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In the social media era, people and organizations increasingly fight over the public's attention. This competition is especially intense in American presidential campaigns. As someone who used attention-grabbing strategies throughout his career, Donald Trump's communication skills were well suited to this environment. His campaigns illustrate the power and limits of attention-grabbing campaign tactics. While he successfully dominated the public's attention in his presidential campaigns, people consistently consumed more negative than positive information about him. Additionally, in this era, the campaign media system and the public continue to focus on incumbent performance, resisting efforts to change the subject. Finally, the editorial decisions that prestigious news outlets make about what to cover still seem to shape which stories people hear about in the crucial final weeks of the campaign. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
By 2022, social media platforms had become more prominent access points to news than traditional news media platforms. Although news media also draw benefits from online platforms, they find themselves in an increasingly asymmetric relationship that appears to harm journalists and new media’s ability to generate revenues online. Remedying the uneven playing field between big tech and news media has been a recurring ambition of European media policy. In the context of literature on corporate political activity, this chapter investigates how three big tech companies, Alphabet, Meta and Microsoft, have positioned themselves in relation to EU policymaking that aims to strengthen the rights of journalists, news media and press publishers online. The chapter argues that while these big tech companies primarily seek to preserve their own business models and reputations, the media policy domain also reveals a split in their lobby narratives. Due to lower exposure to reforms in digital media policy, Microsoft has been less opposed to, and in fact has campaigned for, stronger protection for news media against digital platforms.
The established idea that people learn about politics and relevant societal issues via the news media can be put into question because of a 'twin challenge of increased media choice.' First, there is a growing number of people who choose to avoid most news which leaves them uninformed about what is happening in politics and society. Second, people may form their beliefs based on false and misleading information, leading them to become misinformed about current political issues. This Element investigated both challenges based on data from a large comparative survey in eighteen Western countries. Consistent with the existing literature, the results largely confirm the added value of staying informed through using traditional news media, the public broadcaster in particular. In contrast, consuming news from newer media sources such as social media and messaging apps is typically associated across countries with less knowledge and more misperceptions about political matters.
Political news consumption is highly uneven today: few people consume from news outlets directly, while many encounter news incidentally through social media and aggregators. Because outlets depend on direct consumers for revenue, they respond primarily to this core audience’s preferences. Several contemporary styles of news coverage—which emphasize partisan conflict, employ specialized jargon, engage in predictive analysis, and use clickbait language—are attractive to core consumers, but may also make news less accessible for others. In a pre-registered survey experiment (n = 2,233), I show that, relative to a public interest style that prioritizes key information about policy and democratic norms, typical news styles weaken post-exposure recall of key news information—that is, they are under-informative. Recall penalties are especially severe for those with lower baseline political engagement, yet still affect highly engaged consumers as well. This study shows that contemporary approaches to news coverage broadly under-serve the public by inhibiting political learning.
This paper reports exploratory data from a broader study that examines media representations of the voluntary sector in Canada. It specifically identifies the resources and organizational attributes of Canadian voluntary groups that appear to be important for receiving mainstream news coverage. The data identifies four sets of characteristics of more than 500 voluntary organizations: demographic variables, association type, noneconomic resources, and economic expenditures. These characteristics are examined in terms of their relationship to news coverage. The data suggest that area of activity is significantly related to the amount of media attention that organizations receive. However, the amount of media attention that an organization receives is most strongly influenced by its yearly budget. The implications of these findings are discussed in relation to both current debates about advocacy in the voluntary sector and important contextual developments that are transforming the communication environment in which charities and nonprofit organizations in Canada operate. We also draw comparisons to news coverage of the voluntary sector in other liberal democratic countries.
This chapter considers how advocacy of press freedom necessarily implicates contested political questions about desirable structures of governance and social interaction. Professor Magarian discusses two political oppositions that strongly influence how the free press functions: objectivity vs. subjectivity and institutionalism vs. populism. First, the chapter describes the late-twentieth-century news media’s heightened commitment to objective reporting. That commitment has strong political resonance with our era’s anxiety about submergence of objective truth in political debates. At the same time, the news media’s push toward objectivity fostered a stultifying homogeneity that prompted dynamic efforts, embodied imperfectly in the Fairness Doctrine, to complicate hegemonic narratives. Present advocates for press freedom must assess which truths the press should propound and which positions it should interrogate. Second, the chapter juxtaposes the institutionalized character of dominant late-twentieth-century news media with the populist fragmentation of news sources in the age of online communication. Institutionalized mass media have inculcated valuable journalistic norms of professionalism and ethics that contemporary online news sources often elide. However, populist mass media present a wider, more diverse range of voices than institutionalized media support. Present advocates for press freedom need to pursue the optimal balance between these opposing virtues.
