The “hijacking” and “drug instrumentalization” models of psychoactive drug use predict opposite outcomes in terms of adaptive behavior and fitness benefits. Which is the range of applicability of each model? To answer this question, we need more data than those reported by studies focusing on medical, psychiatric, and legal problems in addicted users. An evolutionary analysis requires a much wider focus.

Experiments on choice blindness support von Hippel & Trivers's (VH&T's) conception of the mind as fundamentally divided, but they also highlight a problem for VH&T's idea of non-conscious self-deception: If I try to trick you into believing that I have a certain preference, and the best way is to also trick myself, I might actually end up having that preference, at all levels of processing.

Normative theories like probability logic provide roadmaps for psychological investigations. They make theorizing precise. Therefore, normative considerations should not be subtracted from psychological research. I explain why conditional elimination inferences involve at least two norm paradigms; why reporting agreement with rationality norms is informative; why alleged asymmetric relations between formal and psychological theories are symmetric; and I discuss the arbitration problem.

According to Jones & Love (J&L), Bayesian theories are too often isolated from other theories and behavioral processes. Here, we highlight examples of two types of isolation from the field of word learning. Specifically, Bayesian theories ignore emergence, critical to development theory, and have not probed the behavioral details of several key phenomena, such as the “suspicious coincidence” effect.

There must be innate conceptual machinery, but perhaps not as much as Carey proposes. A single mechanism of Perceptual Meaning Analysis that simplifies spatiotemporal information into a small number of conceptual primitives may suffice. This approach avoids the complexities and ambiguities of interactions between separate dedicated analyzers and central concepts that Carey posits, giving learning a somewhat larger role in early concept formation.

The instrumental model offered by Müller & Schumann (M&S) is broadened to apply not only to drugs, but also to other methods of self-control, including the use of mental constructs to produce adaptive changes in behavior with the possibility of synergistic interactions between various instruments.

Would we lie to ourselves? We don't need to. Rather than a single self equipped with a few bivariate processes, the mind is composed of a dissociated aggregation of subselves processing qualitatively different information relevant to different adaptive problems. Each subself selectively processes the information coming in to the brain as well as information previously stored in the brain.

Mercier and Sperber's (M&S's) theory of reasoning cannot predict reasoning in the absence of an argumentative context. Applying the theory to hypothesis testing behavior, I propose that hypothesis testing is often motivated by determining the true inference and that reasoning models should account for utilities (affected by various motives, including the wish to convince) of reasoning outcomes.

This commentary reviews the effects of nicotine on mood and cognition in support of the drug utilization concept of Müller & Schumann (M&S). Specifically, it amplifies the concept with the nicotine utilization hypothesis (NUH), which opposes the nicotine withdrawal hypothesis (NWH). Evidence against NWH comes from changes in mood after abstinence and the performance effects of nicotine supporting drug utilization.

Mercier and Sperber (M&S) are correct that reasoning and argumentation are closely related. But they are wrong in arguing that this relationship is one of evolutionary adaptation. In fact, persuasive reasoning that is not veridical can be fatal to the individual and to the propagation of his or her genes, as well as to the human species as a whole.

Understanding cognitive processes with a formal framework necessitates some limited, internal prescriptive normativism. This is because it is not possible to endorse the psychological relevance of some axioms in a formal framework, but reject that of others. The empirical challenge then becomes identifying the remit of different formal frameworks, an objective consistent with the descriptivism Elqayam & Evans (E&E) advocate.

Jones & Love (J&L) should have given more attention to Agnostic uses of Bayesian methods for the statistical analysis of models and data. Reliance on the frequentist analysis of Bayesian models has retarded their development and prevented their full evaluation. The Ecumenical integration of Bayesian statistics to analyze Bayesian models offers a better way to test their inferential and predictive capabilities.

Carey rightly rejects the building blocks model of concept acquisition on the grounds that new primitive concepts can be learned via the process of bootstrapping. But new primitives can be learned by other acquisition processes that do not involve bootstrapping, and bootstrapping itself is not a unitary process. Nonetheless, the processes associated with bootstrapping provide important insights into conceptual change.

There are problems with the thesis of von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T): (1) It entails that self-deception arises from interpersonal deception – which may not be true; (2) it entails that self-deception is optimal – which is not necessarily so; and (3) it entails that interpersonal deception is optimum – which may not be true.

Based on their “drugs as instruments” framework, Müller & Schumann (M&S) propose a staged drug policy that matches well the neoliberal governance scheme. To mend the sad loss of the sociocultural dimension in their model, I propose three such considerations: first, sociocultural interactions with the brain; second, sociocultural context and justice of drug use; and third, sociocultural preparedness for implementing their drug policy.

Cognitive models focus on information and the computational manipulation of information. Rational models optimize the function that relates the input of a process to the output. In contrast, efficient algorithms minimize the computational cost of processing in terms of time. Minimizing time is a better criterion for normative models, because it reflects the energy costs of a physical system.

Elqayam & Evans (E&E) are focused on the normative judgments used by theorists to characterize subjects' performances (e.g. in terms of logic or probability theory). They ignore the fact, however, that subjects themselves have an independent ability to evaluate their own reasoning performance, and that this ability plays a major role in controlling their first-order reasoning tasks.

Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) interpret belief in God and belief in strong government as the outcome of an active process of self-deception on a worldwide scale. We propose, instead, that these beliefs might simply be a passive spin-off of efficient cognitive processes.

Mercier & Sperber (M&S) claim that the phenomenon of belief bias – which they consider to be an archetypal manifestation of a general confirmation bias in human reasoning – provides fundamental support for their argumentative theory and its basis in intuitive judgement. We propose that chronometric evidence necessitates a more nuanced account of belief bias that is not readily captured by argumentative theory.

In order to develop sophisticated models of the core domains of knowledge that support complex cognitive processing in infants and children, developmental psychologists have mapped out the content of these knowledge domains. This research strategy may provide a blueprint for advancing research on adult cognitive processing. I illustrate this suggestion with examples from analogical reasoning and decision making.