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In the nineteenth century, the United States also opposed the British- and French-sponsored Paris Declaration of 1856, which conflicted with the US policy of freedom of the seas. The Paris Declaration protected enemy goods on neutral ships and neutral goods under enemy flag during armed conflict at sea. In the US view, it did not go far enough in protecting all private property from capture at sea, owned by either a neutral or a belligerent, which the United States offered in the Marcy Amendment. The United States had long sought the more sweeping principle of “free ships, free goods,” meaning that neutral ships should be able to trade freely even with belligerents, except for contraband. The European powers rejected the Marcy Amendment, and the United States remained outside the regime. The law and policy regarding prize capture of neutral property and interference with neutral ships would arise again during World War I and II.
The US policy on maritime neutrality during World War I and World War II reflected its efforts to stay out of the wars while protecting its economic interests and ensuring the safety of American shipping. However, in both conflicts, neutrality was difficult to maintain due to violations by belligerents – both Britain and Germany. The principle of freedom of navigation differed slightly in US law and policy between the two wars, but they shared enduring themes. When World War I broke out in 1914, President Woodrow Wilson declared that the United States would remain neutral. This reflected traditional American non-interventionism, following the principles laid out in George Washington’s Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine. Following the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany in 1939, Congress amended the Neutrality Acts to allow arms sales to France and Britain on a “cash-and-carry” basis. In September 1941, after a German U-boat attacked the US destroyer USS Greer. President Roosevelt responded with an order for the US Navy to engage German submarines on sight if threatened. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued the Atlantic Charter in August 1941.
The United States fought its first conflict as an independent nation against France, the ally that was essential for gaining freedom from British rule. After the United States signed the Jay Treaty with Great Britain resolving outstanding issues from the Revolutionary War and normalizing trade, France reacted by interdicting US commercial ships that were now trading with its enemy. The US policy on freedom of the seas was shaped by the need to protect its neutral shipping rights, especially in the face of increasing French maritime aggression. This policy stemmed from a desire to avoid being dragged into European wars while maintaining profitable commerce. However, the French government, angered by the US neutrality during the French Revolutionary Wars, saw American trade with Britain as a violation of their alliance, and French privateers began seizing American commercial shipping. In response, Congress authorized the use of military force, leading to the deployment of the US Navy to defend American merchant ships against interference by the French Navy.
The US policy on freedom of the seas was a central issue contributing to the outbreak of the War of 1812. Britain sought to prevent the United States from trading with France and began forcible conscription or impressment of US merchant sailors into the Royal Navy. Britain also imposed a blockade against American ports in violation of US maritime neutral rights, which restricted American ships from trading with French-controlled ports unless they passed through British ports first. The United States hoped to end impressment of American sailors and secure the right to trade freely on the high seas without British interference. The War of 1812 solidified the concept of freedom of the seas as a legal doctrine that applied during peace and armed conflict and became a permanent feature of American policy. Although the war itself was inconclusive in some respects, it served to magnify the importance of freedom of navigation to the United States and reinforced a broader understanding that the United States would use force to resist infringements on freedom of the seas.
Joseph Story thought that the United States needed more than courts to vindicate its independence in the War of 1812. The youngest justice on the Supreme Court also believed that the nation needed legal doctrines that would support its aspirations to global power. For decades, American policymakers – and especially the Court under John Marshall – had defended the rights of neutral nations to trade peaceably in wartime. That approach made sense when a militarily weak but commercially vigorous United States sought to profit from trade with European powers embroiled in conflict. But now that the United States itself was at war, Story envisioned a different national future, in which a robust military and strong central government were the foundation of American sovereignty. The split that emerged on the Court over neutral and belligerent rights reflected a generational divide over how to preserve and extend American independence, and it fractured the Marshall Court’s prior unanimity. Despite Marshall’s resistance, Story persuaded his colleagues to adopt doctrines that favored the rights of nations at war, pushing the courts – and the country – to assume a more assertive presence at sea.
