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The Middle East has famously been described as a region ‘dripping with identity politics’. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that constructivism has gained prominence among scholars studying the international relations of the region. Following an introduction to the philosophical and sociological roots of constructivism as a social theory, the chapter discusses various strands among constructivists. It also explores how Middle Eastern scholars employ a constructivist approach holding distinct characteristics compared to those found in the broader debate on constructivism within International Relations. Scholars of Middle Eastern politics have been attentive to challenges to state identity, at supra- and sub-state levels, resulting in puzzling international behaviour. Insights from these debates on constructivism inform the case study, which contrasts the ‘classic’ Arab cold war among Arab states in the 1950s and 1960s with the regional rivalries that emerged following the Arab uprisings, which some observers have characterised as a new (Arab, neo-sectarian, Sunni–Shia) cold war. While supra- and sub-state identities played a crucial role in regional politics during both periods, notable differences existed. The case study examines whether and how identities and ideas matter in the international relations of the region in these two eras of Middle East history.
‘Religion, Migration and the Irish Novel’ considers the way in which the bitter sectarian divisions that characterised Irish society in the nineteenth century were both reflected in and produced by the fiction of the period. Novels such as William Parnell’s Maurice and Berghetta: or, the Priest of Rahery (1819) were written with the clear intention of repealing the Penal Laws that restricted the rights of Irish Catholics, while Selina Bunbury’s The Abbey of Innismoyle (1828) uses Gothic tropes of abduction by malicious friars to stoke Protestant fears of Catholic conspiracies. These sectarian divisions were reinforced for Irish migrants in novels such as Mary Anne Sadlier’s New Lights (1853), a Famine novel that pits a charitable Catholic priest against a rapacious Protestant evangelical, and which was published in New York for Irish-American readers, taking its place with Irish-American novels such as Peter McCorry’s The Lost Rosary (1870).
Political violence against women is often analyzed primarily through gender, leaving underexplored how other systems of domination shape its production and enforcement. This article develops an intersectional feminist institutionalist framework to explain how patriarchal and sectarian formal and informal rules co-produce political violence against women in deeply divided societies. Drawing on Lebanon as a theory-building case study and applying an abductive approach to our empirical data, we argue that such violence is not simply a backlash against women’s political presence, but is core to preserving the sectarian order. We identify three overlapping mechanisms through which political violence against women candidates is enforced by multiple actors, namely family coercion, party- and militia-linked enforcement, and sectarian boundary policing, with all of them mobilizing scripts of honor, purity, loyalty, and communal stability to constrain women’s political agency. Our framework offers broader insights into intersectional political violence across ethnically and religiously divided societies.
This article argues that the sectarian clauses in Lebanon’s 1926 constitution, namely Articles 9 and 10, were the product of French colonial policies rooted and justified in Europe’s minority rights discourse. It relies on colonial archives, local press, and the private papers of the constitution’s presumed author, Michel Chiha (1891–1954), to demonstrate how French administrators imposed their own legal and moral framework—as seen in the League of Nations’ mandate charter and France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen—at the expense of local input. The article also highlights the contingencies that led the Maronite clergy to push for Article 95, institutionalizing sectarian quotas in the allocation of public employment. Close analysis of archives and private papers shows that legal sectarianism was not inspired by local realities as much as European minority treaties, which were insensitive to the Lebanese context and premised on their assumed universality. It points to the fundamental disconnect between European models of governance and the Arabs to whom they claimed to give voice.
Sectarian cleavages are widely seen as central to Middle Eastern conflict, and Iran-backed armed non-state actors (ANSAs)—Hezbollah, the popular mobilization units, and the Houthis—are often portrayed as sectarian militias. Yet there is little empirical evidence that public support for these actors systematically varies along sectarian lines. Drawing on original survey experiments conducted in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen during the 2023–2025 Gaza war, this study uses a list experiment to mitigate social desirability bias and measure whether citizens view their domestic ANSA as a source of instability. Nearly half of respondents in each country expressed criticism. Sectarian affiliation alone does not explain variation. Instead, favorable attitudes toward Iran are associated with reduced criticism of ANSAs. This effect is not reducible to co-sectarian identity: perceptions of Iran as a regional power confronting Israel provide a more consistent explanation. The findings highlight the limits of static sectarian accounts and underscore the importance of geopolitical evaluations.
