This article tells the story of one small department in the Israeli Ministry of Justice: “The Inspector for Complaints Against General Security Service (GSS) Interrogators” (in Hebrew: Mavtan). Tasked with examining complaints of torture in GSS interrogations, and determining whether they merit launching a criminal investigation, Mavtan has reviewed more than 1,450 complaints to date. None of these, however, had ever led to criminal charges. By analysing this failure, we tell a segment of the story of torture in Israel and, more broadly, of the legal bureaucracy that makes state and colonial violence possible. Despite the failure to produce concrete outcomes, Mavtan is a very industrious unit. We argue that this extensive bureaucratic labor creates a semblance of the rule of law by performing an adherence to hallmarks of good governance, such as transparency and accountability. Paraphrasing Mitchell (1999), we call this semblance the “legitimacy effect,” as it works to produce state legitimacy on two levels: internationally, to cordon off external interventions, and domestically, to defuse the internal tension between torture and democracy. It hence allows torture to emerge as a problem that may be addressed procedurally, without ever contending with the violence and the violations of international law it necessarily entails.

Every complex organization is sometimes marked by preference heterogeneity, disagreement, and conflict. Within political parties, such frictions are traditionally viewed negatively, while recent research has started to perceive them more positively. How might such contradictory evaluations be explained? Through a three-step conceptual analysis we (1) identify two analytical perspectives on intraparty friction, one rooted in a primarily structural conception of parties, one in a primarily behavioral conception; and (2) specify a minimal definition of intraparty friction, which underpins a hierarchical concept structure to (3) suggest a way to resolve contradictions in the consequences attributed to intraparty frictions. Structuralist accounts often view frictions as negative due to a more demanding conceptual threshold, suggesting different types and levels of risk taking by conflict partners. Conversely, behavioralist perspectives see friction more often as beneficial because they focus on expressed disagreement without necessitating an organizational response. Our conceptual tools have important implications for research on membership organizations generally.

It is widely agreed that the increased polarization many countries experience is bad for democracy. However, existing assessments of how polarization affects democracy operate with simplified understandings of both polarization and democracy. Bringing empirical studies and democratic theory into dialogue, I argue that polarization cannot be understood as a single phenomenon that can be evaluated in one way. Moreover, its different kinds affect different parts of the democratic system in distinct ways. First, we must distinguish between the degree of polarization in a given context and the different kinds of polarization at play. Second, we must consider whether people have good reasons for their polarizing behavior or whether it is entirely irrational. If people have good reasons for their polarizing behavior, the problem lies elsewhere than in polarization itself. Third, we must distinguish between the content of polarized opinions and the process of opinion formation. Both can be assessed with democratic criteria, but they raise different questions. Finally, for democratic evaluation it matters where polarization occurs and thus, we must differentiate between different sites of polarization: civil society, election campaigns, and legislatures. I recommend a systemic approach to assessing the democratic implication of polarization, which analyzes both the effects of polarization at different sites and on democracy as a composite whole.

We examine the effects of the Nobel Peace Prize on the support for women’s rights groups to highlight the roles of the positive symbolic action, “prize and praise,” in international relations. Based on psychological theories, we argue that the Nobel Peace Prize increases the support for women’s rights activists by reassuring, persuading, and pressuring people across the world. We substantiate the claim by exploiting the as-if random assignment of interviews around the announcements of the Nobel Peace Prizes. The analyses indicate that when the prize was awarded to women’s rights activists, it increased people’s trust in women’s organizations. The analysis of mechanisms implies that the prize pressured conservative people to amend their attitudes. We also explore macro-level implications, finding that the prize decreased violence against women. However, these changes are short-lived. These results imply that symbolic actions entail real-world changes; however, the question of how to sustain these changes remains.

The neologism “mansplaining” captures an insidious dynamic in which men explain things to women that women already understand, assuming that, by virtue of being a woman, she lacks the man’s knowledge. Mansplaining has started to receive some attention in contemporary scholarship, conceptualizing the phenomenon and identifying its epistemic harm. My purpose is to consider mansplaining and its harms from the perspective of democratic theory. Setting the problem of mansplaining against the norms we expect of democracy—equality, inclusion, and recognition—I argue that mansplaining poses harms that are not only individual and epistemic but also collective and relational. I distinguish two types of mansplaining based on women’s expertise and experience to elaborate on its collective epistemic harms to decision making and its relational harm of political exclusion. Mansplaining poses further relational harms of inequality and misrecognition, undermining the equal social relations and social trust required for deliberation.