Considered a staple of the French press since at least the nineteenth century, the fait divers—a catch-all category for short, often sensational news items such as murders, petty crimes, and suicides—has been taken up and transformed in West African cultural production. This essay focuses on the transformations and transpositions of the fait divers tradition in the work of Senegalese writer Aminata Maïga Ka (1940–2005), arguing that her short stories and novels inflect earlier treatments of the journalistic genre while staging a broader critique of the liberalization of the media in Senegal during the 1970s and 1980s. Ka’s works offer a window onto the entangled histories of postcolonial literary production and the emergent popular press in Senegal. Specifically, she updates and expands Ousmane Sembène’s rescripting of the French fait divers in his short story “La Noire de …” (1961/1962) and the landmark film from 1966 by the same title.
This chapter analyzes what New York Times correspondent David Halberstam called “a war within a war,” the conflict between journalists who reported about the deficiencies of the Saigon government or the US war effort in Vietnam and administration officials in the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations who considered those stories myopic or malicious. It argues that news media coverage of the Vietnam War rankled presidents not because it was slanted or sensational but because it showed the hard realities, high costs, and inconvenient truths of a controversial war. As polls revealed declining popular support for the US war effort, it became politically expedient for Johnson and Nixon to blame the news media – and especially the television networks – for public discontent. The “war within the war” has had enduring legacies. The efforts of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon to discredit the reporting of television journalists, prominent columnists, and newspaper correspondents established precedents that a later generation of government officials has used in 21st-century battles over “fake news.” Like so much of the US experience in Vietnam, the disputes over the reporting of the war remain part of the present, even as they recede further into the past.
This article examines the information sharing behavior of U.S. politicians and the mass public by mapping the ideological sharing space of political news on social media. As data, we use the near-universal currency of online information exchange: web links. We introduce a methodological approach and software to unify the measurement of ideology across social media platforms by using sharing data to jointly estimate the ideology of news media organizations, politicians, and the mass public. Empirically, we show that (1) politicians who share ideologically polarized content share, by far, the most political news and commentary and (2) that the less competitive elections are, the more likely politicians are to share polarized information. These results demonstrate that news and commentary shared by politicians come from a highly unrepresentative set of ideologically extreme legislators and that decreases in election pressures (e.g., by gerrymandering) may encourage polarized sharing behavior.
This study explores vulnerability narratives used in relation to older adults and others during the COVID-19 pandemic. A mixed-method content analysis was conducted of 391 articles published in two major newspapers in Canada and the USA during the first wave of the pandemic. The findings indicated that during the early months of the pandemic, limited attention was directed towards its impact on older adults or other ‘vulnerable’ subpopulations in both countries. Where evident, intrinsic (individual-level) risk factors were most consistently used to frame the vulnerability of older adults. In contrast, vulnerability was more likely to be framed as structural with regard to other subpopulations (e.g., ethno-racial minorities). These narratives also differed somewhat in Canadian and US newspapers. The framing of older adults as intrinsically vulnerable reflects ageist stereotypes and promotes downstream policy interventions. Greater attention is needed to the role of structural factors in influencing pandemic-related outcomes among older adults.
This study aims to determine whether ultra-processed foods (UPFs) are being discussed in news media in Australia and whether this terminology, as described in the NOVA system, is being applied accurately.
Design:
Interpretive content analysis of online and print media articles that mentioned UPFs from 2009 to 2023 in Australia.
Setting:
Australia.
Participants:
Online and print media articles.
Results:
A total of two hundred ninety-eight Australian media articles were captured. A substantial increase in the number of UPF articles was observed between 2017–2019 and 2021–2023. The UPF concept was inaccurately explained or defined in 32 % of the articles and was frequently used interchangeably with other descriptors, such as ‘highly or heavily processed food’, ‘junk food’, ‘unhealthy food’, ‘packaged food’ and ‘discretionary food’. Most of the articles had a health focus; however, sustainability interest increased, particularly in the past 18 months.
Conclusions:
UPFs are increasingly being discussed in news media in Australia; however, the concept is still incorrectly presented in over a third of articles. This highlights the importance of improving the literacy about UPFs to ensure that messages are communicated in a way that is salient, accessible and accurate.
