To account for the prevalence of group myths explaining the shared history of a people, Sijilmassi et al. suggest that the key characteristics of such narratives incorporate cues of fitness interdependence. These key characteristics – namely, markers of antiquity and continuity, and details about defining events or challenges for the group – accord nicely with the cognitive cues for fitness interdependence that the authors describe. They focus especially on descriptions of “human groups as having an immemorial history of continuous cooperation” which creates a “cue of repeated interaction” (target article, sect. 1, para. 9). However, those narrative features also align with cognitive cues from another domain: The development of self-concepts. We thus present an explanation of how group myths leverage cues that we use to create the “knowledge representation[s] that contain knowledge about us, including our beliefs about our traits … values … goals … as well as the knowledge that we exist as individuals” (Jhangiani & Tarry, Reference Jhangiani and Tarry2022). Our account and the argument from Sijilmassi et al. are mutually compatible; in fact, one would imagine that it would make sense for group myths to include cognitive cues from more domains rather than fewer.

Our explanation stems from a common feature of group myths the authors do not mention – that they often describe the relevant group as a quasi-coherent self with distinct characteristics, goals, and desires. Importantly (if almost tautologically), the group-self is bounded by the group myth from the rest of the social world, like an individual self. Consider the mythical origins of Ukraine, among many other examples: “Ukrainians were never an inert mass – but always striving toward liberation and independence.” The unique needs and qualities of the group-self further clarify its boundaries; in this case, Ukraine's selfhood takes shape primarily through the quest for freedom. Group-selves are narrated as individuals – a claim bolstered furthered by the presence in group myths of individuals that act as stand-ins for the nation, whether real (i.e., Simone Bolivar) or fictional (i.e., Brer Rabbit).

The self-concept literature traditionally focuses on two facets of the self. The first is self-clarity (Campbell, Reference Campbell1990; Campbell & Lavallee, Reference Campbell, Lavallee and Baumeister1993; Campbell, Assanand, & Di Paula, Reference Campbell, Assanand and Di Paula2003), which describes how a self-concept distinguishes the self from one's social world and unifies the unique aspects of that self. Clearly, group-selves use self-clarity cues – myths present a social boundary for the group, and that boundary structures a set of group traits and behaviors. The less obvious link is with the second facet of self-concepts: Self-continuity. Self-continuity is temporal and describes the sense of connection between the past and present of a self (Bluck & Alea, Reference Bluck, Alea and Sani2008; Habermas & Köber, Reference Habermas, Köber, Mclean and Syed2014, Reference Habermas and Köber2015). Experimental work on self-concepts has found that when either facet is threatened, people turn to autobiographical memory to restore self-continuity, which in turn boosts self-clarity (Jiang, Chen, & Sedikides, Reference Jiang, Chen and Sedikides2020). Autobiographical memories sustain the apparent unity of the individual self.

We argue that a similar dynamic exists between the unity of the group-self outlined in historical myths and the core features of those myths described by Sijilmassi et al. Antiquity is obviously a feature of both historical myths and autobiographical memories; they both occurred in the past, and we recognize them as such during recall/consumption. Continuity between past and present is also well-documented in autobiographical memory – extensive research shows that our memories are not faithful replays of the past, but instead reconstructions that better align with our present beliefs, experiences, and information (Hastie, Reference Hastie, Higgins, Herman and Zanna2022; Hogendoorn, Reference Hogendoorn2022; Loftus & Palmer, Reference Loftus and Palmer1974). Similarly, “historians frequently note that many apparently immemorial national traditions were in fact recently ‘invented’ with the clear aim of ‘establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or artificial communities’”. A return to defining events or challenges is less obvious, but also appears in experimental work on autobiographical memory and self-concept (Jiang et al., Reference Jiang, Chen and Sedikides2020). When self-concept clarity is low, people most easily regain it when recalling important life events, as opposed to unimportant or general events. Historical myths likewise remind their listeners of important past events experienced by the social unit, which generates both continuity in the group-self and elucidates its key characteristics – just as it does for individuals. The cumulative effect of these self-concept cues in historical myths is to create a continuous and clear model of a group-self in consumers of historical myths.

Of course, this raises the question of how social units benefit from appearing to their constituents as coherent selves. Presumably, constituents are better served by clearly knowing the boundary and values of their group, and modeling the group as a coherent self may make this information more accessible. But alongside this general answer, we raise a more interesting possibility: Constituents of a coherent group-self are more easily cued to give up their individual self-concepts in favor of the group self-concept, which then emboldens individual behaviors aimed toward group-level benefit. Suggestive here are thematically similar group rituals that encourage collective effervescence in constituents – in other words, the feeling that one is part of something larger than oneself, like a nation. Reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, the Pesach Seder, and military marches are all good examples. Additionally, it seems likely that historical myths are deployed more often at moments in a group's history where group-level sacrifice is beneficial: For instance, during revolutions or wartime. If so, this would fit with our argument that establishing a group-self, by incorporating the cues outlined above, also effectively pushes for diminution of individual self-concepts in consumers of the historical myth. We are not aware of data on this latter point, though the claim is certainly plausible.