To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter argues that the Sophist prompted the reflection of the Early Academics on at least two main fronts: (1) the elaboration of binary divisions of entities (Xenocrates, Hermodorus, divisiones aristoteleae, Aristotle’s On the Good); and (2) the critical reaction to Eleatic monism, as it emerges especially from Aristotle’s Metaphysics N 2. In doing so, the chapter also brings out ways in which this can shed light on aspects of the background of Aristotle’s ontology and theory of predication. It also discusses the problem, recently brought to scholarly attention, of the Early Academic composition of a textual canon functional to a work of systematization of Platonism.
Several aspects of Aristotle’s distinction of four types of opposites remain unclear, despite the familiarity of the distinction itself. This chapter sketches a story about some of those aspects as the result of Aristotle’s implicit but systematic engagement with Plato’s Sophist. The first section focuses on a passage from Metaph. XIV.2, which seems to refer to the Sophist and the way in which Plato discusses non-being there. I suggest, among other things, that the Sophist was read by Aristotle as embedding the ‘archaic’ mindset that eventually misled people into thinking of the opposition between being and non-being as a sort of categorial distinction between term-like items. The second section turns to illustrating how a series of remarks Aristotle drops at different places about negation, otherness, and the different types of opposites can be read as reactions to some of the things Plato writes in the Sophist. While the first section illustrates Aristotle’s take on the Sophist with respect to some basic metaphysical questions, the second section shows that points of detail in Aristotle’s account of the opposites can be taken as responses to the Sophist.
Sophists were active participants in ancient discussions about being or what-is at the most general level. This chapter discusses the contributions of Gorgias, Protagoras, Xeniades, and Lycophron in the context of the Eleatic philosophers Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus. All of these figures share a serious commitment to ontological inquiry as well as a concern with the problems that arise when discussing being or what-is. They also share an approach to these problems that is at times paradoxical and self-undermining. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of Parmenides’ poem, a work that serves as an important backdrop for later ontology. It then covers Gorgias’ On Not-Being, a response to the Eleatics and a unique contribution in its own right. Gorgias’ work is then compared with that of Zeno and Melissus. Finally, the more limited evidence we have of Protagoras, Xeniades, and Lycophron’s ontological theorizing is discussed.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.