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This chapter analyzes crisis bargaining models under complete information. It begins with a finite-action model in which the disputed good is treated as indivisible, and shows that war can occur even under complete information because of the indivisibility. It then analyzes an ultimatum divisible-good model, establishes the existence of a bargaining range of agreements that both sides prefer to war, and shows that war never occurs under complete information. It then introduces a status-quo division of the disputed good and formalizes the notion of a country being satisfied or dissatisfied with the status quo. Finally, it analyzes two infinite-horizon crisis bargaining models loosely based on the Rubinstein bargaining model, which is also presented and analyzed. It is shown that the results of the infinite-horizon models are largely similar to those of the simpler ultimatum model, and hence the latter is generally preferred in applied work. The exercises ask the reader to analyze many variants of crisis bargaining models, applying the baseline model to many different theories of international conflict.
This chapter analyzes some variations of the standard crisis bargaining model. It begins by analyzing a model of intra-war bargaining that allows bargaining to continue even after a war begins, moving beyond the standard costly-lottery assumption that bargaining ends when war begins. It then analyzes an empirically common limited use of military force, the military fait accompli, expanding on the rationalist approach’s focus on explaining full-fledged wars. The next section moves beyond the standard crisis bargaining model’s assumption that peace is costless and analyzes how sufficiently high costs for maintaining the status quo can lead to costly war even under complete information. Next, the chapter explores a setting where the dispute is over policy rather than a disputed good that both sides want, and shows that even costless messages can allow for credible signaling under certain conditions. Finally, the chapter explores the conditions under which it can be rational to fight a costly war purely to establish or maintain a reputation for resolve and strength. The exercises ask the reader to analyze many different extensions of the models analyzed in the main text.
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