Dixon et al. have provided an insightful analysis of prejudice that wisely points to the insufficiency of equating prejudice with a negative attitude toward a target group. Despite our agreement with this key point, we depart from their emphasis on attitudes toward groups. Instead, we contend that the attitudes that drive prejudice are not general attitudes toward groups, but attitudes that are constructed in particular contexts. These attitudes – for example, toward men as childcare workers – can be quite different from attitudes toward the group in general.
Prejudice arises in contexts that present individuals with potential opportunities (Diekman et al. Reference Diekman, Eagly, Johnston, Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick and Esses2010). Job candidates, for example, are evaluated in the context of a particular job opening, and the most favorably evaluated candidate generally gets the job. Group membership is relevant to gaining such opportunities because one's sex, race or ethnicity, age, or social class often influences such judgments. However, the critical information is not how gatekeepers evaluate candidates' group memberships, but how they evaluate these memberships in relation to particular opportunities (e.g., Diekman & Hirnisey Reference Diekman and Hirnisey2007). For example, women are typically evaluated less favorably than men for jobs such as firefighter and corporate executive and men less favorably than women for jobs such as kindergarten teacher and clerical worker. It is not attitudes toward women and men in general that underlie such evaluations, but attitudes that emerge in context.
The reason that evaluations of group members in context often diverge from evaluations of them in general pertains to group stereotypes that underlie these attitudes. The overall attitude toward a group summarizes the evaluative content of the attributes ascribed to the group, often producing ambivalent attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken Reference Eagly and Chaiken2007). With respect to producing prejudice, these stereotypes are critical because they convey information that is far more specific and relevant to the judgment-at-hand. For example, women are generally associated with positive communal qualities such as niceness and social sensitivity (e.g., Eagly et al. Reference Eagly, Mladinic and Otto1991). It is these culturally feminine qualities that can disqualify women from positions such as prosecuting attorney or corporate executive, which are generally thought to require culturally masculine qualities (Eagly & Karau Reference Eagly and Karau2002). If no women seek such roles, this prejudice is latent, masked by generally positive attitudes toward women. Those who seek new roles bring prejudice to the surface; these women can be viewed as pushy, unqualified, and undeserving. People suspect that these new candidates do not possess the attributes that yield success in the role. Even if the group stereotype is generally accurate, these beliefs are often misapplied to an individual group member who seeks a nontraditional opportunity (Eagly & Diekman Reference Eagly, Diekman, Dovidio, Glick and Rudman2005).
The second half of Dixon et al.'s article elaborates two models of social change that have captured the attention of psychologists. The prejudice reduction model focuses primarily on creating more positive attitudes toward disadvantaged groups, whereas the collective action model focuses on eliciting behaviors by which disadvantaged groups disrupt the societal status quo. Neither of these models provides an adequate analysis of social change because both fail to incorporate the principle that attitudes-in-context are the direct precursor of prejudice and discrimination.
The prejudice reduction model falls short because succeeding in making attitudes toward a group more positive misses the engine of prejudice. For example, making attitudes toward groups such as senior citizens or women more positive would not remove the discriminatory impediments they face as long as these attitudes are grounded in the very positive communal, interpersonally sensitive qualities that tend to be ascribed to these groups. They would continue to face prejudice in relation to opportunities requiring agentic, assertive attributes. In fact, a lessening of discrimination could be achieved by reducing the positivity of attitudes toward senior citizens and women by ascribing somewhat less positive agentic qualities to them such as assertiveness and competitiveness.
The collective action model falls short because of its failure to home in on the goals of collective action that would most readily improve the fortunes of disadvantaged groups. Effective social action enables access to roles that convey power and resources; indeed, these are the very roles that are off-limits to disadvantaged groups. This goal can be attained through challenging the requirements of roles and by changing the stereotypes associated with disadvantaged groups.
The requirements of many roles are surprisingly malleable in response to economic, political, and historical forces. For example, in the United States women rapidly entered “Rosie the Riveter” positions in formerly male-dominated fields such as welding and metalworking during World War II. Temporarily, these roles were understood as not necessarily requiring masculine levels of physical strength or of assertion and boldness. However, after the war, traditional beliefs resurfaced, and women were quite speedily removed from these positions. This rapid social change was likely not driven by changes in attitudes toward women or in the female stereotype. Instead, industrial jobs had been temporarily redefined as compatible with the psychological and physical attributes ascribed to women. In other circumstances, roles are gradually redefined in response to diffuse societal influences. For example, the cultural definition of leader roles has changed in the last decades away from masculinity toward androgyny that incorporates a larger measure of social skills (Koenig et al. Reference Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell and Ristikari2011).
Changing the stereotypes of demographically defined social groups is no easy matter. Because role behavior constitutes the elementary observations that produce group stereotypes in the first place, stereotype change typically requires that group members actually undertake new roles. Effective social action therefore targets access to desirable social roles and to the educational and other socialization experiences that precede role access. Yet, vanguard group members who first enter new social roles do not produce much change in their group stereotype but can leave vestiges of positivity that pave the way for further role access for their group. As a critical mass of individuals succeed in entering nontraditional social roles, they eventually change the stereotype of their group, as well as the characteristics ascribed to the roles that they enter. Access to desirable roles thus underlies the social change that lessens prejudices.
