This chapter argues military history first emerged as a recognised genre of historical inquiry in Britain between 1815 and 1856. The dramatic increase in historical writing on warfare following the end of the Napoleonic Wars led William Napier to write History of the War in the Peninsula (1828–40). It was the first history of a war by a British writer to be based on extensive primary source research and to present its subject as shaped by ‘principles’ it was possible to learn. This caused the work to be identified by literary periodicals and the Regius professor of modern history at the University of Oxford as representing the emergence of a new form of historical inquiry in Britain: military history. In 1850, following Napier’s lead, the army began to use military history for officer education to communicate the ‘principles of war’. Popular military history also emerged as publishers and authors began to apply new commercially lucrative literary practices to military history, expanding its consumption by the growing reading public. The most notable product of these developments was Edward Creasy’s Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World (1851) which became a publishing sensation.

This chapter refutes the influential claims made by J. F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart that the study of military history by the army centred on learning factual information for its own sake. In fact, how the subject was taught at Sandhurst, Woolwich and the Staff College ran through several phases, the first of which was ushered in following the Crimean War. During the 1850s and 1860s the army adopted the methods of studying the subject used by European armies, so it was employed to communicate the ideas of continental theorists, including Antoine-Henri de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz. As military history was taught to convey a standardised understanding of warfare, when the wholesale adoption of continental models became challenged from the 1890s it reflected the latest advances in British military thought. Psychological factors, new technology and political and maritime considerations all played a prominent role in how warfare was conceptualised from this time. Following the poor British showing during the Second Boer War, military history was again employed to further the professionalism of the officer corps as it was added to the exams sat by officers when seeking promotion.

The Conclusion builds on the arguments contained in the chapters to consider the wider significance of this book’s findings. It demonstrates that as there has been hitherto no attempt to examine military history’s growth on its own terms, this has served to limit understanding of the development of British historical writing more broadly and the subject’s role in shaping responses to the First World War. When military history is incorporated, existing explanations of the nature and evolution of historical writing in Britain are shown to be problematic and incomplete as they do not account for either the topics covered or the methodological complexity of some of the subject’s subgenres. Equally, understanding the role military history played in the development of military thought in the army helps explain several aspects of the force’s decision-making at the outbreak of war in 1914. This chapter concludes by briefly outlining how military history’s evolution prior to the First World War shaped its subsequent development during the twentieth century.

This chapter argues that the developments in officer education examined in Chapter 2 provided a catalyst for the growth in military history published for officer education after 1856. When the army started to teach the subject, a financial incentive was created for both authors and publishers to produce textbooks. The reformation of the way the army taught military history after the Second Boer War expanded this market yet further as officers seeking promotion were forced to read widely around the campaigns under study. Equally, from the 1890s several military reformers anxious to increase the professionalism of the officer corps published military history for this purpose too. Although military history was mostly used to communicate the ideas of continental military theorists, in the decades prior to the outbreak of the First World War this began to change. A ‘British School’ of military thought emerged which employed the subject to introduce new ideas into how war was understood.

There were three factors which contributed to military history’s establishment as a scholarly discipline and its appearance as a university subject. First, in the final decades of the nineteenth century a new generation of university-based historians emerged at Oxford, Cambridge and Manchester who emphasised solving historical problems using primary source material. This legitimised the study of military history in their eyes and allowed the subject to make inroads into the curricula of these institutions. Second, following its poor showing during the Second Boer War, the army introduced a scheme by which a university student could qualify for a commission after sitting a series of exams, including one on military history. As a result, between 1904 and 1914 the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Manchester and London came to teach the military history required for this scheme. Third, a concern that the ignorance of military matters by politicians and electorate would lead to foreign policy disasters fed the conviction that civilians required knowledge of military affairs, further driving the development of ‘high-brow’ military history.

The Introduction sets out the main themes explored in the book and provides an overview of the limited existing literature on this topic. In so doing, it highlights that there has been hitherto no attempt to provide an explanation of military history’s initial emergence and development in Britain. To ensure that the concepts and categories which are used currently by historians are not applied without reflection to the nineteenth century, the Introduction begins with a discussion of how the scope of military history as a subject has changed over time. It identifies the period between 1815 and 1914 as the foundational stage in the development of military history. It describes the four main subgenres of the subject which appeared during this time: material for officer education and official, popular and scholarly military history. The Introduction discusses the book’s methodology, comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the source material and outlines the book’s structure.