This chapter uses the twin rubrics of “state” and “sovereignty” to understand many of the most important or controversial aspects of ‘Alamgir’s forty-nine-year reign. What emerges is a portrait of a ruler who was, by turns, determined to restore law and order, protect social hierarchies, coopt or crush anyone who opposed his efforts, replenish the imperial treasury, and strengthen Mughal rule. Although ‘Alamgir mostly positioned himself as a typical Mughal emperor in terms of his sovereign self-expression, his style of renunciate sovereignty (at once Timurid and Islamic) radiated into the court and empire in distinctive ways. Ultimately, his decision to invade the Deccan in the early 1680s proved to be his and the Mughal Empire’s undoing. Against a backdrop of political and military failure, ‘Alamgir nonetheless held on to his throne. This chapter ends by arguing that his emergence as a living saint–emperor (Zinda Pir ‘Alamgir) was a key factor in his political survival.
The 1930s saw both the rise of militantly racist regimes in Europe and a dramatic increase in Jewish immigration in Mandatory Palestine, which provoked a radicalisation of Arab opposition to the Zionist settlements. Meanwhile, Ireland experienced a further polarisation and a hardening of partition. The chapter looks first at the various manifestations of the sectarian mindset of the times. Then it examines the outbreak of sectarian violence of the summer 1935, which spread rapidly from Northern Ireland to the Twenty-Six Counties. The chapter then discusses the minorities’ responses to the 1937 Constitution and the election of the first President of Éire, the Protestant Douglas Hyde. By comparison with most of the rest of Europe, Ireland was a safe haven. In any case, the two minorities had very limited options, which, as usual, boiled down to a choice between emigration and submission. Many continued to emigrate, and for Jews Zionism represented the prospect of equality and liberty in the promised land. Mandatory Palestine also attracted the attention of Irish Protestants, some inspired by religious considerations, others by their imperial mindset.
In the late 1960s, Protestants seemed in terminal demographic decline, while the Jewish population stagnated. At the same time, the old Catholic/Protestant divide retained much of its old political significance in Northern Ireland. As the Province descended into violence, the southern minorities were shocked to see how fragile were the achievements of half a century of democratic elections and self-government. The ‘minority question’ had not been answered, or perhaps the traditional response – submission or emigration – was no longer the one Northern nationalists were prepared to offer. This prompts us to consider one final point. As both Jews and Protestants claimed repeatedly throughout the period discussed in this book, what made their history noteworthy was not Ireland’s presumed exceptionalism, but the general significance of their experience as minorities in a democratic nation state. In this, they were basically right. Indeed, while a free society depends on the dignity of dissent, the challenge of how to make diverse democracies work is still with us, has become increasingly global, and has been renewing itself at every generation.
Minorities were the source of much concern and disruption in Europe in the 1920s. This chapter explores its subject by looking at three aspects: the more or less brutal neutralisation of the defeated unionists; the attempt to create a form of liberal democracy which would reassure minorities about their prospects in the new state; and a case study about one very practical aspect of what liberty meant for the most active and fervent Protestants: the freedom to preach at open-air events. This chapter approaches the issue of the targeting of Protestants in the Revolution through the diaries and memoirs of a few women who left detailed accounts of daily life in dangerous times, including Violet Whitla-Lucas and Edith Somerville. The picture that emerges is complex and contradictory, not least because of the chameleonic strategies adopted by many Protestants once the Union became unsustainable. The IRA aimed at taming unionists, rather than destroying Protestants, and its success was so complete that soon made violence unnecessary. More generally, once minorities ceased to be threatening for the nation state, the latter could afford to be generous to minorities.
Aurangzeb 'Alamgir (r. 1658–1707) was the last of the so-called 'great' Mughal emperors. He remains a controversial historical figure: castigated for religious intolerance and placed at the centre of a narrative of Mughal decline by some; considered a great Muslim hero by others. In this richly researched exploration of Aurangzeb 'Alamgir's life and times, Munis D. Faruqui contests such simplistic understandings to unearth a more nuanced picture of the emperor and his reign. Drawing on a large and varied archive, Faruqui provides new insights into the emperor's rise to power, his administrative and religious policies, and the role of the imperial eunuchate and harem. By unpicking the complex dynamics of a long reign, from Aurangzeb 'Alamgir's accession to the last weeks of his life and his eighteenth-century memorialisation, this remarkable new history cuts through the many myths that have obscured the extraordinary life story of Emperor Aurangzeb 'Alamgir.
