Closing auctions account for about 10% of daily trading volume and offer a potentially attractive alternative to trading in the continuous market. We find that the price impact is lower in closing auctions than in the continuous market for all stocks except Nasdaq microcaps. Opening auctions are illiquid. We compute trading costs for anomalies based strategies by strategically placing orders in the lower cost mechanism. The annualized trading costs for long/short portfolios based on financial ratios such as profitability and investment range from 17 to 41 basis points (bps). Excluding microcaps, these costs fall to 9–21 bps in closing auctions.

We show that the decision to go public is influenced by spatial variation in the supply of equity financing. We measure the amount of capital of equity investors in each U.S. region and document that the incidence of initial public offerings (IPOs) by intangible-intensive resident firms increases significantly when regional equity capital is abundant. Using a novel empirical strategy and hand-collected data on out-of-state pension flows, we confirm that our findings are not due to underlying regional factors.

We exploit U.S. states’ staggered adoption of Universal Demand (UD) laws to study how the risk of shareholder lawsuits affects insider trading. UD laws, which make it harder for shareholders to bring derivative lawsuits against directors and officers, lead to more profitable insider trades, especially sales. This effect is stronger among smaller firms and firms with lower institutional monitoring. After UD laws, the timing of insiders’ trades also appears more opportunistic and riskier, for example, sales increase before negative earnings surprises. Overall, our study offers clean evidence that the threat of shareholder litigation deters opportunistic insider trading.

We develop a capital structure model in which firms differ in their ability to adjust output prices. Firms with inflexible prices are more exposed to nominal and real shocks, leading to lower leverage, shorter debt maturity, higher cost of debt, tighter covenants, and greater precautionary cash holdings. Shocks to cash flow volatility raise the cost of debt more for firms with less pricing flexibility. We empirically confirm these predictions: Firms with inflexible prices experience significantly larger increases in credit spreads following monetary policy shocks and the 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, especially when they face high preshock rollover risk.

How do bankers treat green firms? Using unique loan application and banker preference data from a mid-sized bank, we find that customer managers, serving as front-line bankers, give more favorable recommendations to green firms, especially when they hold green values themselves. However, a minority of environmentally skeptical loan officers, aware through internal training that customer managers generally have greener preferences, counter this by downgrading positive evaluations of green firms. Despite not knowing the customer manager’s identity, these officers use their discretion to mitigate what they perceive as green biases, demonstrating the significant moderating role of superiors within the bank’s hierarchy.

We study the aggregate impact of information spillovers emerging from industry star firms. Changes in stars’ relative earnings growth predict future earnings growth, consensus earnings surprises, and job postings of same-industry nonstar firms. Star-firm performance also predicts industry-level GDP and employment growth. Price markup and innovation spillovers are potential channels underlying these patterns. Our results further show that this performance predictability is not fully incorporated into nonstars’ stock prices. A long–short portfolio based on star firms’ earnings growth earns an annualized 6-factor alpha of 8.7%. Together, our findings provide consistent evidence of the economic importance of star firms.

This article studies the flow of payout funds in the financial system. Using various data sources and empirical strategies, it provides evidence that a significant portion of payouts enters the banking sector as deposits, which are then intermediated to bank borrowers. The findings highlight an important channel through which corporate payout policies shape capital allocation in the economy and suggest that policies aimed at restricting payouts may distort this process by limiting the flow of funds from large and profitable corporations to small, bank-dependent firms and households.

What are the benefits of access to the bond market for unlisted firms, and how does it affect their bank lending conditions? Using a regulatory reform that allowed unlisted firms to issue minibonds, we address these questions comparing new bank loans to issuers with concurrent loans to matched non-issuers. After the first minibond issuance, issuers obtain lower interest rates on bank loans of similar maturity, largely reflecting a shift in the seniority structure of corporate debt, and reduce the use of bank loans while increasing their total financial debt. They also increase turnover, total and fixed assets, particularly intangible assets.

We propose and test a catering theory of earnings guidance. As predicted by our model, managers cater to reference point-dependent investor preferences by issuing excessively optimistic earnings forecasts if their investors have experienced poor stock returns. Moreover, earnings guidance is most biased when managers strongly discount future outcomes, when the stock’s payoff uncertainty is high, and when managers face low costs for issuing inaccurate forecasts. Catering via earnings guidance succeeds in moving stock market prices and induces mispricing which is partially corrected around the corresponding final earnings announcement.

Under Title II of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, firms can sell private placement securities to the public via general solicitation (GS) or privately (non-GS). We find that equity offerings under GS tend to be riskier than under non-GS. After accounting for selection, GS issuers are less likely to succeed in i) raising capital, ii) getting venture capital (VC) funding, and iii) exiting via IPO or mergers and acquisitions, and incur substantial brokerage costs for advertising and verifying investor accreditation. However, GS appears to help new entrants and offerings that use registered brokers. The success of Form D financing improves future VC financing and exit outcomes.

I show that home ownership decisions across countries and individuals are shaped by a cultural heritage from agriculture. For centuries, dominant assets in preindustrial economies were either land or cattle. Consequently, the type of farming prevailing locally shaped preferences and beliefs about the relative value of immovable and movable assets. This cultural heritage had long-lasting consequences. Today, individuals originating from societies with a history of crop agriculture—where the dominant asset was land—are more likely to be homeowners. For identification, I rely both on home ownership decisions of second-generation immigrants in the United States and on an instrument.

We find that CEO compensation increases following acquisitions only in those deals in which acquirer stock is used as the method of payment. These compensation increases are driven by increases in equity-based compensation and are concentrated in riskier acquirers, in riskier acquisitions, and in acquirers whose CEOs have low exposure to the stock price. We find little support for traditional agency cost explanations of changes in CEO pay following acquisitions. However, our findings are broadly consistent with compensation changes representing a contracting solution to a two-sided adverse selection problem that is present only in stock acquisitions.

We investigate whether judges’ political ideology affects corporate tax behaviors. We find that firms engaging in less aggressive tax planning when Circuit Court judges are more liberal. Cross-sectionally, the deterrent effect of liberal judge ideology is more pronounced for firms that engage in judiciary-sensitive tax strategies, face higher enforcement risk from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), or have larger reputational costs from tax disputes. Our findings further suggest that liberal judge ideology reduces firms’ R&D investments and market value by constraining tax planning. Overall, our evidence highlights the importance of judge ideology for firm behavior in the context of corporate tax planning.

This study proposes a specific channel through which labor markets facilitate firm growth: the occupational alignment between an establishment’s workforce and local skills. Using occupational employment statistics, we construct an index that compares each establishment’s occupational mix to that of its local market. Establishments with higher alignment grow faster in sales and employment. This growth comes primarily through lower adjustment costs and higher capital investment. We also show that the effects are most pronounced in establishments with a higher share of skilled workers and industries with higher idiosyncratic cash flow risk. This employee–firm matching channel helps explain how local labor markets translate into competitive advantage.

Housing and human capital represent two major forms of household wealth. This article investigates the potential for housing speculation to crowd out household investment in children’s education, an endeavor that only pays off in the long run. To address endogeneity concerns, we exploit the unintended spillover effect of staggered house purchase restrictions (HPR) in China. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that HPR reduce educational investment of households in nearby unregulated cities. We also provide evidence consistent with a housing speculation channel. These findings shed new light on the socioeconomic consequences of housing market booms.