What has allowed inequalities in material resources to mount in advanced democracies? This chapter considers the role of media reporting on the economy in weakening accountability mechanisms that might otherwise have incentivized governments to pursue more equal outcomes. Building on prior work on the United States, we investigate how journalistic depictions of the economy relate to real distributional developments across OECD countries. Using sentiment analysis of economic news content, we demonstrate that the evaluative content of the economic news strongly and disproportionately tracks the fortunes of the very rich and that good (bad) economic news is more common in periods of rising (falling) income shares at the top. We then propose and test an explanation in which pro-rich biases in news tone arise from a journalistic focus on the performance of the economy in the aggregate, while aggregate growth is itself positively correlated with relative gains for the rich. The chapter’s findings suggest that the democratic politics of inequality may be shaped in important ways by the skewed nature of the informational environment within which citizens form economic evaluations.
The digital economy raises important concerns relating to the concentration of economic-political power and, consequently, to the separation of powers in a broad sense, or more narrowly to checks and balances. Several recent or proposed pieces of legislation, especially in Australia, the European Union, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States aim at tackling some issues posed by large digital platforms. These recent or proposed pieces of legislation all address important issues in the digital economy, and some of them could contribute to reduce entrenched market concentration, however, to a degree that remains to be defined. The most comprehensive set of bills from this perspective was introduced in the U.S. Congress during the last two years. However, even in this country, the concentration of politico-economic power in a few firms and the control of the digital infrastructure of democracy by them would remain widely unregulated, as in other countries, should Congress pass the proposed bills.
Chapter 3 documents how the meaning of fake news changes over time. I look at how fake news was understood during the 2000s and 2010s – prior to the Trump era – in the New York Times. I discuss how fake news was primarily understood in three ways – related to fabricated stories passed off as real news events, as entertainment content pertaining to current events, and as government propaganda masquerading as journalism. Further, the US media’s understanding of fake news has shifted over the years. My analysis of the New York Times’ coverage of fake news in the 2010s finds that the paper defined the concept in many ways, compared to Trump’s various definitions, with little overlap between the paper and the former president. Editorially, the paper emphasizes conventional definitions of fake news that avoid understanding it as a form of propaganda operating in service of governmental interests. I examine various competing definitions of fake news in other media venues, providing evidence that the social construction of fake news is a contested phenomenon. I examine US partisan cable media, alternative left- and right-wing media, and social media venues – each of which puts forward its own interpretations of what fake news means.
Chapter 5 analyzes two cases of fake news as disinformation – the 2003 Iraq war and climate change. I look at how political and economic actors manipulate the news media to promote disinformation, in the process “manufacturing consent” for the public. With Iraq, I document the initial success of the Bush administration in selling the US invasion, producing growing support for the war, with the news-consuming public based on notions that Iraq possessed WMDs and ties to terrorism. Support for war declined over time, as the public was increasingly sensitized to rising casualties and the financial cost of the war, after the United States failed to find WMDs, and as the war was increasingly seen as unwinnable and immoral. I also examine how the fossil fuel industry utilized “false balancing” as a news management technique for encouraging mass confusion related to climate change, pitting climate-change skeptics against individuals recognizing planetary warming. Examining “climategate” and cap-and-trade legislation in the late 2000s, I show how reactionary narratives dominated the news, driving increased public opposition to efforts to address climate change. Public opposition receded by the mid-to-late 2010s as extreme weather and a warming planet undermined efforts to foster mass ignorance.
Extensive research in Western societies has demonstrated that media reports of protests have succumbed to selection and description biases, but such tendencies have not yet been tested in the Chinese context. This article investigates the Chinese government and news media's selection and description bias in domestic protest events reporting. Using a large protest event data set from Weibo (CASM-China), we found that government accounts on Weibo covered only 0.4 per cent of protests while news media accounts covered 6.3 per cent of them. In selecting events for coverage, the news media accounts tacitly struck a balance between newsworthiness and political sensitivity; this led them to gravitate towards protests by underprivileged social groups and shy away from protests targeting the government. Government accounts on Weibo, on the other hand, eschewed reporting on violent protests and those organized by the urban middle class and veterans. In reporting selected protest events, both government and news media accounts tended to depoliticize protest events and to frame them in a more positive tone. This description bias was more pronounced for the government than the news media accounts. The government coverage of protest events also had a more thematic (as opposed to episodic) orientation than the news media.
Public and patient expectations of treatment influence health behaviours and decision-making.
