Mythology commands marginal interest today, although myths still tantalize the twenty-first century mind as it is commonplace knowledge that human societies are underpinned by compelling narratives about their origin and history. Yet, as Hallowell (Reference Hallowell1947, p. 544) remarked years ago, “This marginal position…is not due to the inherent nature of the material but to a failure to exploit fully the potentialities of such data.” In “Our Roots Run Deep,” the authors exploit this potential, and it will hopefully spark a revival of interest in the function and nature of historical myths. After a literature view, the authors conclude that it has never been successfully explained why humans find historical myths so appealing, especially creation myths and the origins of nation-states. Nor has anyone explained why historical myths still play important roles in national discourse or unite individuals in both small- and large-scale societies. So, the objective of their essay is to explain the “exact psychological mechanisms by which information about the remote collective past becomes relevant to humans.”
The article addresses the following research question: “humans need committed and numerous group members to engage in productive collective action and prevail in conflict.” How do you persuade them to cooperate? Answer: By special purpose cognitive mechanisms and making effective use of cues to activate fitness interdependence. In small-scale societies unity is easy, they note, because of face-to-face interactions and shared genes. But when humans share a common culture but minimal genetic relatedness, how do you persuade them to engage in collective action with mostly strangers? The authors propose that in nation-states this is done by strategic (and foxy) agents or myth-makers who compete to attract new recruits by using historical myths and capitalizing on the allegiance of citizens to a shared homeland. What makes historical myths so compelling, they say, is that they are cleverly designed by these myth producers to activate psychological cues to inherent and specific cognitive devices; and this is why historical myths can mobilize the masses and make large-scale societies possible.
A nice theory but is it true? Do precise hard-wired cognitive devices for detecting fitness-interdependence exist? The target article does not go back in evolutionary time, missing out on fossil, molecular, and other relevant data to help buttress their hypothesis. For example, there are eight billion of us alive today but, surprisingly, we have little genetic diversity – indeed, less than any other primate species (Barbujani, Shirotto, & Tassi, Reference Barbujani, Shirotto and Tassi2013). This peculiarity is linked to bottleneck events in hominin evolution, especially a severe one between 930,000 and 813,000 years ago, that seemingly wiped out 98.7% of human ancestors, leaving a Homo population of fewer than 1,200 breeding individuals (Hu et al., Reference Hu, Hao, Pengyuan, Vincenzo, Manzi, Cui and Li2023). Such little variability in the human genome supports the belief in a pan-human nature. Indeed, we should not be surprised that when humans are confronted with problems of fitness and survival, populations work out relatively similar solutions – like using historical myths (a cross-cultural universal) to activate feelings of loyalty and unity. Cladistic analysis, comparative neuro-anatomy between great apes and humans, and primate data can also bring insights into humans' evolved biology (see Turner & Maryanski, Reference Turner and Maryanski2024). For example, the depiction of self-interested myth-producers who use Machiavellian manoeuvres to manipulate others is not unique to humankind. Chimpanzees, albeit in an elementary way, also employ Machiavellian maneuvering to achieve an end and purely for self-interest. (Maclean & Hare, Reference Maclean and Hare2012; Schmeltz, Calland, & Tomasello, Reference Schmeltz, Calland and Tomasello2011).
How domain-specific are the cognitive devises proposed? Natural selection is a conservative force, so a cognitive perception of fitness interdependence may stem from a more general processer that activates all kinds of collectivism – like worldwide religions. Sodalities (a cross-cultural universal) also anchor social formations organized around voluntary ties for collective activities. And, what of rabid sport fans who wear team logos and even undergo ceremonial rituals? Devotees are fiercely loyal to their team, which activates a license to communicate with other devotees, and, at times, whip up conflict toward members of other teams. Indeed, historical myths, religions, sodalities, and sport teams all rise above the narrow confines of genealogical kinship, often use competitive recruitment, and cultural objects (e.g., a sport mascot like the USC Trojans), or a task-oriented collaborative to generate the aura of a fitness interdependence that transcends individuals. Indeed, it would seem that fitness interdependence underpins all sorts of diverse social formations, indicating a more widely applicable cognitive mechanism at play rather than “exact psychological mechanisms.”
Finally, we are puzzled by the authors' statement that “the cultural evolution of historical myths does not require any form of functionalism.” Functionalism refers to a process or a need for integration or cooperation. The intent of the authors is to “show that the cultural success of historical myths is driven by a specific adaptive challenge for humans: the need to recruit coalitional support to engage in large scale collective action and prevail in conflicts.” This is a classic functional orientation because the need for coalitional support then operates as a selective mechanism, or a selection pressure. As coalitional support (the effect or end result) cannot produce its own cause, the authors propose the existence of preexisting mechanisms that activate fitness interdependence. Still, in the light of evolution, the reality of these evolved proclivities must be taken on faith until the selection pressures that led to these evolved cognitive devices are empirically supported in some fashion.