Across the world, political parties are incorporating social movement strategies and frames. In this study, we pivot from the dominant focus on party characteristics to analyze drivers of support for movement parties in six European countries. We report results from a choice-based conjoint survey experiment showing that contrary to previous research, movement party voters favor neither candidates who are institutional outsiders nor those who actively participate in protests. Candidate policy positions are the most important driver of the vote for movement parties. Movement party voters, additionally, prefer candidates who either display anti-elitist sentiments or who want to ensure the smooth running of the current political system. These insights invite renewed attention to movement parties as an electoral vehicle whose voters prioritize decisive policy change.

From 1972 to 1991, a network of Chicago Police detectives used torture to force confessions from over 100 criminal suspects. Almost all were Black men, and many were wrongly convicted, some for capital offenses. I synthesize insights from comparative research on human rights, state abuse, and police violence in democracies to explain why, for nearly two decades, liberal institutions in Chicago failed to stop the torture. I argue that the nature of state violence in this case—targeting marginalized individuals uninvolved in political activity—intensified the practical, affective, and informational obstacles that are inherent to activating liberal institutions—courts, elected officials, media, and civil society—to fulfill their roles as rights enforcers. Applying these literatures to a type of case they typically overlook—a wealthy liberal democracy—contributes to understanding why state violence persists in such states and why it tends to concentrate on marginalized populations.

Do demonstrations tend to deepen or endanger democracy? I examine this theme of major debate between scholars and among political actors, analyzing how the United States and other democracies have dealt with—and been shaped by—popular pressure on representative institutions. Cases that are discussed include Martin Luther King’s 1963 March on Washington and the January 6, 2021 assault on the Capitol, as well as examples drawn from Spain, Portugal, and Italy. I offer clear principles to differentiate between types of protest that deepen democracy, advance the goal of inclusion, and others that endanger democratic principles. Among the issues I take up is whether the location of protest—for example, adjacent to or even inside legislative chambers—is decisive. Rejecting that approach, my argument instead emphasizes the difference between protests intended to influence policy-making or the political agenda and those that use intimidation or violence to replace the primacy of elections in selecting office holders. The discussion argues that conceptualizing demonstrations as complementary to the work of representative institutions can help to promote the difficult to obtain objective of political equality between citizens. The article also asks whether consensus on this matter can be attained and if so how.

Despite considerable attention in the literature, existing studies analyzing the effect of left governmental power on inequalities suffer from three main limitations: a privileged focus on economic forms of inequality at the expense of political and social ones, inaccurate measurements of left governmental power, and the analyses’ narrow time spans. This article addresses such concerns through a comparative longitudinal analysis where the impact of left governmental power on different measures of political, social, and economic inequalities is investigated in 20 Western European countries across the last 150 years. Data show that, consistent with previous literature, the Left in government has significantly reduced most forms of inequalities. However, the equalizing effect of the Left in government has decreased over time and has become not significant since the 1980s. The Left is today incapable of accomplishing its historical mission of reducing inequalities. The article discusses the rationale and implications of these findings.

Regimes do not change consistently across territorial levels. There has been progress in understanding national democratic erosions and subnational regimes, but barring a few exceptions, these research strands have not engaged in a thorough dialogue. To bridge this gap, I contend that when democracy advances in one territorial level, but erodes in another, we observe multilevel regime decoupling (MRD). Using global data from the Varieties of Democracy project, I examine the 1990–2022 period, showing that the proportion of decoupled cases increased from 20% in the 1990s, to 43% in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Preliminary regression analyses and a descriptive exploration of Italy, South Africa, India, and the United States indicate the non-deterministic influence of structural factors and the potentially pivotal role of courts in facilitating decoupled change. Considering these findings, renewed data collection efforts and an actor-centred approach are needed to strengthen our understanding of the varieties of (de)coupled regime change that have become common over the last decade. Given that regimes across territorial levels increasingly move in separate directions, future assessments of autocratization and democratic change need to embed territorial considerations in their analysis to remain informative about citizens’ real-world experiences on the ground.

