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This chapter offers a novel account of trust as a form of opening one’s mind to the autonomy of other persons. Despite a long tradition of philosophical thinking about trust, it remains unclear how (non-instrumental) trust works in close human relationships. While important strands of theorising in sociology and moral psychology recognise that trust involves accepted vulnerability, the autonomy of the trusted person is typically viewed as something to be coped with rather than embraced. By drawing on a central distinction in Husserl’s phenomenology, the chapter proposes shifting the perspective and placing the other’s autonomy at the centre of the trusting attitude in close relationships. A personalistic perspective on trust emphasises shared goals and values with the trusted individual, shaping the affective attitude towards them. To understand the affective dynamics involved in sharing and adjusting one’s goals or values in interpersonal trust, the authors suggest conceptualising attitudinal aspects of trust as a metacognitive feeling that entails a self-explorative dimension. The chapter demonstrates how this self-explorative dimension helps explain the dynamics of disclosing intimate details and adopting another’s perspective in psychotherapeutic relationships, or what is referred to as transformative trust.
The cognitive ability to think about other people's psychological states is known as `mindreading'. This Element critiques assumptions that have been formative in shaping philosophical theories of mindreading: that mindreading is ubiquitous, underpinning the vast majority of our social interactions; and that its primary goal is to provide predictions and explanations of other people's behaviour. It begins with an overview of key positions and empirical literature in the debate. It then introduces and motivates the pluralist turn in this literature, which challenges the core assumptions of the traditional views. The second part of the Element uses case studies to further motivate the pluralist framework, and to advocate the pluralist approach as the best way to progress our understanding of social cognitive phenomena.
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