The first part of this chapter focuses on the shift in Anglo-Spanish relations brought on by the death of the British ambassador in Madrid. It delves into the critical role that individuals can play during diplomatic negotiations and the subsequent effects they can have on issues relating to neutrality and sea power. Keene’s relationship with William Pitt and with Ricardo Wall largely kept Anglo-Spanish relations afloat and working toward an eventuality where Spain would remain neutral and willing to compromise on neutral rights. Keene actively worked to persuade Wall to accept the Court of Prize Appeal as the best mechanism to safeguard Spanish neutrality but failed to achieve his goal before he died. Keene’s successor, Lord Bristol, proved much less effective and relations between the two governments deteriorated further. It was under these trying political circumstances that the San Juan Baptista came before the Court of Prize Appeal. Lord Hardwicke’s intent appeared to be to ensure that the first Spanish appellate case be decided in favour of the Spanish in order to win Spanish government support for the Court of Prize Appeal as a fair and viable mechanism to safeguard neutral rights.
This chapter begins Part III of the book which focuses on Anglo-Spanish relations during the Seven Years’ War and focuses particularly on the first two Spanish cases to come before the Court of Prize Appeal. This serves as a contextual chapter for Anglo- Spanish affairs and introduces the specific people and dynamics within the Spanish Court that were critical to negotiations over neutrality. It also introduces the cases of the San Juan Baptista and the Jesús, Maria, y José. The chapter highlights that the political and diplomatic contexts of Anglo-Spanish relations were markedly different from those of Anglo-Dutch relations and that preserving Spanish neutrality was, in many ways, much more fraught and complicated. This was due largely to internal Spanish political events (such as the death of King Ferdinand VI and the death of the British ambassador to Spain) and Anglo-Spanish maritime grievances that went beyond questions of prize-taking but spoke to the core of Spanish fears that British maritime hegemony would drastically alter the power of balance in the Americas and adversely affect neutral nations.
The latter years of Spain’s neutrality during the war (1759–62) saw an even greater deterioration in Anglo-Spanish relations. Ministers from both Courts attempted to preserve and salvage Spanish neutrality, but unresolved diplomatic grievances, as well as the deaths of both the Spanish king, Ferdinand VI, and the British monarch, George II, foiled their efforts and any gains made by the case of the San Juan Baptista. The increasing decay and eventual breakdown of Anglo-Spanish relations during the war demonstrate that the tactics used to ensure Dutch neutrality could not so easily be transferred to maintain Spanish neutrality. This chapter begins with the appellate case of the Jesús, Maria, y José and a close look at the legal arguments presented for both the Spanish shipowners and the British privateers who took the ship as prize. The proceedings of the court are analysed alongside the political developments between the Spanish and British ministries, and illustrate how they influenced one another. The case demonstrates Hardwicke’s continued attempts to make legal arguments that would set the Rule of the War of 1756 as the standard rule for how Britain’s prize court system would judge the legality of enemy goods carried in neutral ships.
The cases of the Maria Theresa and the America were designed, by Hardwicke, Holderness, and Newcastle, to instil confidence in the Dutch government that the Court of Prize Appeal would safeguard the Dutch neutral rights that had been agreed throughout the first part of the war. They were also designed to instil confidence in British privateers and naval captains and ensure that French colonial trade carried in neutral ships could still largely be stopped and condemned as legal prize. This chapter focuses on the two appellate cases and the legal arguments presented. These are then tied to the legal and strategic maritime thinking of Lord Hardwicke and his creation of the Rule of the War of 1756. This rule became the bedrock for how Britain would understand and negotiate neutral rights over the course of the next major European maritime wars. The basic premise of the rule was that trade that was prohibited to a neutral during times of peace would be considered by the British prize court system to be prohibited in times of war. The chapter, through an analysis of Dutch cases in the Court of Prize Appeal, examines how and why Hardwicke developed this rule.
The Conclusion delves into the strategic and legal legacies of the Seven Years’ War. It ties the Seven Years’ War and the unresolved tensions around maritime neutrality to the outbreak of Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-Spanish hostilities during the American War of Independence. It does so by examining the peace treaty of 1763 wherein no new significant arrangements were made about neutral rights between the Spanish and the British. The argument is made that the ambiguity of existing treaties left both governments room to continue negotiations whilst the Rule of the War of 1756 would provide an understanding of how British prize courts would treat neutral ships in future conflicts. The chapter examines the legacy of the Court of Prize Appeal and the thinking behind the rule. It discusses how the court and the rule were used in subsequent conflicts through the Napoleonic Wars and the role that individual judges took in making the rule a critical or underplayed element of British maritime strategic thinking. The rule loomed large in British maritime law for many wars after Hardwicke created it and it is, perhaps, one of the best illustrations of the link between law, sea power, and strategic thinking.
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