Aims
We aimed to understand how the media has portrayed the therapeutic use of ketamine in psychiatry.
Method
We systematically searched electronic databases for print and online news articles about ketamine for psychiatric disorders. The top ten UK, USA, Canadian and Australian newspapers by circulation and any trade and consumer magazines indexed in the databases were searched from 2015 to 2020. Article content was quantitatively coded with a framework encompassing treatment indication, descriptions of prior use, references to research, benefits and harms, treatment access and process, patient and professional testimony, tone and factual basis.
Results
We found 119 articles, peaking in March 2019 when the United States Food and Drug Administration approved esketamine. Ketamine treatment was portrayed in an extremely positive light (n = 82, 68.9%), with significant contributions of positive testimony from key opinion leaders (e.g. clinicians). Positive research results and ketamine's rapid antidepressant effect (n = 87, 73.1%) were frequently emphasised, with little reference to longer-term safety and efficacy. Side-effects were frequently reported (n = 96, 80.7%), predominantly ketamine's acute psychotomimetic effects and the potential for addiction and misuse, and rarely cardiovascular and bladder effects. Not infrequently, key opinion leaders were quoted as being overly optimistic compared with the existing evidence base.
Conclusions
Information pertinent to patient help-seeking and treatment expectations is being communicated through the media and supported by key opinion leaders, although some quotes go well beyond the evidence base. Clinicians should be aware of this and may need to address their patients’ beliefs directly.
Previous studies have found negative ageing narratives in the media during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, few have focused on compassionate ageism and how the news responded to the progression of the COVID-19 pandemic. We investigated (a) media themes of negative and compassionate ageism and (b) their relationships with COVID-19 parameters and the public health response. The sample included 1,197 articles relevant to COVID-19 and older people in Hong Kong published between January and December 2020. We used thematic analysis to identify themes from the news articles and structural equation modelling to explore these themes' relationship with the number of older people infected, effective reproduction number, number of COVID-19 deaths and public health response parallel in time. Pandemic-related variables were lagged for a day – the time needed to be reflected in the news. Two negative ageism themes portrayed older people as vulnerable to COVID-19 but counterproductive in combating the pandemic. Two compassionate ageism themes depicted older people as a homogenous group of passive assistance recipients. The theme blaming older people was associated with the number of confirmed infections (β = 0.418, p = 0.002) but vulnerability of older people was not associated with pandemic-related variables. The theme helping older people was negatively associated with the percentage of older people in confirmed infections (β = −0.155, p = 0.019). The theme resources available was negatively associated with confirmed infections (β = −0.342, p < 0.001) but positively associated with the Containment and Health Index (β = 0.217, p = 0.005). Findings suggested that negative and compassionate ageism were translated into narratives about older people in the media as the pandemic evolved but did not address the actual risk they faced. Media professionals should be aware of the potential negative and compassionate ageism prompted by the news agenda and promote adequate health behaviours and responses.
This chapter sets the stage for the book by providing an empirical overview of citizen legitimacy beliefs, elite legitimacy beliefs, and elite communication in global governance. It shows that citizen legitimacy beliefs vary across countries, international organizations, and over time, but that there is no secular decline in international organization legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. It further demonstrates that elites are divided in their legitimacy beliefs, but that they on average moderately support international organizations. Elite communication in global governance tends to be negative in tone in the context of the international organizations studied, but also involves a broadening of narratives about international organizations and a pattern of fluctuations over time.
Why is misleading partisan content believed and shared? An influential account posits that political partisanship pervasively biases reasoning, such that engaging in analytic thinking exacerbates motivated reasoning and, in turn, the acceptance of hyperpartisan content. Alternatively, it may be that susceptibility to hyperpartisan content is explained by a lack of reasoning. Across two studies using different participant pools (total N = 1,973 Americans), we had participants assess true, false, and hyperpartisan news headlines taken from social media. We found no evidence that analytic thinking was associated with judging politically consistent hyperpartisan or false headlines to be accurate and unbiased. Instead, analytic thinking was, in most cases, associated with an increased tendency to distinguish true headlines from both false and hyperpartisan headlines (and was never associated with decreased discernment). These results suggest that reasoning typically helps people differentiate between low and high quality political news, rather than facilitate belief in misleading content. Because social media play an important role in the dissemination of misinformation, we also investigated willingness to share headlines on social media. We found a similar pattern whereby analytic thinking was not generally associated with increased willingness to share hyperpartisan or false headlines. Together, these results suggest a positive role for reasoning in resisting misinformation.