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3 - Tbilisi, 2008 – Russia Invades Georgia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 July 2026

Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning
Affiliation:
Norwegian Intelligence School (NORIS) Norway
Stig Stenslie
Affiliation:
Norwegian Intelligence School (NORIS) Norway
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Summary

Shortly before midnight on 7 August 2008, Georgian President Mikail Saakashvili picked up the phone and turned pale. It had been a long day marked by renewed shelling of Georgian villages by South Ossetian separatists, unprecedented mounting of Russian troops to the Roki Tunnel – a strategic mountain passage connecting North and South Ossetia – and efforts at ceasefire. The news he received around 23:30 strongly suggested that this was no weekend skirmish but a potential full-scale invasion of Georgia by Moscow's forces. If so, this would be the first time since 1979 that Moscow deployed its forces across the national borders of another sovereign state. A Russian army column was now on South Ossetian territory, moving southwards. Moments before midnight, Saakashvili, who made the territorial integrity of Georgia his cornerstone policy, made a controversial decision. He ordered a pre-emptive attack against the mounting Russian troops pouring into South Ossetia. David had attacked Goliath. The 2008 Russo–Georgian War was now underway. The West was surprised and caught off guard.

Fifteen years after that five-day conflict, which developed into a full-scale Russian invasion of Georgia, many controversies remain: Was the first conventional war of the twenty-first century inevitable? Had Russia been planning a full-scale invasion all along? Was Saakashvili too quick to react to Russian advances into the disputed territory? If so, what should he have done? What role did the West play in the run-up to the conflict?

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