While collective identity scholarship has generated insights into how social movements construct and mobilize identities to distinguish themsleves from others, it has paid comparatively less attention to why some groups reject divisive identities and instead align with broader collective identities. Using the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and their rejection of sectarianism as a representative case study, the article examines why social movements choose to adhere to larger collective identities, even when their environment encourages the adoption of divisive ones. Tracing the Brotherhood’s collective identity, the article advances an ideational explanation that shows how two enduring identity elements—the constitutive norm of Islamic inclusivity and the social purpose of resisting imperialism and authoritarianism—generated master frames that consistently led the group to reject sectarian divides during periods of heightened secterianization in the Middle East. This identity construction both enabled and constrained the movement’s political choices, shaping its responses to regional sectarian tensions. This article demonstrates how collective identity framing structures the repertoire of political options available to social movements and offers a theoretical and empirical vantage point for understanding their behaviour.
This chapter examines the profound impact of the Arab uprisings on the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)). While initially perceived as distant from the epicentre of the unrest, these countries underwent significant economic, political and security transformations as a result of it. It describes key events initiated by the Tunisian revolution, emphasising the interconnectedness of the Gulf region with the wider Arab uprisings. Furthermore, it explores the economic and socio-political conditions in the GCC countries that shaped their responses to the uprisings, particularly in the context of the challenges posed by the oil-based developmental model. In terms of implications, it dwells on the growing polarisation and intra-GCC rifts, particularly the conflict between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the one hand, and Qatar, on the other, between 2017 and 2021, jeopardising regional integration. The Arab uprisings revealed the vulnerabilities of the GCC countries’ status quo, leading to a reassessment of their political and economic trajectory both from the domestic and the external relations points of view.
Religion shapes Gulf politics in different ways depending on the country under consideration but also the shifting socio-historical circumstances at the domestic and the regional levels. Religion has been used as a tool of state-building by Saudi Arabia. Alternatively, it has also been used by Islamist movements for the contestation of established regimes. In societies that are diverse religiously, sectarian divides between various currents of Islam have been politicised more often than not. Religion has also been an important element of the international soft power of Gulf states. In the twenty-first century, Gulf states have promoted ‘moderate Islam’ as a way to counter Islamist movements and to consolidate their international standing.
Chapter 1 opens with the question of how to achieve normative legitimacy of the state (legitimation). How does the state become accepted and expected by a population to be the arbitrator of their collective life? The chapter reviews legitimation crises in Iraq at four key historical junctures: the foundational moment in 1921, the 1958 revolutionary coup d’etat, and the 1990s in the lead-up to the post-2003 state. Drawing on the work of Iraqi sociologist and public intellectual Ali al-Wardi, this chapter argues that legitimation of a state’s ruling principles (normative legitimation) is linked to a state’s ability to address social injustice. Furthermore, social injustice is intrinsic to any state order. A robust democracy is the only reliable mechanism through which to uncover the nature of injustice – and ways of addressing it – at any given time and space, and thereby avoid a legitimation crisis.
Chapter Two examines the notions of “becoming” and “being” Qizilbash, contextualizing the Ottoman Qizilbash within the broader literature on belonging while revealing the multitude of factors influencing this choice of adherence, as perceived by both the ruler and the ruled. More specifically it examines the motivations behind Qizilbash belonging in Ottoman lands through a framework that scrutinizes their lived experience under two major modes: belonging rooted in spiritual conviction and belonging driven by social, economic, and political compulsion. Within this framework, the chapter aims to illustrate that belonging took on diverse forms and that a shift in sectarian affiliation did not always entail the complete abandonment of previously held beliefs; instead, it often occurred within a larger interplay of politics and morality, as well as personal and material needs.