Dixon et al. have provided an insightful analysis of prejudice that wisely points to the insufficiency of equating prejudice with a negative attitude toward a target group. Despite our agreement with this key point, we depart from their emphasis on attitudes toward groups. Instead, we contend that the attitudes that drive prejudice are not general attitudes toward groups, but attitudes that are constructed in particular contexts. These attitudes – for example, toward men as childcare workers – can be quite different from attitudes toward the group in general.
Prejudice arises in contexts that present individuals with potential opportunities (Diekman et al. Reference Diekman, Eagly, Johnston, Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick and Esses2010). Job candidates, for example, are evaluated in the context of a particular job opening, and the most favorably evaluated candidate generally gets the job. Group membership is relevant to gaining such opportunities because one's sex, race or ethnicity, age, or social class often influences such judgments. However, the critical information is not how gatekeepers evaluate candidates' group memberships, but how they evaluate these memberships in relation to particular opportunities (e.g., Diekman & Hirnisey Reference Diekman and Hirnisey2007). For example, women are typically evaluated less favorably than men for jobs such as firefighter and corporate executive and men less favorably than women for jobs such as kindergarten teacher and clerical worker. It is not attitudes toward women and men in general that underlie such evaluations, but attitudes that emerge in context.
The reason that evaluations of group members in context often diverge from evaluations of them in general pertains to group stereotypes that underlie these attitudes. The overall attitude toward a group summarizes the evaluative content of the attributes ascribed to the group, often producing ambivalent attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken Reference Eagly and Chaiken2007). With respect to producing prejudice, these stereotypes are critical because they convey information that is far more specific and relevant to the judgment-at-hand. For example, women are generally associated with positive communal qualities such as niceness and social sensitivity (e.g., Eagly et al. Reference Eagly, Mladinic and Otto1991). It is these culturally feminine qualities that can disqualify women from positions such as prosecuting attorney or corporate executive, which are generally thought to require culturally masculine qualities (Eagly & Karau Reference Eagly and Karau2002). If no women seek such roles, this prejudice is latent, masked by generally positive attitudes toward women. Those who seek new roles bring prejudice to the surface; these women can be viewed as pushy, unqualified, and undeserving. People suspect that these new candidates do not possess the attributes that yield success in the role. Even if the group stereotype is generally accurate, these beliefs are often misapplied to an individual group member who seeks a nontraditional opportunity (Eagly & Diekman Reference Eagly, Diekman, Dovidio, Glick and Rudman2005).
The second half of Dixon et al.'s article elaborates two models of social change that have captured the attention of psychologists. The prejudice reduction model focuses primarily on creating more positive attitudes toward disadvantaged groups, whereas the collective action model focuses on eliciting behaviors by which disadvantaged groups disrupt the societal status quo. Neither of these models provides an adequate analysis of social change because both fail to incorporate the principle that attitudes-in-context are the direct precursor of prejudice and discrimination.
The prejudice reduction model falls short because succeeding in making attitudes toward a group more positive misses the engine of prejudice. For example, making attitudes toward groups such as senior citizens or women more positive would not remove the discriminatory impediments they face as long as these attitudes are grounded in the very positive communal, interpersonally sensitive qualities that tend to be ascribed to these groups. They would continue to face prejudice in relation to opportunities requiring agentic, assertive attributes. In fact, a lessening of discrimination could be achieved by reducing the positivity of attitudes toward senior citizens and women by ascribing somewhat less positive agentic qualities to them such as assertiveness and competitiveness.
The collective action model falls short because of its failure to home in on the goals of collective action that would most readily improve the fortunes of disadvantaged groups. Effective social action enables access to roles that convey power and resources; indeed, these are the very roles that are off-limits to disadvantaged groups. This goal can be attained through challenging the requirements of roles and by changing the stereotypes associated with disadvantaged groups.
The requirements of many roles are surprisingly malleable in response to economic, political, and historical forces. For example, in the United States women rapidly entered “Rosie the Riveter” positions in formerly male-dominated fields such as welding and metalworking during World War II. Temporarily, these roles were understood as not necessarily requiring masculine levels of physical strength or of assertion and boldness. However, after the war, traditional beliefs resurfaced, and women were quite speedily removed from these positions. This rapid social change was likely not driven by changes in attitudes toward women or in the female stereotype. Instead, industrial jobs had been temporarily redefined as compatible with the psychological and physical attributes ascribed to women. In other circumstances, roles are gradually redefined in response to diffuse societal influences. For example, the cultural definition of leader roles has changed in the last decades away from masculinity toward androgyny that incorporates a larger measure of social skills (Koenig et al. Reference Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell and Ristikari2011).
Changing the stereotypes of demographically defined social groups is no easy matter. Because role behavior constitutes the elementary observations that produce group stereotypes in the first place, stereotype change typically requires that group members actually undertake new roles. Effective social action therefore targets access to desirable social roles and to the educational and other socialization experiences that precede role access. Yet, vanguard group members who first enter new social roles do not produce much change in their group stereotype but can leave vestiges of positivity that pave the way for further role access for their group. As a critical mass of individuals succeed in entering nontraditional social roles, they eventually change the stereotype of their group, as well as the characteristics ascribed to the roles that they enter. Access to desirable roles thus underlies the social change that lessens prejudices.