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Mythology commands marginal interest today, although myths still tantalize the twenty-first century mind as it is commonplace knowledge that human societies are underpinned by compelling narratives about their origin and history. Yet, as Hallowell (Reference Hallowell1947, p. 544) remarked years ago, “This marginal position…is not due to the inherent nature of the material but to a failure to exploit fully the potentialities of such data.” In “Our Roots Run Deep,” the authors exploit this potential, and it will hopefully spark a revival of interest in the function and nature of historical myths. After a literature view, the authors conclude that it has never been successfully explained why humans find historical myths so appealing, especially creation myths and the origins of nation-states. Nor has anyone explained why historical myths still play important roles in national discourse or unite individuals in both small- and large-scale societies. So, the objective of their essay is to explain the “exact psychological mechanisms by which information about the remote collective past becomes relevant to humans.”
The article addresses the following research question: “humans need committed and numerous group members to engage in productive collective action and prevail in conflict.” How do you persuade them to cooperate? Answer: By special purpose cognitive mechanisms and making effective use of cues to activate fitness interdependence. In small-scale societies unity is easy, they note, because of face-to-face interactions and shared genes. But when humans share a common culture but minimal genetic relatedness, how do you persuade them to engage in collective action with mostly strangers? The authors propose that in nation-states this is done by strategic (and foxy) agents or myth-makers who compete to attract new recruits by using historical myths and capitalizing on the allegiance of citizens to a shared homeland. What makes historical myths so compelling, they say, is that they are cleverly designed by these myth producers to activate psychological cues to inherent and specific cognitive devices; and this is why historical myths can mobilize the masses and make large-scale societies possible.
A nice theory but is it true? Do precise hard-wired cognitive devices for detecting fitness-interdependence exist? The target article does not go back in evolutionary time, missing out on fossil, molecular, and other relevant data to help buttress their hypothesis. For example, there are eight billion of us alive today but, surprisingly, we have little genetic diversity – indeed, less than any other primate species (Barbujani, Shirotto, & Tassi, Reference Barbujani, Shirotto and Tassi2013). This peculiarity is linked to bottleneck events in hominin evolution, especially a severe one between 930,000 and 813,000 years ago, that seemingly wiped out 98.7% of human ancestors, leaving a Homo population of fewer than 1,200 breeding individuals (Hu et al., Reference Hu, Hao, Pengyuan, Vincenzo, Manzi, Cui and Li2023). Such little variability in the human genome supports the belief in a pan-human nature. Indeed, we should not be surprised that when humans are confronted with problems of fitness and survival, populations work out relatively similar solutions – like using historical myths (a cross-cultural universal) to activate feelings of loyalty and unity. Cladistic analysis, comparative neuro-anatomy between great apes and humans, and primate data can also bring insights into humans' evolved biology (see Turner & Maryanski, Reference Turner and Maryanski2024). For example, the depiction of self-interested myth-producers who use Machiavellian manoeuvres to manipulate others is not unique to humankind. Chimpanzees, albeit in an elementary way, also employ Machiavellian maneuvering to achieve an end and purely for self-interest. (Maclean & Hare, Reference Maclean and Hare2012; Schmeltz, Calland, & Tomasello, Reference Schmeltz, Calland and Tomasello2011).
How domain-specific are the cognitive devises proposed? Natural selection is a conservative force, so a cognitive perception of fitness interdependence may stem from a more general processer that activates all kinds of collectivism – like worldwide religions. Sodalities (a cross-cultural universal) also anchor social formations organized around voluntary ties for collective activities. And, what of rabid sport fans who wear team logos and even undergo ceremonial rituals? Devotees are fiercely loyal to their team, which activates a license to communicate with other devotees, and, at times, whip up conflict toward members of other teams. Indeed, historical myths, religions, sodalities, and sport teams all rise above the narrow confines of genealogical kinship, often use competitive recruitment, and cultural objects (e.g., a sport mascot like the USC Trojans), or a task-oriented collaborative to generate the aura of a fitness interdependence that transcends individuals. Indeed, it would seem that fitness interdependence underpins all sorts of diverse social formations, indicating a more widely applicable cognitive mechanism at play rather than “exact psychological mechanisms.”
Finally, we are puzzled by the authors' statement that “the cultural evolution of historical myths does not require any form of functionalism.” Functionalism refers to a process or a need for integration or cooperation. The intent of the authors is to “show that the cultural success of historical myths is driven by a specific adaptive challenge for humans: the need to recruit coalitional support to engage in large scale collective action and prevail in conflicts.” This is a classic functional orientation because the need for coalitional support then operates as a selective mechanism, or a selection pressure. As coalitional support (the effect or end result) cannot produce its own cause, the authors propose the existence of preexisting mechanisms that activate fitness interdependence. Still, in the light of evolution, the reality of these evolved proclivities must be taken on faith until the selection pressures that led to these evolved cognitive devices are empirically supported in some fashion.
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