argued that the Teleology chapter of the Logic does not reject the artifactual model for teleology but in fact embraces it, for the teleology of artifacts requires that an intention come “first” in the construction of its object. Artifactual teleology shows in a concrete way how the moments of conceptual form can be unified in the objective domain.

Chapter 3 concerns Hegel’s use of the term “the Concept” (der Begriff) in the Doctrine of the Concept. The chapter argues that the use of this term is closer to its ordinary philosophical meaning than is claimed by standard metaphysical readings of the Logic. In particular, the singular use of “the Concept” is a synecdoche for the structure of conceptual thought as exemplified in philosophy in general. Hegel argues that conceptual thought has a formal structure of universality, particularity, and singularity. However, in contrast to many interpretations, these are not treated as properties that all concepts must have to be concepts. Rather, these formal features are exhibited variously in different concepts, judgments, and syllogisms. Hegel’s discussion of the formal dimension of thought sets up his attempt to show that some structures of thought more perfectly exemplify the form of the Concept than others.

Here the focus is on covert cases of wh-movement, i.e. cases where the movement takes place in such a way that it cannot be directly observed in the output of PF, but only in terms of its effects on the semantic interpretation. The best-known example of this kind of wh-movement is found in Mandarin Chinese; accordingly we focus on that language. Next, we look at cases of covert movement in English: Quantifier Raising and wh-movement in multiple questions. Then we turn to the nature of the copies of movement, showing how copies can provide an account of reconstruction of binding-theory relations at the CI interface, as well as of partial movement and doubling at PF.

This chapter explores Wittgenstein’s two references to the arts in 4.014. The first is his musical example of the unity of language and the world; the second his allusion to the fairytale The Gold-Children by Brothers Grimm. The chapter argues, first, that Wittgenstein’s early notion of logic incorporates forms that for Kant belong to transcendental aesthetic, namely, space and time. Second, it spells out how this commitment motivates Wittgenstein’s musical example and why it is crucial to draw a distinction between transcendental form and empirical structures made possible by that form. Finally, the chapter argues, pace Peter Sullivan, that the unity of language and the world is guaranteed by the metaphysical subject as their common origin. If the fairytale is read as a condensed illustration of Wittgenstein’s position, then this common origin is signified by a golden fish.

This stage of the journey offers an explanation of how truth conditions and truth-value judgements can be used in understanding sentence meaning, moving on to the role of a formal metalanguage, possible worlds, and models. As ‘food for thought’, it focuses on the importance of selecting a suitable formal language, introducing some options available in the formal semantic tradition, as well as on the cognitive reality of such approaches to meaning.