Scholarly work on the politics of immigration in the U.S. has focused primarily on the influence of local demographics. Less understood are the ways in which local governments respond to demographic changes beyond the city limits. We hypothesize that local governments anticipate future influxes of immigrants from neighboring localities and adjust policies ex ante in order to constrain their movement before it can occur. We predict variation in anti-immigrant legislation as a function of proximity to nearby immigrant populations and find that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of the foreign-born population in a city’s surrounding areas doubles the likelihood that a city considers a restrictive policy. The effect is more pronounced when neighboring immigrants originate from Latin America than from other regions. We also find suggestive evidence that knowledge of adjacent foreign-born populations is transmitted via commuting patterns as neighboring populations commute into cities for work. Our research highlights the importance of spatial networks in local politics and how local political units influence one another and engage in an anticipatory strategic response.

This article introduces the Markov Riding Position Sampler (MaRiPoSa) for simulating Canadian elections under alternative configurations of electoral district boundaries. Despite Canada’s strictly non-partisan system of boundary design, MaRiPoSa demonstrates that, for a single Canadian election, there are alternative, allowable and more equitable configurations of boundaries to return either Liberal or Conservative governments without changing the vote or location of a single voter. If the same votes in the same places produce different governments depending on which valid configuration of boundaries happens to be used, to what extent can we say that it is voters and their territorial distributions that determine the outcome of Canadian elections? Canada will need to adjust principles and institutions to prepare for the new technological environment brought about by advances in computing and artificial intelligence.

Spatial inequalities in human capital are reshaping the politics of high-income democracies. However, comparative research on the political consequences of spatial inequality is constrained by a lack of data that is geographically detailed and cross-nationally comparable. This letter introduces the Regional Human Capital Database (RHCD), an open-access dataset covering 60,000 units in twenty wealthy democracies from the 1980s onward. The RHCD offers disaggregated data on educational attainment, demographics, urban structure, and voting, enabling analysis of within-region variation with unprecedented precision. We explain the construction of the dataset, including extensive checks to ensure reliability and validity. Our analysis demonstrates its value by showing growing urban–rural divides in educational attainment across countries with differing institutions and links between human capital and populist-right voting even within economically dynamic cities. The RHCD advances comparative research on the spatial dimensions of political change, offering a vital resource for scholars across political science and beyond.

Existing research mainly analyzes mass attitudes towards the European Union (EU) from the national and individual‐level perspective. This paper adds to this literature by focusing on the relationship between EU support and subnational economic conditions, using harmonized survey data covering 40 years and 1.1 million respondents in 197 European regions. We first describe Europe's changing subnational conditions in terms of catch‐up, wealthy, declining and glass‐ceiling regions. The paper then develops and tests a set of hypotheses regarding the temporally dynamic relationship between EU attitudes and regions’ long‐ and short‐term economic conditions. Our analyses reveal important longitudinal variations in this relationship with low levels of geographic differentiation in public opinion giving way to clear spatial differences in recent years. Our findings are consistent with the idea that the Great Recession and Brexit have generated a new geography of both Euroscepticism in Europe's declining regions and EU support in its wealthy and catch‐up regions.

In many European countries, people increasingly leave rural or small municipalities to live and work in urban or metropolitan environments. Although previous work on the ‘left behind’ places has examined the relationship between the rural–urban divide and vote choice, less is known about how depopulation affects electoral behaviour. Is there a relationship between experiencing a loss in population and support for the different parties? We investigate this question by examining the Spanish case, a country where the topic of depopulation has become a salient issue in political competition. Using a newly compiled dataset, we also explore whether the relationship between depopulation and electoral returns is moderated by municipality size, local compositional changes, the loss of public services and changes in amenities. Our findings show that depopulated municipalities give higher support to the main Conservative party, mainly in small municipalities. Yet, municipalities on the brink of disappearance are more likely to give larger support to the far‐right. Results overall show that the effect of depopulation seems to be driven by compositional changes, and not as a result of losing public services or a deterioration of the vibrancy of the town. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between internal migration and electoral behaviour.

This research note investigates the scope of regional variations in levels of affective polarization across Europe and contrasts it with national scores to highlight the theoretical and empirical interest of a disaggregated approach. Using all waves of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset, we compute an affective polarization score for 143,857 individuals and aggregate these scores in 190 regions nested in 30 countries, across a period ranging from 1996 to 2019, covering 105 elections. We map variations in affective polarization across regions, both cross‐sectionally and longitudinally. Our results reveal that the range of scores is larger across regions than between countries and that approximately half of the variation in affective polarization scores can be attributed to within‐country heterogeneity. Second, we find that some countries display rather homogeneous regional patterns, while others display heterogeneous scores. Third, we show how the increase in the affective polarization scores over time at the national level can be driven by sharp changes in some regions only, while other regions remain stable. Overall, these results point to the added value of adopting a regional approach to the study of affective polarization.

