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This chapter examines and clarifies Aristotle’s views concerning truth, truthaptness, truthbearers, truth-conditions, and temporal relativism and argues against two common readings of Aristotle. First, while Aristotle is often credited with the first correspondence theory of truth (wherein items such as beliefs and declarative sentences are true if and only if there is some item – such as a fact or obtaining state of affairs – to which the relevant belief or declarative sentence corresponds), I argue that there is little reason to attribute a substantive correspondence theory of truth to Aristotle. Secondly, although it is often thought that Aristotle is inclined towards a temporalist view according to which truthbearers vary in truth across times while undergoing mere Cambridge change, I argue that Aristotle instead held that truthbearers do not undergo any change at all. This, I suggest, has interesting implications for Aristotle’s views concerning temporalism and apparent changes in truth value.
The Stoics were temporalists: they relativised the truth of propositions to time and held that propositions vary in truth-value over time. On their view, to say that a proposition is true is to say that it is true now (where now is understood as the time at which the truth of the proposition is being assessed). It has further generally been agreed that this must entail that they think that any proposition, including those about the past or the future, is true by virtue of some present state of the world. This chapter suggests that this needn’t be the case and offers an alternative to views that appeal to present truthmakers for past and future truths by way of causal chains of events. I do this by means of a reconstruction of the Stoic theory of tense. I show that the Stoics had developed a tense logic far more sophisticated than usually recognised with tense operators which themselves relativise the truth of a proposition to the time at which it is evaluated. This removes the need for present truthmakers and saves the Stoics from biting unnecessary bullets.
The Divine Attributes explores the traditional theistic concept of God as the most perfect being possible, discussing the main divine attributes which flow from this understanding - personhood, transcendence, immanence, omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence, perfect goodness, unity, simplicity and necessity. It argues that the atemporalist's conception of God is to be preferred over the temporalist's on the grounds of perfect being theology, but that, if it were to be the case that the temporal God existed, rather than the atemporal God, He'd still be 'perfect enough' to count as the God of Theism.
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