During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Division of Neurology at BC Children’s Hospital rapidly transitioned to almost exclusively virtual health. In April 2020, 96% of outpatient visits were done virtually (64%) or by telephone, and only 4.2% were in-person. Total clinic visit numbers were unchanged compared to previous months. Neurologists reported high satisfaction with the virtual history and overall assessment, while the physical examination was less reliable. Additional in-person visits were rarely required. Rapid, sustained adoption of virtual health is possible in a pediatric neurology setting, providing reliable care that is comparable to in-person consultations when physical distancing is necessary.

SARS-CoV-2, the causative agent of coronavirus disease 19 (COVID-19), was identified in Wuhan, China. Since then, the novel coronavirus started to be compared to influenza. The haematological parameters and inflammatory indexes are associated with severe illness in COVID-19 patients. In this study, the laboratory data of 120 COVID-19 patients, 100 influenza patients and 61 healthy controls were evaluated. Lower lymphocytes, eosinophils, basophils, platelets and higher delta neutrophil index (DNI), neutrophil-to-lymphocyte ratio (NLR) and platelet-to-lymphocyte ratio (PLR) were found in COVID-19 and influenza groups compared to healthy controls. The eosinophils, lymphocytes and PLR made the highest contribution to differentiate COVID-19 patients from healthy controls (area under the curves (AUCs): 0.819, 0.817 and 0.716, respectively; P-value is <0.0001 for all). The NLR, the optimal cut-off value was 3.58, which resulted in a sensitivity of 30.8 and a specificity of 100 (AUC: 0.677, P < 0.0001). Higher leucocytes, neutrophils, DNI, NLR, PLR and lower lymphocytes, red blood cells, haemoglobin, haematocrit levels were found in severe patients at the end of treatment. Nonsevere patients showed an upward trend for lymphocytes, eosinophils and platelets, and a downward trend for neutrophils, DNI, NLR and PLR. However, there was an increasing trend for eosinophils, platelets and PLR in severe patients. In conclusion, NLR and PLR can be used as biomarkers to distinguish COVID-19 patients from healthy people and to predict the severity of COVID-19. The increasing value of PLR during follow-up may be more useful compared to NLR to predict the disease severity.

Emergency departments (EDs) worldwide struggled to prepare for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) patient surge and to simultaneously preserve sufficient capacity for “regular” emergency care. While many hospitals used costly shelter facilities, it was decided to merge the acute medical unit (AMU) and the ED. The conjoined AMU-ED was segregated into a high-risk and a low-risk area to maintain continuity of emergency care. This strategy allowed for a feasible, swift, and dynamic expansion of ED capacity without the need for external tent facilities. This report details on the technical execution and discusses the pearls and potential pitfalls of this expansion strategy. Although ED preparedness for pandemics may be determined by local factors, such as hospital size, ED census, and primary health-care efficacy, the conjoined AMU-ED strategy may be a potential model for other EDs.

State governments and hospital facilities are often unprepared to handle a complex medical crisis, despite a moral and ethical obligation to be prepared for disaster. The 2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) has drawn attention to the lack of state guidance on how hospitals should provide care in a crisis. When the resources available are insufficient to treat the current patient load, crisis standards of care (CSC) are implemented to provide care to the population in an ethical manner, while maintaining an ability to handle the surge. This Editorial aims to raise awareness concerning a lack of preparedness that calls for immediate correction at the state and local level.

Analysis of state guidelines for implementation of CSC demonstrates a lack of preparedness, as only five states in the US have appropriately completed necessary plans, despite a clear understanding of the danger. States have a legal responsibility to regulate the medical care within their borders. Failure of hospital facilities to properly prepare for disasters is not a new issue; Hurricane Katrina (2005) demonstrated a lack of planning and coordination. Improving disaster health care readiness in the United States requires states to create new policy and legislative directives for the health care facilities within their respective jurisdictions. Hospitals should have clear directives to prepare for disasters as part of a “duty to care” and to ensure that the necessary planning and supplies are available to their employees.

The national response to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has highlighted critical weaknesses in domestic health care and public health emergency preparedness, despite nearly 2 decades of federal funding for multiple programs designed to encourage cross-cutting collaboration in emergency response. Health-care coalitions (HCCs), which are funded through the Hospital Preparedness Program, were first piloted in 2007 and have been continuously funded nationwide since 2012 to support broad collaborations across public health, emergency management, emergency medical services, and the emergency response arms of the health-care system within a geographical area. This commentary provides a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis to summarize the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats related to the current HCC model against the backdrop of COVID-19. We close with concrete recommendations for better leveraging the HCC model for improved health-care system readiness. These include better evaluating the role of HCCs and their members (including the responsibility of the HCC to better communicate and align with other sectors), reconsidering the existing framework for HCC administration, increasing incentives for meaningful community participation in HCC preparedness, and supporting next-generation development of health-care preparedness systems for future pandemics.