Urban–rural divides are large and growing in many national elections, but the sources of this widening divide are not well understood. Recent research has pointed to policy disagreement as one possible mechanism for this growing divide; if urban and rural residents hold increasingly dissimilar policy preferences, this disagreement could produce ever‐widening urban–rural electoral divides. We investigate this possibility by creating a synthesized dataset of nearly 1000 policy issue questions across 10 distinct Canadian national election studies conducted between 1993 and 2021 (N = 5.3 million), combined with a measure of the urban or rural character of every federal electoral district. This dataset allows us to measure urban–rural policy disagreement across a much larger range of policy issues and over a much longer time period than has previously been possible. We find strong evidence of urban–rural policy disagreement across a range of issues, and especially in areas of cultural policy, including questions relating to gun control, immigration and Indigenous affairs. We further find strong support for the ‘progressive cities’ hypothesis; in nearly all policy domains, urban residents support more left‐wing positions on policy issues than rural residents. However, we find no evidence these urban–rural policy divides have grown since the 1990s. Urban–rural policy disagreement, while large and meaningful, cannot explain the ever‐widening urban–rural political divide.

In this research note, we propose a new typology of geographic places for use in advancing Canadian politics research on the political effects of place. We use hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) to inductively derive place types from Aggregate Dissemination Areas (ADAs), a fine-grained unit of geography covering all of Canada, newly available from Statistics Canada. Using this approach, we uncover seven distinct place types, adding nuance to earlier more aggregated approaches focused on urban-rural (or urban-suburban-rural) distinctions. We then demonstrate our typology's utility by showing how it provides new insight into the relationship between place and politics, using the example of the 2021 Canadian federal election. We conclude with a discussion of how our approach may be used to further the study of Canadian political geography, and we make available all files necessary for researchers to merge our place types with survey data for this purpose.

Despite growing interest in the political consequences of the urban–rural divide, we know little about whether urban and rural populations differ in the policy problems they view as most important. This study explores urban–rural differences in policy priorities over an extended period (1939–2020), using data from 850 U.S. surveys. The analysis reveals modest but persistent gaps between urban and rural residents in several key policy areas. However, while urban–rural differences remain stable across diverse economic and political contexts, partisan affiliation significantly outweighs place-based identities in shaping these priorities. The findings suggest that despite geographic distinctions, urban and rural populations predominantly rely on partisan cues when forming policy agendas, which contributes to a nuanced understanding of political representation.

The extent to which legislators pursue their privately held preferences in office has important implications for representative democracy and is exceedingly difficult to measure. Many models of legislative decision-making tacitly assume that members are willing and able to carry out the wishes of their constituents so as to maximize their reelection prospects and, in so doing, relegate their personal preferences. This project explores this assumption by examining the role that members’ place of birth plays in shaping legislative behavior, apart from other politically relevant factors like partisanship. We find that birthplace exerts an independent influence on members’ voting behavior. Using a variety of geographic measures, we find that members who are born in close proximity to one another tend to exhibit similar patterns in roll call voting, even when accounting for partisanship, constituency attributes, and a variety of other determinants of voting. We also demonstrate in a secondary analysis that the agricultural composition of members’ birthplace influences their support for agricultural protection. Our findings suggest that members’ personal history shapes the representational relationship they have with their constituents.

Territory and territoriality lie at the heart of both world politics and International Relations (IR) theory. In terms of IR theory’s geographical assumptions, one of the most influential studies to date has been political geographer John Agnew’s 1994 article on the ‘the territorial trap’ (TTT). While Agnew’s original insights and subsequent research has reached canonical status in political geography, mainstream IR scholarship has yet to fully engage TTT. Political geographers, in turn, have largely dealt with the consequences of TTT for our understanding of world politics. This study offers the first detailed account of the origins of TTT, which are hidden in broad daylight in IR’s own history. The origins of TTT and mainstream IR are intertwined in terms of two dynamics: the racist and colonial origins of IR, and the selective nationalistic ontology that dominated IR especially in the first half of the 20th century. The arguments offered in this study have a wide variety of implications for problematising the ways in which IR-as-epistemological-community approaches territory and territoriality as well as our understanding of the origins and evolution of the present-day global territorial order.

Populist radical right (PRR) parties are often more successful in some regions of their countries than in others. However, previous research shows that the relationship between context and PRR support is not straightforward. We develop and test an expanded framework linking local conditions to PRR support through two causal mechanisms. First, we argue economic and cultural contextual factors can influence citizens by fostering a sense of perceived local decline, which in turn predicts both populist and nativist attitudes and, hence, PRR support (mediation). Second, we expect that citizens with fewer resources and stronger local embeddedness are more strongly influenced by the context in which they live (moderation). Combining geocoded survey data with contextual data from four countries (DE, FR, GB and NL), we show that the link between local context and PRR support is indeed mediated and moderated, providing a better understanding of the spatial distribution behind recent PRR success.

On June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court ended enforcement of Section 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act in Shelby County v. Holder. As a result, over 3500 municipalities were released from the preclearance requirement to seek federal approval prior to enacting changes to elections. Despite the Court’s majority opinion that Section 5 was no longer needed, practices like enforcing strict voter ID requirements and last-minute polling place changes increased dramatically after Shelby County. However, one underexamined election change is changing municipal boundaries through annexations. Municipal annexations can weaken minority political representation in municipal elections if minority population shares decrease after annexation. Using difference-in-differences models, I analyze annexations for over 15,000 municipalities from 2007–2020 across all forty U.S. states with annexable land. I find no evidence that municipalities previously covered by Section 5 increased annexation activity or that they conducted more annexations that dilute Black and minority resident shares after Shelby County. Patterns of annexations pre-Shelby County suggest that the null finding can be explained by the limited effectiveness of Section 5 in preventing minority dilution through annexations when it was in place. This study underscores how municipal boundaries can be manipulated to perpetuate inequality and the limitations of federal legislation in preventing this practice.