Revolutionary protest rarely begins as democratic or revolutionary. Instead, it grows in a process of positive feedback, incorporating new constituencies and generating new demands. If protest is not revolutionary at its onset, theory should reflect this and be able to explain the endogenous emergence of democratic demands. In this article, I combine multiple data sources on the 2010–2011 Tunisian Revolution, including survey data, an original event catalogue, and field interviews. I show that the correlates of protest occurrence and participation change significantly during the uprising. Using the Tunisian case as a theory-building exercise, I argue that the formation of protest coalitions is essential, rather than incidental, to democratic revolution.

Under what conditions are user-generated digital content platforms responsive to pressures from users, businesses, and states? I propose that digital platforms show different levels of responsiveness to users, businesses, and states over time. Early in a platform’s life, the platform is highly sensitive to the demands of users, who have an opportunity to directly shape the institutional characteristics of the platform through the threat of user revolt. The unique power of its users stems from the network logic that underpins the value of the platform. As a platform grows and the size and centrality of its network increase, it becomes more sensitive to pressures by businesses (through boycotts) and the state (through regulation). At the same time, the power of users lessens as collective action problems become more severe and exit threats become less credible. The threat of user revolts has a temporal significance: Unless users alter the institutional architecture of the platform and lock in pro-user institutional characteristics early, the threat of user revolts becomes less consequential as the platform grows. Comparative case studies of Facebook, Wikipedia, Digg, and Reddit provide support for the theory.

When do political transitions lead to greater inclusion for groups historically excluded from power? Scholars and policymakers often assume the answer is simple: a transition will result in more inclusion when it ends in democracy. Yet this answer is incomplete at best, since many democracies systematically exclude women, particular ethnic groups, or lower economic classes from power. Using data on political transitions around the world from 1945 to 2014, this study shows that a political transition’s initiating force critically shapes post-transition political inclusion. When transitions are initiated through unarmed civil resistance campaigns they achieve greater advances in inclusion relative to other types of transition. We propose three mechanisms to explain this effect: civil resistance leads to greater continued mobilization and civic activism among the historically excluded, provides greater opportunities for elites from historically excluded groups to rise to positions of leadership in new regimes, and forges more pluralistic norms of political behavior.

I consider the role of exposure to large-scale strikes in shaping preferences about workplace action and labor unions, replicating and extending past work identifying the effect of large-scale teachers’ strikes. I study a large 2019 grocery store strike. Using an original survey fielded in affected states and an instrumental variables design, I find strike exposure increased support for the strikes, including actions taken supporting the striking workers. I do not find consistent evidence that strikes increased interest in online actions to support other workers or in workers taking most forms of labor actions at their own jobs. Firsthand contact with strikes had no effect on individuals’ broader perceptions of the labor movement or support for a union at their job. These results suggest important distinctions between strikes. Suggestive evidence indicates that the grocery strikes may have failed to inspire a greater sense of linked fate between affected members of the public and striking workers, as had occurred with teachers’ strikes. I conclude by laying out a research agenda for understanding the impact of mass strikes.

Democratic backsliding, the slow erosion of institutions, processes, and norms, has become more pronounced in many nations. Most scholars point to the role of parties, leaders, and institutional changes, along with the pursuit of voters through what Daniel Ziblatt has characterized as alliances with more extremist party surrogate organizations. Although insightful, the institutionalist literature offers little reflection about the growing role of social technologies in organizing and mobilizing extremist networks in ways that present many challenges to traditional party gatekeeping, institutional integrity, and other democratic principles. We present a more integrated framework that explains how digitally networked publics interact with more traditional party surrogates and electoral processes to bring once-scattered extremist factions into conservative parties. When increasingly reactionary parties gain power, they may push both institutions and communication processes in illiberal directions. We develop a model of communication as networked organization to explain how Donald Trump and the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement rapidly transformed the Republican Party in the United States, and we point to parallel developments in other nations.

Despite 30 years of research on economic inequality, the question of whether government ideology affects inequality remains unresolved. As rising inequality poses a major challenge to contemporary democracies, we ask: (when) do parties matter regarding inequality? Our systematic analysis finds that research is divided, with a tendency toward a pessimistic “no.” We decipher the factors that account for this split in theoretically predictable ways. We assess the roles played by the type of inequality, the time horizon, and the impact of policy channels. Bivariate and multivariate analyses of 393 TSCS-regression findings show how the type of inequality and a neglect of top incomes, a focus on short- rather than long-term effects, and the inclusion of policy channels that absorb the effects of parties strongly codetermine the results. Effects septuple depending on how these factors are combined. We draw three lessons that, when combined, foster a shift toward a more optimistic perspective on the latitude of politics.

