Kripke’s fixed-point theory of truth relies essentially on the monotonicity of valuation schemes in order to guarantee the existence of fixed points for the truth predicate. Under non-monotonic valuation schemes, Kripke’s jump may fail to generate a monotonic sequence, and fixed points need not exist. Inspired by Leitgeb’s dependence-based reconstruction of fixed points in classical two-valued semantics, this paper investigates whether analogous constructions are possible in three-valued semantics, including under non-monotonic valuation schemes. To this end, we generalize Leitgeb’s semantic dependence relation to three-valued semantics using partial predicates. On this basis, we define a dependence jump operation and a conditional dependence jump, and show how these operations induce monotonic sequences for the truth predicate under arbitrary three-valued valuation schemes. We compare the least fixed points generated by these jumps with those obtained from Kripke’s original jump across a range of standard valuation schemes, including Kleene, supervaluational, Łukasiewicz, and Gödel schemes. Finally, we show that the resulting notion of semantic dependence yields a uniform formal characterization of self-referentiality in three-valued semantics, thereby extending well-known two-valued results to Kripkean truth theories.

This article argues for a new interpretation of Ephesians based on its self-referentiality. Taking as my starting point the standard view that Eph 3:3–4 refers to the preceding portion of Ephesians, I explore how the text works rhetorically. I argue that in Ephesians 3:3–4 the author reflexively authorizes Ephesians as a revelatory text that provides privileged access to “the mystery” and to “Paul” as its mediator figure. Eph 3:3–4 thereby commends its readers to approach the epistle as textualized revelation. I advance this thesis through a contextual examination of Eph 3:2–13 with attention to three sets of comparanda. First, the Pesharim and Hodayot provide relevant witnesses to the textualization of revelation in early Judaism. Second, Quintilian’s depiction of ideal reading and the reception of Eph 3:3–4 by Origen and Jerome provide an opportunity to reimagine the epistle in light of ancient readerly landscapes. Third, depictions of inspired individuals endowed with divinely granted “insight” provide a revelatory framework for understanding σύνεσις in Eph 3:4. To conclude, I suggest further avenues of research that the present interpretation of Ephesians might open, including light it sheds on Ephesians’s pseudepigraphy.