Chapter Five delves into one of the major aspects of the Ottoman response to Safavid actions and actors, in both ideological and practical realms: encouraging migration from Safavid lands. Examining numerous cases involving both well-known and lesser-known individuals and groups who were receptive to the Ottoman invitation, this chapter addresses two key questions. (1) To what extent and how did Istanbul and its agents actively strive to directly engage with Safavid subjects, especially as a response to ongoing Safavid propaganda within Ottoman territories and its resonance among local sympathizers? (2) To what extent did Safavid immigrants contribute to the evolution, articulation, and dissemination of an official narrative that increasingly leaned toward a pro-Sunni and anti-Qizilbash/Shiʿi/Safavid stance in the sixteenth century? From the perspective of the Ottoman state, communication with Safavid subjects counteracted the Safavid court’s efforts to garner sympathy and support for its ideological agenda in Ottoman territory. From the viewpoint of Safavid subjects, this communication represented a significant avenue by which they hoped to alleviate the political, religious, or financial challenges they faced under Safavid rule in Iran.
Chapter Three provides a thorough exploration of the multifaceted experience of being Qizilbash within the Ottoman realm and the consequential implications of such an identity within the intricate Ottoman–Safavid geopolitical landscape. By scrutinizing a diverse array of Qizilbash texts, artifacts, and ceremonial practices, the chapter elucidates the complex processes entailed in shaping and perpetuating a collective sense of belonging. Additionally, this chapter seeks to integrate a discussion of the Ottoman state’s surveillance strategies into the analysis of Qizilbash subjecthood formation within the empire.
The Epilogue tells the story of how a 2024 proposal to amend the Iraqi family law (Personal Status Law (PSL)) came to pass in early 2025 and outlines the objections to it in the context of this book’s main thesis about how and why state consolidation matters. The Epilogue highlights the main objections to the amendment, coming from Iraqi critics, which are focused on the social justice implications of introducing a legal structure wherein an authority is granted decision-making power over an aspect of public life that is parallel to, and outside of, the state’s authority. Critics see this as a canonization of state fragmentation and the underlying ethno-sectarian power-sharing arrangement on which it rests. The epilogue illustrates through this political and legal contestation the connections that run through sites of state fragmentation, attempts to consolidate a political order, historical legacies of state consolidation, and social justice. What the PSL story suggests is that who decides on public life is consequential to the political possibilities of justice.
Chapter Four explores the politics of sectarianism and statecraft within the context of the triangular relationship among the Ottoman state, the Safavid state, and the Qizilbash communities situated between them. The chapter examines how the Ottoman state and its Qizilbash subjects devised diverse strategies to navigate their religious sensitivities, sociopolitical realities, and fiscal imperatives. A new set of questions is introduced to challenge the prevailing notion that the relationship between the “Sunni Ottoman” state and its “non-Sunni Qizilbash” subjects was inherently irreconcilable and characterized by continuous persecution of these supposedly powerless, defenseless religious nonconformists. It reveals the existence of a range of policies and approaches adopted by the Ottoman state, from providing financial support to establishing quid pro quo arrangements, from accommodating Qizilbash subjects to resorting to surveillance and heavy-handed suppression and persecution of the very same populations. The chapter emphasizes that the Ottoman Qizilbash, as significant powerholders during this period, exerted their influence not only through practices of conversion and reconversion but also through negotiation, migration, intervention, and at times rebellion.
Examining sectarian divergence in the early modern Middle East, this study provides a fresh perspective on the Sunni–Shi'i division. Drawing on Ottoman Turkish, Persian, and European sources, Ayşe Baltacıoğlu-Brammer explores the paradox of an Ottoman state that combined rigid ideological discourses with pragmatic governance. Through an analysis of key figures, events, periods, and policies, Boundaries of Belonging reveals how political, economic, and religious forces intersected, challenging simplistic sectarian binaries. Baltacıoğlu-Brammer provides a comprehensive historical account of Ottoman governance during the long sixteenth century, focusing on its relationship with non-Sunni Muslim subjects, particularly the Qizilbash. As both the founders of the Safavid Empire and the largest Shiʿi-affiliated group within the Ottoman realm, the Qizilbash occupied a crucial yet often misunderstood position. Boundaries of Belonging examines their role within the empire, challenging the notion that they were merely persecuted outsiders by highlighting their agency in shaping imperial policies, negotiating their status, and influencing the Ottoman–Safavid rivalry in Anatolia, Kurdistan, and Iraq, and western Iran.