Several aspects led to the poor control of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak in the US from a rural emergency department (ED) perspective. These include US residents’ attitude towards political involvement in health and civil rights; lack of enough testing kits and rapid test results, or not available at all; and personal protective equipment (PPE) shortages. These obstacles related to medical supplies and resources, and lack of coordinated approach to the pandemic in the US, are important information for retrospective disaster research to understand study limitations, extrapolate accurate and valid data, and for other countries to understand how and why the US had higher numbers of COVID-19 cases and deaths compared to other countries.

As the curve continues to flatten during the severe acute respiratory coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic, and more physicians resume outpatient clinical work, the question arises of how to ensure the safety of the patients and staff while performing cases. Many institutions and health-care offices have turned to screening questionnaires to determine the likelihood of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) positivity. However, screening questionnaires are woefully inadequate as studies have shown that roughly 6.4% to 50% of patients may spread this virus without any symptoms. In this study, we have outlined a proposal to restart elective procedures after the curve has flattened in a certain locale, particularly for ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs). Until additional data are collected for specific sensitivity and specificity values for PCR testing, we recommend performing 2 consecutive polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests to minimize false negative rates. The algorithm described in this study can help ASCs begin their practices and provide local public health officials with valuable data that can help establish true sensitivity and specificity rates for these tests.

In view of the possible disruptions in the manufacturing and supply of health products following the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the Tunisian medicines regulatory authority was mobilized to guarantee patient safety. Teleworking has become the ultimate way of service continuity. The planning was revised according to health priorities. Work procedures were set online. A minimum list of medicines known as "medicines of health and strategic interest" was established. The Directorate of Pharmacy and Medicines (DPM) has been working on updating medicines stock data. A provisional suspension of authorizations for medicines export for 1 mo was decided. A fast-track procedure allowing the validation of alternative sources of raw materials has been put in place. An appeal for a fast track manufacture of hydroalcoholic gel/solutions was launched. A Monitored Emergency Use of Unregistered and Investigational Interventions (MEURI) procedure has been adopted in order to dispense off-label prescriptions of hydroxychloroquine and azithromycin combination. Focus groups were organized in order to set up therapeutic trials exploring possible strategies of COVID-19 treatment, such as serotherapy and BCG vaccine. This proactive and anticipatory policy has made it possible to meet the health challenges dictated by this crisis.

Several digital contact tracing smartphone applications have been developed worldwide in the effort to combat COVID-19 that warn users of potential exposure to infectious patients and generate big data that helps in early identification of hotspots, complementing the manual tracing operations. In most democracies, concerns over a breach in data privacy have resulted in severe opposition toward their mandatory adoption. This paper examines India as a noticeable exception, where the compulsory installation of such a government-backed application, the “Aarogya Setu” has been deemed mandatory in certain situations. We argue that the mandatory app requirement constitutes a legitimate public health intervention during a public health emergency.

When we consider a probability distribution about how many COVID-19-infected people will transmit the disease, two points become important. First, there could be super-spreaders in these distributions/networks and second, the Pareto principle could be valid in these distributions/networks regarding estimation that 20% of cases were responsible for 80% of local transmission. When we accept that these two points are valid, the distribution of transmission becomes a discrete Pareto distribution, which is a kind of power law. Having such a transmission distribution, then we can simulate COVID-19 networks and find super-spreaders using the centricity measurements in these networks. In this research, in the first we transformed a transmission distribution of statistics and epidemiology into a transmission network of network science and second we try to determine who the super-spreaders are by using this network and eigenvalue centrality measure. We underline that determination of transmission probability distribution is a very important point in the analysis of the epidemic and determining the precautions to be taken.

As strict measures were taken, the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) epidemic has been gradually brought under control. As a port city, Shanghai’s main problem has shifted from treating local cases to preventing foreign imports. To prevent the re-outbreak of COVID-19 caused by imported cases, the Shanghai government has set up central isolation sites for all people entering the country from abroad to be placed under medical observation. This report describes how to set up central isolation sites and run them effectively. We put isolation sites in transformed hotels, arranged personnel according to a huge data network, and set up specific procedures to manage guests. The epidemic situation in Shanghai has confirmed the feasibility and effectiveness of the methods that other jurisdictions can adapt for their use.

In this study, an analysis of the Chilean public health response to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 is presented. The analysis is based on the daily transmission rate (DTR). The Chilean response has been based on dynamic quarantines, which are established, lifted or prolonged based on the percentage of infected individuals in the fundamental administrative sections, called communes. This analysis is performed at a national level, at the level of the Metropolitan Region (MR) and at the commune level in the MR according to whether the commune did or did not enter quarantine between late March and mid-May of 2020. The analysis shows a certain degree of efficacy in controlling the pandemic using the dynamic quarantine strategy. However, it also shows that apparent control has only been partially achieved to date. With this policy, the control of the DTR partially falls to 4%, where it settles, and the MR is the primary vector of infection at the country level. For this reason, we can conclude that the MR has not managed to control the disease, with variable results within its own territory.