Fritz, Lo, and Schmid argue that the symmetry problem for the modal ontological argument dissolves in modal logics weaker than S5, where (P1) $\square\left( g\rightarrow \square{g} \right)$, (P2) $\unicode{x2B26}{g}$, and (P2*) $\unicode{x2B26}\neg g$ are jointly consistent. We grant their formal results but deny their dialectical conclusion. The symmetry problem is not dissolved but relocated. Their atheist advantage in S4 depends on privileging (P1) over its mirror, (P1*) $\square\left( \neg g\rightarrow \square\neg g \right)$. We argue that the principal metaphysical frameworks relevant to (P1) – including dispositional modality, actualist constraints together with divine simplicity, the inexplicability of God’s contingent existence, and theistic grounding – provide no stable advantage for (P1) over (P1*). Depending on their details, these frameworks support both principles, support neither, or generate an asymmetry that does not favour (P1). The symmetry therefore reappears at the level of the necessity claims, and the reverse argument gains no decisive advantage over the original.

I present an argument for God's existence based on the idea that the possibility of God requires the existence of God as a ground. After setting this argument out, I compare it to other arguments for God, concentrating on an argument from Descartes's Third Meditation. I then address various objections and conclude by setting out a non-theistic version of the argument.