To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Addresses fundamental conflict between unlimited executive discretion and a rule-of-law regime, with particular focus on the decision of the US Supreme Court in Trump v. United States granting presidents either absolute or presumptive immunity for crimes committed in the exercise of official functions and the effective neutering of impeachment as a remedy for presidential overreach or criminality. Focuses particularly on designation of pardon power as a core power for which presidents enjoy absolute immunity and fact that abuse of pardon power is, in theory but perhaps no longer in practice, an impeachable offense.
This chapter analyzes the constitutional foundations, historical development, and modern controversies of presidential power in the United States. Article II created a paradoxical executive – empowered by the vesting, commander-in-chief, and take care clauses, yet constrained by checks from Congress and the courts. Presidential powers include appointments, pardons, and vetoes, but their scope has been contested since the founding. Crises have repeatedly expanded executive authority. Lincoln’s Civil War measures, Roosevelt’s New Deal, and post-9/11 security policies reshaped constitutional interpretation. Landmark cases such as In re Neagle (1890), United States v. Curtiss-Wright (1936), and Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (1952) established enduring frameworks, with Justice Jackson’s tripartite test in Youngstown remaining central. Later rulings, including United States v. Nixon (1974) and Trump v. United States (2024), highlight ongoing struggles over privilege and accountability. The modern presidency, increasingly reliant on unilateral actions amid polarization, is both the most powerful and contested branch, raising enduring concerns about separation of powers and democratic accountability.
This chapter addresses the Supreme Court’s recent, partly paradoxical lines of cases involving issues of presidential power, prerogative, and immunity. On the one hand, the Court has held that Article II and the Constitution’s overall structure endow the president with sweeping authorities and prerogatives. These include powers to control a “unitary” executive branch by removing officials who refuse to do the president’s bidding and, separately, a prerogative-like “immunity” from prosecution for many unlawful official acts, including ones that would constitute serious crimes if committed by anyone else. On the other hand, the Court has sought to limit the powers of agencies within the executive branch, which the president heads, on the theory that post–New Deal agency officials were allowed to assume functions that the Constitution reserves either to Congress or to the courts. Nowhere, this chapter explains, has the Court’s conservative supermajority pursued, or does it seem more likely to continue to pursue, a doctrinally revisionist agenda with more sweeping practical consequences.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.