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Kant shares with Locke the project of establishing the limits of human knowledge. But they execute this project differently. Locke is primarily concerned to establish the limits of empirical knowledge based on the limits of human sensibility, while Kant is concerned to establish the limits to claims of metaphysical knowledge based precisely on the necessity of sensibility as well as understanding for all human cognition. Kant places no a priori constraints on the possible refinement or extension of our senses and thus no particular limits on empirical knowledge, but instead derives the limits of metaphysical knowledge from his transcendental analysis of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, or his transcendental theory of experience. But his delimitation of human knowledge depends on his inference to transcendental idealism from his transcendental theory of experience, by means of an argument that is criticized in this chapter as well as in Chapter 5.
This chapter argues that we must interpret the meaning of Kant’s conception of transcendental idealism from his arguments for it. It argues that the popular contrast between “one-world” and “two-world” interpretations of transcendental idealism is misleading, because Kant (and his contemporaries) always recognize an ontological distinction between things outside us and our representations of them (thus, two worlds) – the question is, rather, whether Kant leaves it open that things as they are in themselves might be spatio-temporal or actually denies that they are. This chapter argues that his main argument for transcendental idealism is clearly intended to prove that things as they are in themselves are not spatio-temporal, and cannot be interpreted as leaving that question open. It also argues that Kant’s argument for this assertion is not sound; rather, it depends on an assumption that the general propositions about space and time made in his “metaphysical expositions” of those concepts as well as the specific propositions of geometry are necessarily true of whatever objects they are true of at all, to which he is not entitled. Thus the chapter argues that we can accept Kant’s transcendental theory of experience without accepting transcendental idealism.
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