Social media platforms have an increasingly central influence on global politics. Media of unprecedented reach, they have the power to sway elections, exacerbate societal polarization, promote or provoke conflict at all levels, and jeopardize relations between states. But what of the people who govern and oversee these platforms? For although algorithms and automation may underpin how social media content influences politics, the policies, approaches, and international relations of social media companies are directed or conducted by corporate executives and their representatives, actors who receive limited critical attention in International Relations (IR) scholarship. Combining multiple data sources, including field interviews with Meta and Twitter staff on three continents, this reflection suggests an approach to studying social media companies and their relationships to global politics that moves beyond abstraction and aggregation. Examining these actors and their internal dynamics through an organizational lens can shed fresh light on the contingent spatial, temporal, and normative drivers and enactments of their influence across the international system.

Republicans too often take for granted features not easy to bring about in the absence of social capital. Lovett and Pettit (2009) consider that it is through collective political actions that citizens shed light on acts of domination. For Pettit (2012), civic vigilance is the only guarantee that “the government will be forced to remain responsive to popular inputs”. As Kimpell (2023) mentions, one of the weak points of republican theories remains the lack of an account of norm generation. I aim to show how this could occur in a way that does not constitute itself an arbitrary interference of the government in the people’s lives. The kind of generalized reciprocity which is of utmost importance for republicanism often depends on the presence of ties that connect different socio-economic groups within communities and, “where such interactions do not naturally occur, forums for interaction can be intentionally created and designed to encourage development of social capital” (Warner 2001). More specifically, I argue that such forums for interaction could be represented by polycentric systems. Furthermore, I argue that embracing polycentricity constitutes a non-dominating way in which we could promote the “resistive community” (Pettit 2012) required by republicanism. I consider that the empirical results extensively documented in the Institutional Analysis and Development framework are an appropriate starting point for designing novel republican policies and institutions that can function alongside sufficient levels of trust.

While scholars have focused extensively on the consequences of partnerships between interest groups, less attention has been paid to the historical dynamics shaping when, how, and why such groups unite. This is especially true of “unexpected” partnerships, which unite groups with seemingly little in common. Such partnerships are important, as they can reshape to an unusual degree which actors, issues, and ideas “fit together” politically. We address the puzzle of how unexpected group partnerships form through case studies of previously non-existent alliances between labor unions and the gay/lesbian rights movement in the United States and United Kingdom in the 1970s and 1980s. Using these cases, we produce a theory arguing that unexpected partnerships are a product of a favorable political opportunity structure—present when each group experiences shared threats and mutual vulnerabilities—and the actions of entrepreneurial group leaders, who forge cross-group identities, accentuate shared ideological convictions, and build institutional ties.

Big Tech companies such as Meta, the owner of Facebook, are increasingly accused of enabling human rights violations. The proliferation of toxic speech in their digital platforms has been in the background of recent episodes of mass atrocity, the most salient of which recently transpired in Myanmar and Ethiopia. The involvement of Big Tech companies in mass atrocity raises multiple normative and conceptual challenges. One is to properly conceptualize Meta’s responsibility for the circulation of toxic speech. On one view, endorsed by the corporation itself, Meta can be absolved from any significant share of responsibility for these atrocities because toxic speech is the speech of some (rogue) users, hosted but neither created nor endorsed by the company; if anything, Meta is responsible for failing to anticipate and swiftly remove that speech. I will argue that this view is misleading, as it misses the underlying forces crafting toxic speech. Meta’s business model relies on what one might call the algorithmic capture of attention, which it achieves by manipulating its users and by creating an environment in which manipulative practices of some users thrive over others. This fact alone turns the company into a co-creator of toxic speech rather than a mere conduit of the toxic speech of others. As a result, it is safe to claim that Meta bears significant causal responsibility and sufficient moral responsibility for the dissemination of toxic speech, such that it justifies its inclusion in transitional justice processes and grounds its moral obligation to act in ways that advance these processes.