Commercial opportunism played a central role in the development of popular military history after 1854. The potential readership for such material grew as the literacy rate of the public increased and as book markets in the colonies emerged. Declining book production costs and the general reading public’s greater awareness of current events, due to the emergence of a cheap popular press, further drove up demand. As a result, publishers and authors responded by producing ‘instant’ and serialised historical works on recent military events which were cheap and accessible. The popularity of this material led it to be used to influence the reading public’s understanding of military matters, defence policy and the British Empire. As the period progressed, the messaging popular military history contained underwent considerable change, reflecting the complexity of contemporary views on the British Army and empire.

In lieu of a traditional introduction, the editors elected to invite leading scholars to open the volume with a roundtable, inviting discussion and debate over the value, limits, and contributions of war and society studies to understanding the American experience of war. In a robust conversation prompted by questions from the editors, these prominent scholars tackled the question at the very heart of the volume—what defines the study of war and society? Their conversation is followed by commentary from a scholar who offers a counterpoint from the vantage point of military history. The introduction closes with some concluding thoughts from the editors and a roadmap for the volume that follows. The volume’s subsequent essays grapple, explicitly or implicitly, with the ideas laid out in the opening roundtable. The authors collectively aim to help define and elevate the field of war and society by showcasing its approaches, its promise, its sensitivities, and its possibilities. The volume overall stands as a collaborative declaration of the ambitions, character, and future of the field of war and society.

This article reflects on the state of war and society scholarship in the context of current global conflicts. It argues for bridging the gap between traditional military history and the war and society school to gain a deeper understanding of war's complexities. It uses examples from contemporary conflicts and historical analyses to explore themes such as comradeship, gender, memory, and culture, demonstrating their relevance in interpreting modern warfare. In emphasizing the importance of interdisciplinary approaches in examining war's multifaceted impact on societies and individuals, it calls for war and society scholars to engage more directly with contemporary issues, applying their insights to foster a more nuanced comprehension of the roots and implications of war.

This introduction reflects on the conceptual benefits, challenges, and limits of putting into conversation military history and global history. It regards the two world wars as times of both disruption and heightened connectedness. Severed trade, breaches in diplomatic relations, enforced immobility, and economic sanctions were paired with new connections, contacts, networks, emulations, and reroutings. Four key perspectives define the volume’s approach. First, decentering the study of the world wars widens the geographic, chronological, and social scope of historians’ outlook, introducing a more diverse historical narrative. Second, focusing on the mobility of people, ideas, and goods, which the world wars both engendered and deepened, raises important questions about what was absorbed, adapted, and rejected as part of these circulations. Third, emphasizing encounters helps to show the impact of global warfare at the local level, highlights the transformation of individual and collective identities, and forces a reflection on the lives of those who remained untouched, at least apparently, by faraway events. Finally, this volume explores global languages: the shared systems of conceptualization and communication – including commemorative practices and international and humanitarian law – which developed on account of the world wars’ extreme violence.

The Australian Army’s commitment to the war in South Vietnam unfolded gradually over several years. It commenced with the deployment of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) in 1962, followed by the arrival of a small Australian force headquarters in Saigon and the 1 RAR battle group in 1965, and completed with the establishment of the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) in 1966. The task force initially consisted of two infantry battalions with supporting arms and services, deployed to Nui Dat in Phuoc Tuy province under the operational control of the US II Field Force Vietnam (IIFFV), and a logistic element at the nearby port of Vung Tau. As 1ATF operated separately from the established Australian Army divisional structure, it received additional intelligence resources that would not usually form part of a task force, including a detachment of the Divisional Intelligence Unit and a small signals intelligence capability. In addition, the headquarters of 1ATF had assigned a senior intelligence officer of major rank, a captain intelligence officer, and a small battle intelligence, or order of battle staff.

Journalist and historian Mark Dapin argues that ‘every stage of Australia’s Vietnam War has been misremembered and obscured by myth'. This is not unusual. Much of Australia’s military history is coloured by storytelling and the perpetuation of legends. Several myths, legends and falsehoods have also grown around the conduct of operations of the Australian Army’s intelligence personnel during the war in South Vietnam. These range from simple fabrications and ‘storytelling’ to an attempt to deflect criticism from those responsible. One of these relates to a particular allegation of torture and the mistreatment of a prisoner by Australians during the Vietnam War.

When hostilities in the Second World War ended on 15 August 1945, the Australian Army became responsible for an area extending from Nauru and Kiribati in the east, through to Sulawesi and Borneo to the west, and including the Solomon Islands, Timor, New Ireland, New Britain and New Guinea. Army Intelligence Corps members supported each army formation's headquarters through detachments of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service, Field Security Sections, Air Liaison Sections and Army Air Photographic Interpretation Units. Each army headquarters and infantry battalion were also supported by its intelligence sections, often commanded by Australian Intelligence Corps officers, with other ranks from one of the arms. In addition, Intelligence Corps personnel continued to operate several specialist intelligence units that supported the army even while reducing in strength.