Ashley Thomas’ proposed model is an intuitive theory of relationships, which argues that our representations of social relationships, which enable us to predict how people will interact (what we define as mentalizing), are intuitive, abstract, and built on fundamental knowledge. Whether it is necessary to imagine an innate intuitive disposition – as suggested by Thomas – is an undeniably important question. However, the author takes a static approach to these representations throughout the article. In this commentary, we adopt a dynamic approach based on the construction of interpersonal bond and its intensity. We develop the idea that the nature and intensity of a relationship’s representation and the resulting ability to mentalize are, in fact, constructed and depend on the quality of early interactions with caregivers, who are influenced by processes of synchrony and their secure or insecure responses to infants. We argue that Ashley Thomas’ proposed model does not take into account attachment or mentalization construction processes. While the author presents a mainly cognitive and uniform approach, we argue that the construction of representations of social relationships is also fundamentally embodied, affective, and dynamic.

Approaches based on the development of attachment processes have already largely advocated the construction of relational models from the earliest interactions, or even from the gestation period (McNamara, Townsend, & Herbert, Reference McNamara, Townsend and Herbert2019). Early formulations of attachment theory assume the gradual construction of a relational schema with a primary caregiver, allowing for the internalization of an internal model that will guide social or intimate interactions (Bowlby, Reference Bowlby1969). From their earliest days, children have mechanisms at their disposal (e.g., joint attention and mutual gaze) with the function of reinforcing their caregiver’s presence, specifically to maintain closeness and ensure security. It is through repeated interactions with an external co-regulator (caregiver) that a cognitive representation of the relationship is formed.

We argue that the construction of the relationship’s representation is neither uniform nor static but intrinsically shaped by the nature of interactions and the skills of interaction partners at different stages of development. We use two core mechanisms to illustrate the dynamics of this construction. First, the synchrony between partners (caregivers and their babies) is a central precursor to the dynamic construction of the relationship, the relationship’s representations, and the partner’s goals (what we refer to as mentalization) (Davis, Bilms, & Suveg, Reference Davis, Bilms and Suveg2017; Feldman, Reference Feldman2007). All maternal behaviours during the first hours after birth (such as looking at the infant’s face, high-pitched vocalizations, positive expressions, and affectionate contact) suggest that humans are biologically prepared to engage in coordinated interactions. Similarly, the organization of the infant brain is already well prepared to function as an “intersubjectivity system” (Aitken & Trevarthen, Reference Aitken and Trevarthen1997). These are precursors to synchrony (defined as the temporal concordance between simultaneous or sequential partner behaviours, such as eye gaze, facial expressions, and movement), which will gradually strengthen with the caregiver’s responses, which are characterized by processes of contingency, congruence, and behaviour marking. Concurrently, as they gain experience, the parent and child adapt to each other’s specific signals, and this bio-behavioural synchrony forms the basis of the parent–child bond and the establishment of attachment bonds (Feldman, Reference Feldman2015). In the same line, the theory of affect mirroring between child and caregiver states that the child needs the caregiver’s emotional reflection to construct a representation of their internal state. This form of coregulation by the caregiver then serves as the basis for the child’s sensitivity to social cues and their capacity to mentalize the states of others (Fonagy, Gergely, & Target, Reference Fonagy, Gergely and Target2007).

Another example supporting the dynamics of the construction of the representation of bonds concerns the role of certain parental abilities, such as parental sensitivity (defined as the ability to quickly notice, interpret, and respond to a child’s signals of need and/or interest). Following Ainsworth’s initial work, recent meta-analyses have confirmed that parental sensitivity is a key determinant in establishing a secure attachment between child and parent and developing the child’s future socio-emotional capacities. This effect on the relationship varies according to distinct sensitive periods and the sensitivity of mothers and fathers (Madigan et al., Reference Madigan, Deneault, Duschinsky, Bakermans-Kranenburg, Schuengel, van IJzendoorn, Ly, Fearon, Eirich and Verhage2024).

In addition to possible innate knowledge, the combination of synchrony, parental sensitivity, and their mutual interactions with attachment may contribute significantly to the representations of relationships in a dynamic, embodied, and affective manner (Figure 1). We also argue that these mechanisms are involved in the development of mentalization. Furthermore, and consistent with attachment theories, we suggest that the frequency of occurrence, contingency, and stability of secure responsiveness from the caregiver (a specific type of commitment) may be a more relevant way of characterizing the strength of the bond.

Figure 1.

Overview of the dynamic model based on synchrony and parental sensitivity proposed by Nandrino and Grynberg, which completes Ashley Thomas’ model based on innate knowledge (white rectangle).

Our model offers a complementary perspective to the more innate and static intuitive psychology approach, according to which infants possess abstract representations of relationships and expect agents to primarily act efficiently to achieve their objectives. Although this expectation is undoubtedly central, it is crucial to emphasize how this mentalization competence is constructed, particularly within the context of proximal interactions (Fonagy et al., Reference Fonagy, Gergely and Target2007). We, therefore, advocate the importance of integrating synchrony processes in interactions as a precursor to relationship building.